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“But in fact no moral principle is based, as people sometimes suppose, on any feeling 
whatsoever. Any such principle is really an obscurely thought metaphysics that is inherent in 
every human being because of his rational predisposition” 
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 My interest in working on Kant’s philosophy developed rapidly while I was an undergraduate at 
the University of Toronto. In my third year, I took Arthur Ripstein’s course on the Critique of Pure Reason 
and from then on, it seemed clear to me that I was in for the long haul. But my interest in Kant was at this 
time very narrow. Going into my graduate studies at the University of Chicago, I thought I’d focus solely 
on the theoretical philosophy. My only experience with the practical side had come from an ill-timed two-
week stint with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals as an 18-year-old first year. I hated it, 
scoffing at the idea that a man who had never left his remote hometown could have articulated the most 
universal moral principle. Gripped by the relativism that side-lines so many young students, Kant’s ethics 
seemed to me archaic and best left alone. 
 Thank goodness for Candace Vogler and the course on Kant’s Ethics she taught in the first year of 
my doctoral studies. Reading the Groundwork again, I seized on the passages centered around moral 
feeling. They seemed so foreign to the gross caricature of Kant’s position I had learned about and, 
regrettably, even found immortalized in some corners of the secondary literature. In the pages of the 
Groundwork that mean the most to me, I found the metaphysically complex Kant of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, and a delicate understanding of the way our dependence on the senses necessarily shapes cognitive 
and moral life. I have been thinking, talking, and writing about the relationship between reason and 
sensibility ever since, and this dissertation is the seven-year result.  
 Having arrived at the end of this part of my education, there are many people to thank. Beyond that 
first course, Candace Vogler stayed with me as a committee member, and our conversations have continued 
to be the source of much philosophical growth. I often invoke particular insights of hers when I’m struggling 
to make sense of Kant’s view. They are like anchors for my interpretive efforts. Robert Pippin, my chair, 
also contributed greatly to my early orientation as a graduate student. His paper “Reason’s Form,” was 
presented to members of the Philosophy department soon after I arrived in Chicago. In it, he outlines and 
	 ix 
calls for the synoptic understanding of Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy that it has been my aim 
to present here. I hope that I have done justice to his central concerns. His mentorship and support through 
the many stages of my degree has been invaluable. (I must also go way back, and thank him for allowing 
me to avoid talking shop as a nervous prospective graduate student sitting in his office for the first time. 
That welcome encounter made me think I could be happy under his tutelage.) Before asking Dan Brudney 
to join the project, I was assured by my fellow graduate students that he would be an ideal committee 
member, and that has certainly been the case. His ability to both challenge and support his students is 
remarkable in its balance. When I think of objections to my view, they are often given Dan’s voice. Finally, 
I cannot imagine how different this project would look without Stephen Engstrom’s work and guidance. 
The first time I read his book, The Form of Practical Knowledge, it was impenetrable to me. Now it forms 
the backbone to my thinking. It was an incredible stroke of luck (as he says, emphasizing the “hap” in 
“happiness”) that he came to Chicago to teach a course during the formative stages of my dissertation. As 
a committee member, he went above and beyond with his attention to detail and willingness to dedicate 
hours-long conversations to individual chapters.  
 I also owe thanks to Jim Conant and Michael Kremer. I have benefitted so much from the academic 
bridges Jim has built between the philosophy departments at Chicago, Potsdam, and Leipzig, not to mention 
his inspiring reading of Kant. I feel very lucky to have had Michael Kremer teach my first-year seminar 
and PE workshop, and be the first faculty member I was assigned to as a teaching assistant. He is a model 
for virtuous dedication to the profession, as a teacher, administrator, thinker, and researcher.  
 The saddest part about the end of graduate school is the eventual scattering of the members of the 
student community. I am confident that were I to spend my whole life in the profession, I would never find 
another like the one I have been a part of at Chicago. The non-competitive openness and support, the 
genuine interest in one another’s work, and the deep philosophical and personal bonds that I’ve witnessed 
and shared in over the last seven years have permanently shaped me and my sense of what philosophical 
inquiry should look like. The classes, conferences, and workshops we’ve attended together, the reading 
	 x 
groups we’ve started, have led to countless conversations that focused my thinking and provided me with 
so much motivation. I especially owe thanks to Daniel Smyth and Nic Koziolek, mentors to whom I have 
often turned, and Simon Gurofsky and Andy Werner, my fellow German Idealists who have been with me 
since day one. Your philosophical passion and acuity has meant so much, and your friendship has meant 
even more.  
 I would also like to thank my parents, Sandi and Rick Tizzard, and my sister, Tori Tizzard, for their 
endless support. Once I chose this path for myself, way back in my undergraduate days, they never let me 
think I wouldn’t get to the end of it. I’m sure I don’t understand just how much this has spurred me on. I 
also thank my parents for the long-term financial support that allowed me to begin my graduate studies in 
the first place. There are so many senses in which I wouldn’t be here without them. 
 Finally, my partner Amos Browne has done more for me in the last seven years than I could say in 
a few sentences. Having a family member who, as a fellow philosophy student, understands my day-to-day 
life has made a lonely endeavor far less lonely. Through his loving support, he has been the source of much 
of my growth and confidence over the last several years. But even more than this, he has demonstrated an 
unwavering commitment to earnest and piercing philosophical questioning that I find inspiring, especially 
when it draws me (somewhat painfully) outside the philosophical framework in which I am most 
comfortable. I must also thank him for the emotional labor he has put in, which is so crucial, and so often 
goes unrecognized by those who depend on it. He has been and continues to be the person to turn to in 
moments of crisis and anxiety. Most of all, I owe my gratitude to him.  
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1.1 Finding Unity in Kant’s Philosophy 
 
 
Since its first reception in the 1780s, Kant’s project has been framed as one attempting a 
great unification of two diverse schools of thought. The arrival of the critical works after a silent 
decade of reflection bear the fruit of a sustained and systematic attempt to unite the rationalist 
school he was trained in, with the empiricist school that stirred his mature thinking into 
consciousness. The result is a philosophy that is as concerned to emphasize reason’s autonomy as 
it is to recognize its dependence on the senses. But it is equally true that since its first reception, 
Kant’s unified vision has struck many as fated to bottom out in a dualistic conflict, one which 
expresses itself most fundamentally through a rigid distinction between the incommensurable 
realms of the intelligible and the sensible. Many have objected that to understand reason as both 
free and sensibly dependent is to embrace an oxymoronic account of our mental life that divides 
rather than unifies, reducing both knowledge1 and action to pale imitations of their common-sense 
counterparts. With this dualism, the possibility of knowing the world and acting from knowledge 
of the good are both marred by our dependence on subjective sensible representations that reflect 
the nature of our particular constitution rather than the nature of objective reality, truth, or 
goodness. Because this dependence cannot help but influence the activity of reason, human 
																																								 																				
1 I will typically follow standard translation practices, which render ‘Wissen’ as ‘knowledge,’ and 
‘Erkenntnis’ as ‘cognition’. Kant gives both concepts technical senses with different scopes. Wissen is 
that variety of Erkenntnis which is grasped systematically, hence the German word for the concept of 
science, ‘Wissenschaft’ (JL 9:72). Thus while all Wissen is Erkenntnis, not all Erkenntnis is Wissen, as a 
result of which Kant uses ‘Wissen’ much less frequently. The fact that Kant reserves a special place for 
the term ‘Wissen’ does not, however, mean that he thinks our everyday Erkenntnis fails to amount to what 
English speakers would call knowledge.  
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knowledge is thought to be somehow less than, beholden to the strict objective standards set by 
reason and yet haplessly wedded to the unstable subjective contingencies constitutive of the 
sensible realm. From this vantage point, it is easy to conclude that Kant’s rationalism is ill-suited 
to human life.  
 In the last few decades, there have been numerous attempts to read Kant in a way that cuts 
against this narrative, and recaptures the unifying vision he took himself to have articulated. The 
best of these attempts recognize that it is the seemingly contradictory fact of reason’s self-
determining activity which accounts for the possibility of our dependence on the sensible.2 For it 
is this activity which transforms sensibility and its deliverances so that they can serve as objects 
in acts of cognition. So understood, our spontaneous rational and receptive sensible capacities do 
not stand opposed, with the former conditioning the possibility of cognition and the latter 
handicapping this possibility, rendering it subjective, as if filtered through rose-tinted glasses. 
Instead Kant’s position is taken to show how the sensible element of cognition is at once a marker 
of our finitude—a sign of our embodiment, our physical inhabitance—and yet not antithetical to 
reason’s endeavor to systematically know ourselves and much else besides. On this view, sensibly 
dependent reason is not doomed to enjoy only a pseudo-cognition tainted by our subjectivity. To 
																																								 																				
2 Robert Pippin, Kant’s Theory of Form: An Essay on the Critique of Pure Reason (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1982); John McDowell, “The Logical Form of an Intuition,” in Having the World in 
View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, 23-42 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Stephen 
Engstrom, “Understanding and Sensibility,” Inquiry 49 (2006): 2-25; Stephen Engstrom, The Form of 
Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2009); James Conant, “Kant’s Critique of the Layer-Cake Conception of Human Mindedness,” 
unpublished; Thomas Land, “Kantian Conceptualism,” in Rethinking Epistemology: Vol. 1, eds. Günter 
Abel and James Conant, 197-240 (Boston: De Gruyter, 2012); Robert Pippin, “Reason’s Form,” in The 
Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought, Volume I: Philosophy and Natural 
Sciences, ed. Karl Ameriks, 373-394 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Thomas Land, 




be sure, we can and often do fail to know things, we are liable to be ignorant and to misjudge. As 
I will argue at length in the chapters to come, our dependence on the senses is a condition on the 
possibility of such failure. Had we a different kind of intellect, one which was not reliant on the 
senses for cognition, miscarriages in judgment would be logically impossible. But when we do 
judge well, we enjoy real cognition of objects that is not the worse for being sensibly dependent. 
Insofar as such judgments are constituted through the activity of the higher cognitive capacities—
reason and understanding—they bear the essential features of cognition as such. The sensibly 
dependent activity of reason and the understanding may be contingent in important ways that mark 
our cognitive faculty as fallible, but contingently won cognition is still cognition in the full sense 
of the term. In this respect, Kant’s views reflect our pre-theoretical understanding of what it is to 
have knowledge. We need not occupy God’s perspective, take up the view from nowhere, or have 
perfect intellects in order to know anything.  
 The present study is a partial defense of this view, which claims we can salvage Kant’s 
unifying vision by rethinking the relationship that holds between our spontaneous cognitive and 
receptive sensible capacities. Key to my defense is the claim that the autonomous activity of the 
former determines the nature of the latter, transforming sensibility into a capacity that at once 
conditions the possibility of knowing and failing to know. As Kant describes this relationship in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, “sensibility, when subordinated to understanding, as the object upon 
which the latter exercises its function, is the source of real modes of cognition. But the same 
sensibility, in so far as it influences the operation of understanding, and determines it to make 
judgments, is the ground of error” (B351). To develop this idea, I join those who emphasize that 
we should understand these elements of our cognitive faculty to relate to one another as form to 
 4 
 
matter.3 The concept of form, of that which determines, applies to the spontaneous capacities, 
principles, and concepts which make cognition possible by articulating the grounds for 
combination that enable a systematically connected body of judgments. The concept of matter, of 
that which is determinable, applies to the receptive sensible capacity and its deliverances, which 
individuate these combinatory acts.4 Far from being that which alienates us from the possibility of 
cognition, sensible matter is what enables discrete acts of cognition to occur. Without it, reason 
and understanding would have nothing to determine, nothing upon which to exercise their function. 
 
1.2 Resolute Hylomorphism  
Of course, Kant himself often emphasizes the importance of the concepts of form and 
matter. In the Critique of Pure Reason, they are indispensable to his analysis of space and time as 
forms of sensible intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic; and in the Transcendental Analytic, he 
declares that form and matter underlie all concepts of reflection on the nature of the understanding, 
“so inseparably are they bound up with all [its] employment” (A266/B322). In the practical 
writings, he distinguishes between the form and matter of practical principles of reason, insisting 
that he is the first philosopher to recognize that moral worth must rest on their formal rather than 
material features (KpV 5:39). Accordingly, it is common for Kant commentators of all stripes to 
draw on these concepts to explain his system. What sets the current strand of thinking apart is its 
commitment to a resolute hylomorphism which alone can safeguard the unified vision that is my 
focus here. On this view, we cannot take the concept of sensible matter to refer to stand alone 
																																								 																				
3 Pippin, Kant’s Theory of Form; McDowell, “The Logical Form of an Intuition”; Engstrom, 
“Understanding and Sensibility”; Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge; Pippin, “Reason’s Form”; 
Conant, “Kant’s Critique of the Layer-Cake Conception of Human Mindedness”. 
4 See A266/B322 in the Critique of Pure Reason for Kant’s formulation of form and matter as 
determination and determinable.  
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representations that are intelligible to the subject independently of formal determinations from the 
higher cognitive capacities. One of my central claims will thus be that there is no mere matter, 
only representations that are more or less cognitively determinate, more or less informed by 
spontaneity. Put another way, we do not first enjoy a feeling or sense an object without formal 
determinations, and then apply the forms of understanding and reason in order to have cognition. 
This is what makes the view resolute in its commitment to the concepts of form and matter, and 
the unity they enable: any reference to matter is necessarily reference to the material part of a 
capacity, act, representation, or object comprised of both a spontaneous formal and a receptive 
material element. It is relatively uncontroversial to claim that Kant thinks all sensible matter is 
determinable, but the hylomorphism that I argue for here goes further, insisting that there can be 
no matter which is not already subject to a formal determination of some kind. As I will claim, 
even sensibility’s own form as a capacity cannot be regarded independently of this determining 
activity. Because it is to serve as matter to the forms of reason and the understanding, the entire 
capacity must be understood as determined by the latter’s spontaneous activity. This resolute 
hylomorphism thus claims that our sensibility, the sensibility of a rational being capable of 
cognition, is always already transformed by the determining activity of the higher cognitive 
capacities. It could not provide matter for either theoretical or practical cognition were this not the 
case.  
If we do not make this commitment, the Kantianism that results, however distinguished or 
sophisticated, remains open to the objections with which I began. To salvage Kant’s unifying 
vision, we cannot think of his philosophy as a selective aggregation of the truths in rationalism and 
empiricism. This is exactly what we do if we take his emphasis on the role of experience to entail 
a commitment to the consciousness of mere matter that bears no rational form, excluding the 
 6 
 
influence of reason from sensible nature in a move that cannot help but result in a divided and 
untenable view. Instead, we must understand Kant to develop a sensibly dependent rationalism 
which recognizes our reliance on the senses, but insists that sensible matter as such depends on the 
formal elements constitutive of cognition for its intelligibility. The sensible world in which we live 
is thus already a unified totality of objects that, insofar as they are objects for us, bear some trace 
of the form of cognition, the form of intelligibility. To transcend this world, to exclude the senses 
and contemplate the thing-in-itself, is therefore to abstract from this unity, not to cross a great 
divide. 
I know of no other work that states the above view in precisely these terms, but I take 
myself to have expressed a position whose features, so broadly stated, would be shared by a small 
number of Kant interpreters. Strikingly, however, these interpreters typically use issues in Kant’s 
theoretical philosophy to articulate their commitments.5 My principal contribution to the 
development of this strand of Kantianism will thus be to turn to the practical philosophy, and show 
how it too can be read as exhibiting a resolute hylomorphism that enables Kant’s sensibly 
dependent rationalism, his unifying vision, to extend to our practical life. The result is an account 
of practical reason which takes its structure to closely parallel that of theoretical reason, so that 
each of reason’s two uses can be taken to represent a more determinate version of the same form, 
that of sensibly dependent reason itself.  
This treatment of the practical philosophy is certainly called for, and not just for the sake 
of completeness. For Kant has often been accused of arguing an indefensible moral psychology 
																																								 																				
5 The two exceptions I know of, which are a great source of inspiration for the present work, are Pippin, 
“Reason’s Form”; and Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge. Neither of these works give a 
sustained treatment of how sensibility relates to reason, which is my focus here. 
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rooted in his rigoristic rationalist commitments.6 On the view commonly attributed to him, human 
nature conditions needs and desires that, while in principle determinable by the form of practical 
reason, resist such determination as a matter of course. So when Kant says that our moral life is 
fixed around a system of imperatives, he implies that the moral order which springs from the nature 
of reason itself must be forced upon our unruly sensible nature. Here again, we have not a unified 
picture of human mindedness, but form being imposed upon an independently intelligible sensible 
matter. Only in this case, the picture is more determinate in that it is distinctly practical in nature: 
the form is that of practical reason’s a priori moral law, and the matter is that of sensible desire, 
desire which has been determined independently of reason, through basic facts about our physical, 
biological, and psychological nature.  
Even those who are sympathetic with Kant’s position have articulated his view in these 
terms. One of the world’s most prominent English-speaking interpreters of Kant, Paul Guyer, 
insists that Kant has “a profoundly dualistic conception of human nature.”7 From the fact that Kant 
identifies reason and sensibility as two logically distinct capacities with different laws and 
characteristics, Guyer concludes that, 
 “Kant conceives of us as creatures who must and can act in accordance with the 
laws valid for all rational creatures, but he never conceives of us as creatures who 
can act in accordance with these laws by means of our reason alone, without also 
recognizing our sensibility and inducing this sensibility to act in accordance with 
the demands of reason by means appropriate to sensibility.”8 
																																								 																				
6 The first contemporary reading which argues that Kant has an overly simplistic, divided moral 
psychology is widely attributed to T.H. Green, whose view became known through Terence Irwin, 
“Morality and Personality: Kant and Green,” in Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy, ed. Allen Wood 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). For a helpful survey and refutation of this criticism, see Andrews 
Reath, “Hedonism, Heteronomy, and Kant’s Principle of Happiness,” in Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s 
Moral Theory, 33-66 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). For a more widely known objection 
along the same lines, see Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2006), 15. 
7 Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 365. 




Of course, Guyer is right to say Kant thinks we need to look beyond reason to sensibility to give a 
full philosophical account of human action. Nor should he deny that sensibility has certain distinct 
characteristics and laws which make it possible for us to have inclinations that tempt us to act 
contrary to the moral law. His misstep is to conclude from this that the only workable conception 
of moral sensibility involves treating it like a completely independent capacity that can only be 
soothed on its own terms, as he says, “by means appropriate” to it. The language of inducing or 
nurturing sensibility as a means to morality suggests that sensibility can only function as an 
external factor, one that must be brought into line for the sake of an end determined independently 
of the sensible capacity’s own interests. To be sure, we must sometimes take this stance towards 
ourselves and our moral progress. Breaking bad habits or creating good ones can involve treating 
desire as something to be trained through methods that focus on one’s particular sensible 
constitution, employing inducements that make self-improvement bearable rather than focusing 
on the rational standing of our end. Kant is also insistent that we should cultivate those aspects of 
our sensible nature—feelings of beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy—that are conducive to 
acting well (MS 6:452-9). But these aspects of his account do not necessarily fix the general 
relationship between reason and sensibility as one of dualistic conflict. If practical cognition and, 
more ambitiously, practical wisdom are to be at all possible for us, we must understand the 
relationship between reason and sensibility in a completely different way. Instead of a wholly 
independent capacity that must be brought into line through the foreign demands imposed by 
reason, we must think of sensibility as an integrated part of the rational subject whose function is 
to provide matter for practical reason. If we give up on this unified vision, we give up on the 
possibility of practical life as Kant himself understands it. My aim is thus to articulate a reading 
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of Kant’s practical philosophy that is completely free of Guyer’s dualist reading and the 
impositionism9 it implies, and so in a unique position to represent Kant’s actual view. 
 The heart of my account is a version of the claim made above, namely, that fully 
committing to Kant’s hylomorphism requires thinking of sensibility itself as transformed by the 
higher cognitive capacities. As I will show, we must posit form/matter relations not just between 
the various elements of a representation, but also between the capacities of mind that make these 
possible. The latter are in fact primary: the relationships determined amongst the capacities 
themselves dictate the nature of the particular activities and representations that are characteristic 
to each of them. With reason’s practical use, sensibility takes on a distinctive form insofar as it is 
determined by the moral law, the self-conscious form of pure practical reason.10 As we will see, 
the sensible element germane to the practical use of reason is subjective sensation or feeling, which 
serves as the material aspect of sensible desire. The portion of the Critique of Practical Reason 
dedicated to sensibility must thus concern practical reason’s ability to determine and transform our 
capacity for feeling. In Kant’s own words, it must be about “the relation of pure practical reason 
to sensibility and about its necessary influence upon sensibility to be cognized a priori, that is, 
about moral feeling” (KpV 5:90).11 The interpretive position I develop here claims that we need 
to think of reason’s influence on our capacity for feeling as what secures the unity of Kant’s view. 
In short, we can cognize a priori that practical reason must have an effect on feeling because this 
is the structure our mindedness must have if practical cognition, cognition of the good, is to be 
																																								 																				
9 I borrow this term from Pippin, “Reason’s Form,” 376. 
10 See KpV 5:29, where Kant rhetorically suggests that unconditional or moral law is “the self-
consciousness of a pure practical reason.” 
11 See also 4:460 in the Groundwork: “In order for a sensibly affected rational being to will that for which 
reason alone prescribes ‘the ought,’ it is admittedly required that his reason must have the capacity to 
induce a feeling of pleasure or of delight in the fulfillment of duty, and thus there is required a causality 
of reason to determine sensibility in conformity with its principles.”  
 10 
 
possible for us. Relating as form to matter, as that which determines to that which is determinable, 
practical reason conditions sensibility, giving it the character it must have as the sensibility of a 
moral being whose capacity to feel is responsive to practical demands. In this way, the receptive 
capacity that is not inherently rational—and as such can be possessed by both rational and non-
rational animals alike—is transformed, so that its deliverances possess the form that makes them 
suitable for serving in acts of practical cognition. We can understand this determining activity as 
working on two levels. At the level of capacities, practical reason determines sensibility itself. But 
it is equally true that through this activity, sensibility acquires a distinctly rational form that stands 
as the determining element to its own matter. Thus, both our general capacity for practically 
oriented feeling, and the particular feelings themselves bear this rationally determined form. 
 Because this analysis is concerned with practical reason’s influence on feeling, the 
experienced reader of Kant will not be surprised to find that the concept of respect functions as its 
keystone. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant describes respect as the positive aspect of 
moral feeling (KpV 5:75), the result of pure practical reason’s law influencing sensibility by 
ordering or limiting it so that its deliverances can serve as the material element of practical 
cognition. Given that respect plays this role, I claim that it should be thought of as the form of 
practical sensibility in an argument that draws a close analogy to space and time as the forms of 
theoretical sensibility. Though of course not all of our actions are motivated directly by respect for 
the moral law, our sensibility is respectful in character because it is inherently sensitive to the 
demands of morality. Even when we fall short, as we often do, our sensible capacity still bears the 
form of rational determination that makes good action possible. Thus reason does not either impose 
or fail to impose its rigid form upon sensibility, resulting in good action that has sprung from 
reason, or evil action that has sprung from our sensible needs. The way we think about action 
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cannot be fractured in this way. Insofar as Kant argues that our sensibility is necessarily determined 
a priori by moral interest, that we have a natural predisposition towards the good (R 6:26), that we 
feel pleasure or pain upon seeing how our actions meet or fail to meet the moral demands that do 
so interest us (G 4:460; MS 6:399), he shows us that our capacity for feeling is already rational in 
form, and indeed that it must be, for otherwise there would be no unified subject capable of 
knowing the good.  
 
1.3 Overcoming Dualism through Metaphysics 
If the central claims of my reading can be upheld, the unified conception of sensibly 
dependent reason that results allows us to rethink the role of sensibility and thus of motivation 
within Kant’s practical philosophy. As we will see, Kant’s discussion of the relationship between 
our higher and lower capacities is concerned to make sense of the moral Triebfeder, a concept 
typically translated as ‘incentive’ but which more literally breaks down to ‘driving spring,’ 
capturing what motivates the subject to action. Interpreters have held that Kant’s commitment to 
the concept of a sensible incentive betrays his interest in moral sentimentalism, an empiricist strand 
of moral theory that occupied him during his developmental years.12 How we think of moral 
sensibility and motivation is thus directly connected to how we interpret the attempted unification 
of rationalist and empiricist thought that I attributed to Kant above. His own mature stance on the 
respective gains of each school is well expressed in a letter to Marcus Herz written in 1773:  
“the highest ground of morality must not simply be inferred from the pleasant; it 
must itself be pleasing in the highest degree. For it is no mere speculative idea; it 
																																								 																				
12 See, for example, Karl Ameriks, “Kant, Hume, and the Problem of Moral Motivation,” in Kant and the 
Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation, 89-107 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006); Paul Guyer, “Reason, Desire, and Action,” in Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant’s Response to 
Hume, 161-197 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Owen Ware “Kant on Moral Sensibility 
and Moral Motivation,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (2014): 727-746. 
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must have the power to move. Therefore, though the highest ground of morality is 
intellectual, it must nevertheless have a direct relation to the incentives” (10:145, 
emphasis mine).  
 
We can take two important points from Kant’s claims here. First, we must not underestimate 
Kant’s radical conception of practical reason and the moral imperative. However intellectual the 
claims of morality might be, their basis in reason does not relegate their status to static, merely 
speculative claims about the nature of good and evil. The moral law must itself be capable of 
moving us, independently of any other incentive to act. Second, the motive power of pure practical 
reason’s law cannot be secured without establishing its relation to sensibility and some kind of 
incentive. Our minds are possessed of both reason and sensibility, and our dependence on the latter 
requires that we account for the sensible element of practical reason, regardless of the ultimate 
source of motivation. If we are not careful here, the air of oxymoronic self-defeat can take hold 
again, this time assuming the specifically practical guise. For Kant thinks we must both grasp the 
complete autonomy of reason, casting off the sentimentalist view which places the ultimate source 
of morality in feeling, and acknowledge that as embodied finite beings, we are sensibly dependent 
and so cannot fully explain the possibility of moral motivation without an appeal to the senses.  
These two necessary and seemingly irreconcilable features of Kant’s view have proven to 
be the departure point for a prominent debate about Kant’s theory of motivation. Contributions are 
typically framed through an intellectualist vs. affectivist framework whose parameters are set by 
the question of whether respect, the moral feeling produced by practical reason, should be 
understood as primarily affective or cognitive in nature.13 Some commentators argue that the 
purpose of respect is best explained by concentrating on its nature as a feeling with affective force 
																																								 																				
13 For a helpful summary, see Ware, “Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation”.  
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and varying intensity.14 Others argue that Kant’s tendency to distinguish respect from merely 
pathological feelings suggests that we need to understand it in cognitive terms, as indicative of the 
subject’s ability to grasp the authority of the moral law, an act which is itself sufficient to bring 
about action.15 The debate is thus split between those who emphasize the role of sensibility in 
explaining the possibility of motivation, holding that we need something like the vivid push of 
sensible desire to account for our interest and action; and those who hold that we must understand 
respect as motivating because of the spontaneous cognitive activity that grounds it, and so as 
fundamentally different from merely sensible desire. Though both of these positions seizes upon 
fundamental aspects of Kant’s view, they are necessarily misleading insofar as each misinterprets 
sensibility’s relation to practical reason in its own way. The affectivist embraces the dominant 
dualistic reading commonly attributed to Kant, holding that the autonomy of pure practical reason 
is compatible with a need to account for sensible motivation in terms fixed by an independently 
intelligible view of empirical psychology. The intellectualist, wary of the seeming contradiction 
this implies, pulls back from the economy of sensibly determined motivation that the affectivist 
takes to be necessary to Kant’s picture. But in so doing, she obscures the fact that sensibility has 
any real role to play, painting it as a capacity whose deliverances merely serve to get in the way of 
what would otherwise be perfectly executed rational activity. In either case, we have a view that 
fails to uphold Kant’s unified conception of sensibly dependent reason and do justice to both our 
spontaneous and receptive capacities. Both views have taken up a dualistic conception of human 
nature, and thus cannot emphasize the role of one capacity without obscuring the other. When 
																																								 																				
14 I will draw on primarily on affectivist accounts offered by Richard McCarty, Paul Guyer, Jeanine 
Grenberg, and Owen Ware. 




reason and sensibility are set against one another in an impositionist framework, explaining moral 
motivation requires either descending to the level of empirical psychology or retreating into a 
rationalism that neglects the role of feeling. 
 The view I argue for instead allows us to maintain both the autonomy of reason and the 
importance of sensibility without a dualistic conception of human nature. It does so by raising the 
so-called empiricist element of Kant’s view to the level of metaphysics. The central arguments 
sketched above—that there can be no matter without rationally determined form, and that we must 
therefore think of the capacity to feel as possessing its own such form—are founded in a priori 
claims about the nature of cognition and what our minds must be like insofar as we are capable of 
it. The account of sensibility that forms a crucial part of Kant’s practical philosophy is thus not 
based in a naturalistic account involving appeals to our psychology, or empiricist tenets which 
claim the vivid immediacy of the senses can be the only true source of motivation. It has been 
replaced by a metaphysical account of discursive cognition, the kind of cognition enjoyed by a 
finite being whose intellect is not capable of cognizing objects through the spontaneous activity of 
reason alone. Allen Wood is particularly good at formulating this point, though as I will argue, he 
too ultimately fails to grasp its full significance and the implications that it has for Kant’s view. In 
his introduction to Kant’s Moral Religion, Wood cites Heidegger’s claim that “Kant was the first 
to arrive at an ontological, non-sensuous concept of sensibility,”16 adding that “man’s sensibility 
is not for Kant the reason we call man a ‘being of needs.’ Rather, it is man’s finitude which gives 
transcendental significance to the sensible factors in human volition.”17 Thus when we turn to the 
																																								 																				
16 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft, (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), 19; cited by Allen Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1970), 3. 
17 Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion, 4. 
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issue of sensibility and motivation in Kant’s practical philosophy, we have not left behind the 
terrain of metaphysics to descend to that of empirical psychology. We preserve Kant’s unified 
vision only insofar as we recognize that his emphasis on sensible dependence does not counter his 
rationalism, it proceeds from it, forming a necessary part of any critical investigation into the 
nature and limits of our cognitive faculty. 
 Though others have sought to undercut the accusations of dualism leveled against Kant and 
argue for a non-empirical account of moral motivation, only the hylomorphic conception of reason 
and sensibility sketched above can secure this position. To successfully raise Kant’s discussion of 
sensibility to the level of metaphysics, we need a transformative conception of sensibility, one that 
grasps its necessary features in light of its role as the receptive part of a cognitive faculty. 
Specifically, we must understand our capacity to feel to be rationally determined and so essentially 
responsive to the demands of reason. This is what the concept of respect secures for Kant’s 
position. As the marker of sensibility’s rational transformation, respect is both affective and 
intellectual in character: that we feel it shows that our capacity to be affected is sensitive to the 
claims of reason. If we cannot secure this view, motivation remains beyond reason’s influence, a 
dualistic conception of human nature will prevail, and our best hope will be a moral psychology 
that proceeds by either overpowering or placating independent sensible desires in the service of 
moral ends. If, however, we take sensibility to be always already determined by reason, and thus 
necessarily responsive to its claims, we can argue that motivation is as dependent upon the 
objective standards of reason as it is upon subjective conditions of sensibility. Because the latter 
has been rationally determined, to recognize the cognitive content, the rational standing of a 
practical command is to be motivated by it.  
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 Of course, we do not automatically do something simply insofar as we judge it to be good. 
The necessary connection between objective cognitive content and subjective motivation that I 
argue for cannot be construed in such simplistic terms. In fact, to propose this kind of intellectual 
determinism would destroy Kant’s complex yet unified account of sensibly dependent reason. Our 
practical reasoning is much subtler in character: judgments can be more or less determinate, more 
or less efficacious, and we are always prone to the kind of rationalization and self-deceit which 
weakens our grasp on what is to be done. This subtle approach to the possibility of moral struggle 
and evil action is consistent with an outlook that starts from the broadly unified account of agency 
I have been outlining. We can overturn dualistic interpretations of Kant’s philosophy without 
having to deny that we often struggle to do what we recognize as right. In fact, it is only with this 
unified account that we can safeguard this rich picture of moral life. If we isolate reason and 
sensibility from one another and settle upon some variety of impositionism, there will be no good 
explanation for the kind of uncertainty, confusion, indeterminacy and struggle that colours our 
practical experience. Only the sensibly dependent rationalism I propose can adequately account 
for our finitude, showing how our sensible dependency conditions the possibility of failure in 
judgment without infringing upon reason’s autonomy. If, as on the dualistic view, reason’s activity 
is taken to be wholly self-sufficient, and sensibility is set over and against it as the source of our 
failure, its only explanation will be a crude conception of self-interest that fixes the struggle for 
goodness in terms of a clear-eyed choice between good and evil. Since Kant is adamant that our 
moral interest is irrevocable, and sensibility cannot determine reason against itself, we cannot take 
this voluntarism to reflect his view. 
 Finally, the account of moral motivation that I argue for also allows us to make sense of 
another controversial aspect of Kant’s practical philosophy: namely, the practical postulates of 
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freedom, immortality, and God. Kant argues that belief in the reality of these three ideas of reason 
is subjectively necessary, since only through this belief can the final end of pure practical reason, 
the highest good, be grasped as possible. There is much at stake in this argument, for Kant holds 
that if we lose sight of the highest good’s possibility, the influence of the moral law and thus our 
motivation to pursue good ends will suffer (KU 5:452). Morally determined faith thus comprises 
a necessary part of Kant’s practical philosophy, and to account for it, we must draw upon his theory 
of motivation and the way in which certain beliefs can influence the moral disposition. Here again, 
we find the interpretive terrain dominated by a divided conception of human nature. Those who 
account for moral motivation by appealing to its affective psychological force interpret the 
postulates as beliefs that encourage moral action by appeasing sensibility on its own independent 
terms. For example, Guyer separates Kant’s account of motivation and the postulates from his 
rationalist metaphysics, insisting that “the entire doctrine of the postulates of practical reason is 
stated within the limits of human psychology.”18 Disconnected from our rational capacities, belief 
in freedom, God, and immortality “have no recommendation except that they are effective in 
motivating creatures like us to act in the way and toward the end that reason demands.”19 Opposing 
this view are those who shy away from a psychological reading and think Kant’s doctrine of the 
highest good and the practical postulates must be grounded in his conception of practical reason. 
Taking up the same perspective as those who would argue for the intellectualist conception of 
motivation, these commentators are concerned to distance themselves from any reading which 
understands the postulates as additional incentives which are designed to placate our sensibility 
																																								 																				
18 Guyer, Kant on Freedom Law and Happiness, 367. 
19 Guyer, Kant on Freedom Law and Happiness, 367. For another account along these lines, see Lara 
Denis, “Autonomy and the Highest Good,” Kantian Review10 (2005): 33-59. 
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and increase the chances of moral compliance. These interpretations thus often take pains to show 
how morally grounded religious belief could be rational independently of any hope for God-given 
happiness. For example, in an oft-cited argument, Andrews Reath locates the concept of the highest 
good squarely in the domain of reason, describing it as “a construct of reason” that introduces 
systematic unity into our various ends by organizing them according to the dictates of morality.20 
Grasping the possibility of this systematic unity of ends is necessary for the subject because 
without it, moral conduct might appear to be irrational: morality can seem to place contradictory 
demands upon us; acting well might leave us vulnerable to exploitation by others; or our action 
may just prove ineffective in bringing about the good.21 If moral conduct appears pointless in this 
way, the moral disposition will be damaged. Belief in the postulates thus helps secure moral 
motivation insofar as it safeguards the rationality of moral conduct.22  
 I claim we must reject both of these views and the two forms of dualism they represent. 
Guyer falls on the affectivist side of the moral motivation debate, framing sensibility as an extra-
rational capacity and arguing that the possibility of moral motivation depends upon the conditions 
of empirical psychology. Reath lands on the intellectualist side, giving no account of how 
sensibility figures substantively in motivation and falsely depicting moral conduct as something 
that needs to be defended against claims of irrationality. Neither view represents the unified vision 
Kant calls for in his letter to Herz, which can only be secured through a sensibly dependent 
rationalism that takes our capacity to feel to be fully transformed by reason’s activity. The central 
																																								 																				
20 Andrews Reath, “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 
26 (1988): 597. 
21 Reath, “Two Conceptions,” 618. 
22 See Wood’s Kant’s Moral Religion, for a different argument that defends the postulates on rational 
grounds. Wood claims that an agent implicitly commits herself to certain beliefs in willing her ends, 
beliefs which she cannot refuse on pain of irrationality. He then makes a case for the postulates being 
beliefs of this kind (29-30).  
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idea that morality is grounded in reason but must move us by relating directly to sensibility is 
nowhere to be found. Guyer takes motivation to be secured on grounds that hold independently of 
reason, while Reath, wary of embracing the dualism that Guyer so willingly attributes to Kant, 
takes motivation to be wholly disconnected from the sensible, grounding it solely in the recognition 
of rational authority and allowing any substantive role for sensibility to drop out of the picture. So 
his position, too, ultimately bottoms out in a kind of dualism which sets sensibility against reason 
and effectively erases the former’s part in accounting for moral motivation. Hence we must 
conclude that neither the intellectualist nor the affectivist can give an adequate account of how the 
practical postulates are supposed to motivate us.  
 If, alternatively, the unity of sensibly dependent reason can be secured in the way I propose, 
we can draw on my claim about the necessary inseparability of rational standing and sensible 
motivation to give a new reading of the postulates. I argue that the ideas of freedom, God, and 
immortality safeguard our moral motivation by adding practically grounded cognitive content to 
our representation of the highest good and its possibility. They do not, as Reath claims, help secure 
the rationality of acting well—insofar as the moral law always already interests us, good willing 
can never appear pointless. But the postulates can motivate on rational grounds by solidifying our 
concept of the highest good and thereby bolstering the moral disposition, making us less prone to 
quibble with the moral law and conjure up illusory conceptions of how to realize its final end. In 
short, by helping to secure the right moral outlook, the postulates help to secure moral motivation.  
 Articulating the right relation between our spontaneous and receptive cognitive capacities 
thus has far reaching consequences for Kant’s practical system. The unified conception of 
mindedness that I call for fixes a certain general view of cognition which stretches across both 
Kant’s theoretical and practical thought; a theory of motivation; an explanation of the possibility 
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of evil; and a particular understanding of the role of moral faith. At the heart of each of these issues 
is the question of how our rational and sensible capacities relate. To address these questions in the 
Kantian spirit, we must take up the hylomorphic reading I propose. This is the only way to dissipate 
the air of paradox surrounding Kant’s project, which sets the affectivist and intellectualist on 
opposing paths that both end by destroying the possibility of unity, placing an insurmountable gap 
between reason and the senses. 
 
1.4 Chapter Summary 
 I develop this project in six chapters, including the present introduction. The next four 
chapters are constitutive of my positive reading of Kant’s practical philosophy, while the sixth 
places this reading in relation to prominent positions in the secondary literature. In the second 
chapter, I outline the structure of discursive practical reason by relating it to the form of discursive 
reason as such. Taking seriously Kant’s claim that “there can, in the end, be only one and the same 
reason, which must be distinguished merely in its application” (G 4:391), I pursue the idea that 
finite reason has a general form which admits of two determinate uses. Through an analysis of the 
different ways that cognition can relate to its object, I determine first the concept of a finite, 
discursive faculty of reason, taking up as a contrast case the concept of an infinite, intuitive faculty. 
The upshot of this analysis is an account of our spontaneous and receptive capacities of mind which 
singles out Kant’s claim that they relate to one another as form to matter. I then proceed to an 
analysis of discursive practical reason in particular, grounding the concept in this more general 
structure. Through this methodology, I lay the foundations for both Kant’s cognitivism and his 
commitment to the hylomorphic structure of sensibly dependent reason.  
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 In the third chapter, I take up the relation between reason and sensibility more directly, 
giving an analysis of how these two capacities relate with respect to practical reason. Continuing 
to build on the claims established in the previous chapter, I argue that we should understand our 
spontaneous and receptive capacities to relate in analogous ways across both uses of reason. 
Taking up Kant’s analysis of the forms of space and time in the Critique of Pure Reason, I claim 
we should think of the concept of respect for the moral law as playing a parallel role in the Critique 
of Practical Reason. Other commentators give unsatisfactory accounts of the feeling of respect 
that emphasize its affective aspect at the expense of its intellectual one, or vice versa. In contrast, 
I argue that Kant’s hylomorphic commitments suggest we should understand respect as the form 
of practical sensibility, the result of reason determining the sensible capacity for feeling so that its 
deliverances can serve in acts of practical cognition.  
 In the fourth chapter, I address an important worry that threatens the broadly uniform 
conception of reason under development. Unlike its theoretical counterpart, practical sensibility 
can appear fundamentally resistant to the form of practical reason. Theoretical cognition cannot 
even get off the ground if its sensible representations do not possess the unity bestowed by the 
categories of nature. One of the principal achievements of the first Critique is Kant’s argument 
that all sensible representations of objects must possess categorial form. But on the practical side, 
Kant is adamant that we can have cognition from pure a priori grounds of reason and nevertheless 
experience sensible desire that cuts against these grounds. As Kant insists in the introduction to 
the second Critique, practical reason is dialectical in its empirical use: principles based in sensible 
desire strive to overthrow the moral law and make themselves the only valid determining grounds 
of the will (KpV 5:16). This fact can make the idea of a systematically unified conception of finite 
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reason appear beyond our reach, as it suggests that respect for the moral law cannot be an a priori 
necessary formal element of sensibility. 
Against this worry, I continue to develop the argument that we should think of respect as 
the form of practical sensibility, claiming that we can distinguish between respect as the actual 
incentive or determining ground of the will, and respect as the formal element of our capacity to 
feel which signifies the latter’s responsiveness to the demands of practical reason. This argument 
fleshes out some of the promissory notes sketched above: though we often fail to act from respect 
as the pure, moral incentive, our human action is respectful in character because it is sensitive to 
the demands of practical reason. Even when we fail to act well, our reasoning and action is still 
that of a moral being whose sensible desire is more or less efficacious based on its relation to 
principles of reason. This is a fundamental requirement on the very possibility of practical 
cognition and moral agency. Regardless of whether or not we fail in our efforts, it must be possible 
for us to act from cognition of the good, and this is what respect secures as the rationally 
determined formal element of sensibility. Thus although not every human action is motivated by 
respect for the moral law as the pure formal incentive, our sensible nature is always already shaped 
by practical reason. Having preserved the uniform, hylomorphic view I have been outlining, I go 
on to develop the implications this position has for a detailed account of the possibility of evil.  
 In chapter five, I continue to discuss practical reason’s dialectical nature, turning to the 
practical postulates of freedom, God, and immortality. I argue that the theory of moral motivation 
emerging from the previous chapters allows us to interpret the postulates as ideas that motivate 
good moral character by rendering our representations of the moral law and its final end, the 
highest good, more conceptually determinate. On this view, belief in the reality of the postulates 
is required first and foremost because of limitations on theoretical, not practical, reason. Because 
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of these limitations, which Kant articulates in the Critique of Pure Reason, the subject cannot grasp 
the theoretical possibility that virtue could be causally connected with happiness. This uncertainty 
about the possibility of the highest good opens the door to doubt and despair that weakens moral 
resolve. As I argue, the practical postulates help by adding conceptual determinacy to the content 
of the highest good, showing how it can come about through grounds whose objectivity is 
safeguarded by the moral law itself. 
One can think of these four chapters as relating in two different ways. As the above 
summaries suggest, each addresses a different issue relating to Kant’s practical philosophy. While 
chapter two grounds the cognitivist outlook that permeates the entire project, the subsequent 
chapters offer mutually consistent accounts of the feeling of respect and moral motivation, the 
possibility of evil, and the practical postulates. In addition, one can also understand each of these 
chapters as specifying a new limit to the analogy I develop between practical and theoretical reason 
as specific determinations of sensibly dependent reason. Chapter two begins with the most obvious 
limit, which is brought out in Kant’s description of each use: while theoretical cognition 
determines an already existing object, practical cognition brings the object it determines into 
existence (KpV 5:46; Bix-x). In chapter three, I bring out the implications of this important point. 
Since the object of theoretical cognition must be given, the act of cognition itself must involve a 
synthesis of sensible matter to yield objective representations. Practical cognition, however, 
requires no such sensible synthesis. As that species of cognition that produces its object, practical 
cognition only relates to representations of objects insofar as these representations are efficacious 
or motivating. This limit anticipates the way that sensibility functions in accordance with each use 
of reason.  In the next two chapters my concern shifts to the dialectical use of practical reason, and 
the analogical limits specified by this use. The fourth chapter takes up Kant’s most basic 
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determination of the two uses of reason in their dialectical use: while theoretical reason is 
transcendent in its pure use, practical reason is transcendent in its empirical use (KpV 5:16). The 
fifth chapter explores the implications of this inversion. Because sensibly dependent practical 
reason is immanent in its pure use, it is licensed to assume the objective reality of the ideas required 
for it to realize its necessary ends, even if such objects are ideal and thus transcendent for the same 
faculty in its theoretical use. Suitably developed, these four limits delineate a broadly unified and 
systematic account of theoretical and practical reason that only diverges along principled lines 
required by fundamental differences in the way that practical and theoretical cognition relate to 
their objects. The progression of this project thus safeguards the systematic unity of Kant’s 
philosophy while defending a novel view of its practical part. 
Finally, in chapter six, I turn directly to the secondary literature, providing a more detailed 
version of the structural analysis introduced above. I canvass a number of prominent views from 
the field, organizing them in terms of whether they occupy an intellectualist or affectivist version 
of the dualistic conception of reason and sensibility. Prominent affectivists include Richard 
McCarty, Jeanine Grenberg, and Paul Guyer; intellectualists include Andrews Reath, Henry 
Allison, and Allen Wood. I trace these interpreters’ dualistic commitments as they appear in 
relation to different issues, showing the various problems they give rise to, and highlighting the 
way my own view can sidestep them. 
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The Metaphysics of Practical Subjectivity 
 
 
2.1 Two Worries and the Need for Metaphysics 
 
Kant’s moral system is commonly thought distinctive for its claim that the goodness of an 
action rests on its being done from one’s recognition of duty. From this foundational thought, it is 
just a few steps to the more controversial claim that goodness, for Kant, is a concept that is applied 
on the basis of objective criteria that hold for any and all rational beings. To recognize it as one’s 
duty to act in such and such a way is to recognize that the proposed way of acting is grounded in 
practical principles that hold with absolute necessity and thus admit of no exception. For Kant the 
need for necessary practical principles, or practical laws, simply follows from consideration of the 
concept of morality, and is reflected in the pre-philosophical moral knowledge exhibited by mature 
human beings. Moral demands, he thinks, are intrinsically regarded as necessitating, and such as 
to trump all other merely contingent demands that one might face. It is, however, a corollary of 
this seemingly uncontroversial claim that such principles, in virtue of their absolute necessity, are 
valid for all rational beings, regardless of contingent facts about their subjectivity. For if duties 
were ultimately based in empirical particularities, even generalizable ones that could arguably 
characterize something like a human nature, such duties would in fact be merely conditional and 
thus not duties at all. As Kant concludes, “unless we want to deny to the concept of morality any 
truth and any relation to some possible object, we cannot dispute that its law is so extensive in its 
 26 
import that it must hold not only for human beings but for all rational beings as such, not merely 
under contingent conditions and with exceptions but with absolute necessity” (G 4:408).  
This emphasis on necessary and universal laws holding for all rational beings can be taken 
as grounds for claiming that Kant’s moral philosophy fails to acknowledge the complexity and 
particularity of the human moral experience. In placing too much emphasis on the pure will, or our 
transcendental rational nature, he ultimately fails to provide a convincing account of the role that 
moral knowledge plays in the lives of embodied, fallible creatures like ourselves.  
To push back against the claim that Kant neglects our particular form of subjectivity to the 
detriment of his moral theory, one needs to remind oneself that the concept of duty—often taken 
to be the very foundation of Kantianism, the paradigm example of deontological moral theory—is 
itself a moral concept constituted by subjective considerations. Just a few pages into the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), the first work to exemplify Kant’s mature moral 
theory after the critical turn, readers are introduced to the concept of duty in order to more fully 
explain the concept of the good will, which at this point in Kant’s argument is taken to be the 
fundamental concept in moral judgment. Here he defines the concept of duty as that “which 
contains [the concept] of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances” 
(G 4:397). The concept of duty is thus used to specify the generic concept of the good will in a 
way that admits of more determinate characterizations and examples, and this specification is 
carried out on the basis of subjective features that pertain to a particular set of wills. In the 
definition of duty provided in the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant describes the subjectivity 
at issue as that belonging to a natural, physical being with desires and needs who can, in their 
pursuit, be tempted to turn away from what morality requires: 
 27 
“The very concept of duty is already the concept of necessitation (constraint) of free 
choice through the law...Such constraint, therefore, does not apply to rational 
beings as such (there could also be holy ones) but rather to human beings, rational 
natural beings, who are unholy enough that pleasure can induce them to break the 
moral law, even though they recognize its authority; and even when they do obey 
the law, they do it reluctantly (in the face of opposition from their inclinations), and 
it is in this that such constraint properly consists” (MS 6:379).1 
 
Inherent in this characterization of duty and the human beings to which it applies is the distinction 
between principles and conditions that stand in objective relations, and those that stand in 
subjective relations to a particular being. As a practical principle, the moral law is, as we shall see, 
expressive of the form of practical rationality, so it applies objectively to a particular human being 
just insofar as she herself has practical reason. This law captures the essence of something about 
her, namely, her capacity for practical cognition, and she thus necessarily ‘stands under the law’ 
as its object in the same way that a rock stands under laws of physics. But, as already noted, her 
ability to act on the basis of this law is conditioned by subjective factors, what Kant in the above 
passage calls ‘inclinations,’ that she experiences as a result of her physical existence in the natural 
world. From her perspective as a cognizing subject, these inclinations can appear to be constitutive 
of good reasons to act contrary to what the law of practical reason requires. Hence Kant’s claim 
that for human beings, “actions that are cognized as objectively necessary are subjectively 
contingent, and the determination of such a will in conformity with objective laws is necessitation” 
(G 4:413). It is thus because of our particular subjective constitution that the moral law is 
represented to us as an imperative that commands observance, rather than a law that necessarily 
																																								 																				
1 See also Kant’s definition in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788): “an action that is objectively 
practical in accordance with this law, with the exclusion of every determining ground of inclination, is 
called duty, which, because of that exclusion, contains in its concept practical necessitation, that is, 
determination to actions however reluctantly they may be done” (KpV 5:80). 
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describes our actions, and the notion of duty, as good willing under subjective limitations, becomes 
relevant. 
 Against the claim that Kant over-emphasizes our rational nature to the detriment of what 
is unique to our humanity, we can thus argue that his distinction between objective and subjective 
conditions on the exercise of practical reason affords us the opportunity to take up the human 
perspective as cognizing subject—with all the particular needs, values, desires, reluctance, and 
struggle that this brings—without having to give up on the objectivity inherent in the idea of 
practical knowledge and its object, the good. Following this path can, however, lead to the 
opposing objection that in accounting for the contingency of human experience, Kant goes too far 
and effectively severs any useful ties between his metaphysics of morals, a system of pure rational 
concepts independent of any subjective conditions of feeling (MS 6:375-6), and his practical 
anthropology, a body of claims about human action based in experience (MS 6:406). Were Kant 
to do this, he would contradict his own claim that “a metaphysics of morals cannot be based upon 
anthropology but can still be applied to it” (MS 6:217). His account of human experience would 
be muddied with subjective contingencies, bearing no resemblance to the universal picture of 
rational nature and morality we are introduced to in the Groundwork.2 
																																								 																				
2 This is effectively a less technical articulation of the tension inherent in the intellectualist vs. affectivist 
framework that structures so much contemporary Kant scholarship. If we remove all trace of sensibility 
from his a priori metaphysics—as the intellectualist is inclined to do—we give an impoverished account 
of moral experience. But if we turn too much towards the sensible realm and the empirical forces that 
shape our lives—as the affectivist says we must—we stray from the a priori, metaphysical account of 
morality whose objective universality must ground any properly Kantian account of moral life. I will 
develop this framework in much more detail in Chapter 6. 
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 To keep clear of both objections, then, it is important to show that in accounting for our 
particular form of subjectivity, Kant draws on a series of metaphysical distinctions in the service 
of making a priori claims about the nature of our mindedness. Mapping out these distinctions, 
beginning with the most abstract and descending to the more determinate, will allow us to draw 
two related conclusions. First, we can show that the only proper motivation for acting is that of 
respect for the moral law, a concept that can be laid out completely a priori on the basis of the 
metaphysical distinctions in play. Second, and more generally, we can make room for the idea of 
sensible conditions on acts of practical reason without having to concede that such conditions are 
based in empirical contingency. As Kant’s Anthropology suggests, there are particular empirical 
facts and laws that we can invoke to give a psychological explanation of the way we struggle and 
err in cultivating virtue. But we can nevertheless claim that the general form of our subjectivity 
has firm footing in Kant’s a priori philosophical system, and is not merely constituted by a 
collection of fragmentary empirical claims.  
 I will begin, some distance from the idea of human moral experience, with the idea of 
cognition as such, the different ways in which it can relate to its object, and the distinct forms of 
subjectivity entailed by the latter. We must start here, because it is essential to Kant’s account of 
practical reason and the beings who possess it that practical cognition shares the fundamental 
features of cognition in general. Comprising the subject matter of §2.2, this discussion will center 
around the distinction between the intuitive and the discursive intellect. The latter of these—which 
describes our kind of intellect—relies on sensibility, allowing me to introduce the possibility of 
sensible conditions on cognition. Exploring these in §2.3, we will find that the discursive intellect’s 
cognitive capacity divides into two uses, one theoretical, the other practical. Taking up the idea of 
the latter in §2.4, I articulate the form of subjectivity associated with the specifically practical use 
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of the discursive cognitive capacity. Finally, in §2.5, I will turn to human subjectivity in particular, 
and the extent to which it is conditioned by both metaphysics and contingent empirical facts. This 
will require attending to the metaphysical conditions placed on those beings with a capacity for 
practical discursive cognition, and the extent to which they leave room for contingency rooted in 
human psychology. 
 
2.2 Intuitive and Discursive Intellects 
 
2.2.1 The Intuitive Intellect 
 
 The first and most general distinction that can be applied in characterizing our practical 
subjectivity is that between the intuitive and the discursive intellect. Kant typically introduces this 
distinction when he is already in the process of describing our discursive form of cognition. By 
abstracting from the particular way that our cognition relates to its object, Kant introduces the 
possibility of another, intuitive intellect defined in negative contrast to ours (that is, as non-
discursive) (KU 5:406). Thus the distinction originates from reflecting on the different ways in 
which cognition can relate to its object; namely, on (i), whether the cognitive capacity at issue is 
capable of producing its object independently of any external conditions, and (ii), whether it stands 
in a relation of agreement with its object that is subjectively necessary or merely contingent. 
 Though the idea of the intuitive intellect is secondary insofar as we can only grasp it 
through reflection on our own cognitive capacity, it is in another sense primary insofar as its 
cognitive capacity exhibits a more complete unity and thus involves fewer distinctions in its 
characterization. This is the case insofar as the intuitive intellect exemplifies what Kant calls “a 
complete spontaneity of intuition” (KU 5:406). Put in the simplest terms, it is an intellect “which 
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would not represent given objects, but through whose representation the objects would themselves 
at the same time be given, or produced” (B145). The intuitive intellect thus produces a distinct 
form of cognition because it creates the objects it cognizes in the very act of cognizing them. Put 
in more distinctly Kantian terms, the intuitive intellect is characterized as “that understanding 
through whose self-consciousness the manifold of intuition would at the same time be given, an 
understanding through whose representation the objects of this representation would at the same 
time exist” (B138-9). This description highlights two elements that Kant takes to be essential to 
cognition in general: a faculty of understanding and a manifold of content that is either produced 
or given.3 Without the former, there would be no cognizing subject, without the latter there would 
be no cognized object. Kant defines the understanding in general as “the faculty for bringing forth 
representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition” (A51/B75); and “the faculty for cognizing 
an object by means of...representations” (A50/B74). Through exercises of the understanding, we 
enjoy representations that have the active and self-conscious character of cognition, as opposed to 
merely conscious affection.4 As regards the manifold or object of cognition, it follows from the 
very notion of cognition as objective representation5 that it must be in agreement with its object 
																																								 																				
3 At this stage, I mean to abstract from the question of whether the manifold is intelligible as content in 
isolation from the spontaneous faculty that represents it. Moving forward, we will see that these two 
fundamental aspects of cognition—that which cognizes and that which is cognized—are not as separable 
as one might think. I thank Stephen Engstrom for pointing out the potential for misunderstanding inherent 
to the above formulation. 
4 The contributions that the understanding makes as spontaneity will be more closely examined below and 
in subsequent chapters. See also, Stephen Engstrom, “Understanding and Sensibility,” Inquiry 45 (2006): 
2-25. 
5 In the famous Stufenleiter passage at (A319/B376), Kant defines cognition as “objective perception.” This 
is, however, insufficiently general for the level of abstraction being considered here insofar as perception 
implies that the representation is sensible, and, as we will see, the intuitive intellect would not possess a 
capacity for sensibility. I thus use the more general term “representation.” 
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by somehow standing in immediate relation to that object. In the case of the intuitive intellect, this 
relation is secured simply insofar as the self-conscious activity of the understanding is itself 
productive of the manifold of content and the object that it represents.6 Because this cognitive 
content stands in immediate relation to its object through being its cause, it is aptly called 
‘intuitive’ as opposed to ‘discursive’.7 And again, because these intuitive representations issue 
from the understanding, they are spontaneous. Hence the identification of the intuitive intellect as 
a “complete spontaneity of intuition” (KU 5:406). 
 On the basis of the above characterization, we can conclude that the intuitive intellect 
functions independently of any external conditions. The two general conditions requisite for 
cognition, that there be a capacity for spontaneous representation, and a manifold of content to 
represent that is suitably related to its object, are met simply through reflection on the idea of an 
intellect capable of spontaneous intuition. It is also an important corollary of this statement about 
independence that these conditions are necessarily met in any actualization of the subject’s 
cognitive capacity. In other words, because the intuitive intellect produces the objects that it 
cognizes unconditionally, the conditions on cognition identified above cannot fail to be met. Such 
																																								 																				
6 Because the cognitive capacity belonging to the intuitive intellect secures agreement through causal 
relation to its object, I take this to be good reason to think that Kant intends for this relation of agreement 
between cognition and its object to be causal in every case. Otherwise the difference between intuitive 
and discursive intellects would not just be that each realizes the basic conditions on cognition in different 
ways, rather, what cognition actually is would differ fundamentally. It would no longer be necessary to 
hold that discursive cognition is cognition of actually existing objects, and a subjectivism that most find 
objectionable would find its way in.  
7 The first line of the Transcendental Aesthetic defines intuition as follows: “In whatever manner and by 
whatever means a mode of cognition may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in 
immediate relation to them, and from which all thought gains its material” (A19/B33).		
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an intellect is thus infallible, an attribute expressed through the idea that the relation of agreement 
between cognition and its object is subjectively necessary. 
 
2.2.2 The Discursive Intellect 
 
 In contrast, the characterization of the human intellect as discursive and fallible stems from 
reflection on the kind of cognitive capacity that is dependent on external conditions, thus securing 
only subjectively contingent agreement between cognition and its object. Such reflections begin 
with the idea of an understanding that is not capable of independently8 producing its own object, 
necessitating the further distinction between spontaneous and receptive capacities of mind, and the 
idea of the two-stemmed cognitive power with which Kant opens the Transcendental Logic in the 
Critique of Pure Reason:  
“Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which 
is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the 
faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of 
concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the latter it is thought 
in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind)” (A50/B74).  
 
Unlike the intuitive intellect whose understanding is itself capable of producing the manifold of 
content it cognizes, the discursive intellect relies on a separate capacity that receives the manifold 
in virtue of which cognition stands in agreement with its object. It is, however, important not to 
over-emphasize the role that receptivity plays in presenting the object of cognition to the 
understanding. As a companion claim to the thought, introduced above, that understanding is 
essentially the spontaneous power of producing representations from itself (A51/B75), Kant claims 
																																								 																				
8 This is an important qualification, as practical discursive cognition is productive of the object that it 
cognizes. But as we will see, it cannot do so without certain external conditions being met (specifically, it 
relies on being provided with a manifold of sensible desire).   
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that sensibility is “the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in 
some way” (A51/B75). With these two remarks he specifies, first, that sensibility, the receptive 
capacity, only accounts for whatever element of passive affection figures constitutively in 
cognition;9 and second, that understanding, as the spontaneous capacity more basic to cognition, 
produces objective representations through its own activity. That this is the case relates to the 
earlier thought about the capacity for understanding in general being what distinguishes cognitive 
representations, as self-conscious, active and objective, from merely passive conscious affection. 
As we will see, Kant takes it that reflection on what it is for a representation to amount to something 
more than the latter reveals, first, that the essential activity of the understanding is that of synthesis, 
or combination into a unity, and second, that all cognitive representations, even those which rely 
on sensibility for their content, involve this activity. 
 There is much to be said in a Kantian spirit about the concept of self-consciousness and the 
role it has to play in constituting the possibility for cognition as such. The point that is perhaps 
most basic for Kant, however, comes from reflection on the concept of cognition as a systematic 
body of representations. The idea of a system brings out that cognitive representations stand in 
relations of mutual reinforcement that exclude the very possibility of discord. This distinguishes 
cognition from something like an accumulated series of representations that, however 
sophisticated, form only an aggregate or collection whose members do not stand in logical relation 
to one another. As Kant insists, “if every individual representation were entirely foreign to the 
																																								 																				
9 Kant simply takes for granted that human receptivity is sensible in character. For an argument on Kant's 
behalf that shows the sensible character of receptivity follows from (i) the assumption of our finitude, and 
(ii) a causal condition on cognition which assumes there must be a causal connection between representation 
and its object, see Marcus Willaschek, “The Sensibility of Human Intuition: Kant’s Causal Condition on 
accounts of Representation,” in Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, ed. Rainer Enskat, 129-150 (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2015).   
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other, as it were isolated and separated from it, then there would never arise anything like 
cognition, which is a whole of compared and connected representations” (A97). This feature can 
be summed up by saying that cognition is essentially a unity.  
 That the self-conscious activity of the understanding is responsible for the constitution of 
this unity is apparent from Kant’s formulation of its ultimate source in §16 of the Transcendental 
Deduction in the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here he says, “the ‘I think’ must be 
able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me 
that could not be thought at all” (B131-2). It is thus unity in one consciousness that is constitutive 
of the essential unity of cognition. Though difficult in its abstractness, this thought amounts to the 
claim that a subject who cannot represent itself as the unifying source of all its representations 
could not recognize the relations between representations in virtue of which they form a body of 
cognition. It is thus the first personal character of acts of cognition, that they can be accompanied 
by the ‘I think’, which bestows unity through uniting them in one consciousness. But here it is 
important to note that it is not each cognition's being in one subject that confers systematic unity—
a series of conscious affections can also be united in one subject. It is rather the self-conscious 
nature of this subject that accounts for the unity: the subject, in virtue of possessing a power of 
understanding, is able to recognize acts of cognition as such, namely, as systematically unified 
objective representations. So unity is bestowed not in virtue of these representations being 
attributable to one subject, but in virtue of the subject being able to attribute these objective 
representations, as objective representations, to itself. Self-consciousness is thus essential to the 
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unity of cognition: without the ‘I think,’ there could be no systematic unity for cognition and thus 
no cognition at all.10 
 So it is the self-conscious combination of content by the understanding as spontaneity that 
accounts for the possibility of cognition. But it would not be enough to claim that this possibility 
is met insofar as the understanding can relate already self-standing acts of cognition to one another. 
There arises the additional question of what gives unity to these individual acts, and further still, 
the sensible manifold that such acts rely on for their content. For Kant, the understanding’s 
synthetic activity permeates all the way down the hierarchy of cognitive representations, from 
cognition as a whole, to the judgments that make up its parts, and the various representations that 
make up their parts. It is thus to be taken as a central condition on the two-stemmedness of the 
discursive cognitive capacity that every conscious representation involves the activity of the 
understanding. Though we rely on sensible affection, it is in virtue of understanding’s activity that 
the manifold of sensible content can be combined to represent something that has the unity of an 
object. Thus even when Kant speaks of sensible representations, it is at least implicit that the 
manifold of content given through them has been organized through synthetic activity that can 
only arise from the understanding. If this combination were simply given to us as part of that 
content, it could not be the source of the kind of unity required for cognition. “Since it is an act of 
its self-activity,” Kant insists, combination “can be executed only by the subject itself” (B130). 
Thus it emerges as one of the central tenets of Kant’s theory of cognition that “we can represent 
																																								 																				
10 It is not easy to overestimate the worth that Kant attaches to self-consciousness as a human 
achievement. In his anthropology lectures, he declares: “the fact that the human being can have the ‘I’ in 
his representations raises him infinitely above all over living beings on earth. Because of this he is a 
person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the 
same person” (ApH 7:127).    
 37 
nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves” (B130). It is 
this tenet which leads Kant to claim that sensibility can provide nothing other than mere affection, 
and understanding must be the ultimate source of objective representations which, as such, exhibit 
synthetic unity. As we will see, it is this insight that paves the way for the resolute hylomorphism 
I outline in §1.2 of the Introduction. 
 
2.3 Understanding and Sensibility as Form and Matter 
 From these reflections on the nature of cognition in general and discursive cognition in 
particular, it emerges that the understanding is best understood as relating to sensibility as form 
relates to matter. This thought, suggested by Kant and emphasized by many of his commentators, 
is helpful insofar as it points the way towards understanding how cognition can be constituted 
through two distinct elements and still form a unified activity. Recall the two conditions on 
cognition that we have been working with: first, it must issue from a capacity for spontaneous 
representation. We are now in a better position to see why this is so, for without the acts of 
synthesis performed by the understanding there could be no cognition as a systematic unity of 
representation. Thus we could reformulate this condition as the requirement that cognition exhibit 
self-conscious unity. Second, cognition must represent a manifold of content that stands in 
agreement with its object. For the discursive intellect, these conditions are met through the 
actualization of two distinct capacities, understanding and sensibility, so it can be difficult to see 
how these capacities relate to one another in such a way that the actualizations of each can 
contribute to one unified representation, be this representation a judgment or the sensible 
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representation of an object.11 What the concepts of form and matter enable is the thought that 
sensibility and understanding interact as two stems of the same discursive cognitive capacity. This 
interaction takes place insofar as understanding—which as self-conscious spontaneity is 
essentially the power of cognition—determines sensibility by structuring its deliverances in such 
a way that they can serve as objects of cognition. A hylomorphic unity, a unity of form and matter, 
is one that emerges insofar as form determines or performs its essential function on matter, 
resulting in a being or object or activity exhibiting that form. In the case of discursive cognition, 
we can conceive of self-conscious unity as the essential form of cognition, a form which the 
understanding, through its synthetic activity, confers on the deliverances of receptivity that 
function as its matter. This structuring activity results in a product that in some way bears the form 
of cognition, for example, a judgment or an objective representation that could figure in a 
judgment. The actualizations of understanding and sensibility can thus amount to cognition insofar 
as the former account for the activity of cognition, ensuring that something (or, less misleadingly, 
someone) is cognizing, and the latter provides matter that individuates this activity, ensuring there 
is something to cognize.12  
These form/matter unities that characterize the two-stemmed nature of discursive 
consciousness hold at various levels of abstraction, the characterization of which requires the 
introduction of a few more pieces of Kant’s terminology. On the more concrete, determinate side 
of the spectrum, we have concepts and the sensible representations on which they perform their 
																																								 																				
11 Kant defines judgment as “the mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation of a representation 
of it” (A68/B93).  
12 See, for example, (A295/B351): “Sensibility, subordinated to understanding, as the object to which the 
latter applies its function, is the source of real cognition.”	
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functions.13 On Kant's picture, the understanding is primarily a faculty of concepts, whose function 
is defined as “the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one” 
(A68/B93). Conceptual acts can thus be understood as more determinate acts of unity through 
which the understanding constitutes its body of cognition. We can think of a concept’s function as 
bestowing unity insofar as different representations are brought together under a more general 
representation in virtue of one or more features that they share. This activity of concept application 
can be understood in terms of rules: every concept has its own unifying function that is described 
in terms of its rule of application, which enumerates the features or marks constitutive of that 
concept. In distinguishing whether or not an object can be subsumed under a concept, the subject 
essentially distinguishes whether or not an object stands under the relevant rule (A132/B171). For 
Kant this is the distinctive activity of judgment, “the faculty of subsuming under rules” 
(A132/B171). Because with this activity the understanding is essentially producing general 
representations that can apply to any more determinate representation with the relevant features, 
conceptual cognition is by nature general. And this it must be, for were we unable to unify 
particular representations under more general ones, we could not relate the contents of our thoughts 
to one another in the way required for cognition. 
 As we proceed up the chain of abstraction to less determinate instantiations of hylomorphic 
unity, that which previously served as form now stands as matter to a more abstract form. Thus 
the concepts of the understanding, as formal rule-based functions, become the matter on which a 
still higher unifying activity performs its function. For as explained above, the unity of cognition 
																																								 																				
13 In fact we can begin at an even more determinate level, with the activity of the understanding that renders 
the passive material of sensibility into a contentful, unified representation that purports to be of an object. 
For our purposes here, however, it is enough to begin with concepts and sensibly given representations of 
objects.   
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requires not just that sensible representations of objects are systematically combined; rather, this 
systematic combination must itself possess unity. Otherwise, the subject could not fully reflect 
upon and grasp the character of the understanding’s rules, and the way these rules relate to one 
another—they could not be brought to self-consciousness. Such an incomplete form of 
representation would lack the fully systematic character of cognition. For Kant, this higher 
function of unity is performed by reason: “if the understanding may be a faculty of unity of 
appearances by means of rules, then reason is the faculty of the unity of the rules of understanding 
under principles” (A302/B359). Reason, as the faculty of principles, thus accounts for the ground 
of the unity of concepts, while the understanding accounts for the ground of the unity of objects. 
Because concepts are only used in judgments, insofar as reason governs the use of concepts it 
structures the logical relations in which judgments stand to one another. It is thus only through the 
activity of reason that we can articulate the complete unity of discursive cognition.  
 Returning to the two questions posed above, we can determine the character of discursive 
cognition more precisely by asking (i), whether the cognitive capacity at issue is capable of 
producing its object independently of any external conditions, and (ii), whether it stands in a 
relation of agreement with its object that is subjectively necessary or merely contingent. As regards 
(i), we are now in a position to affirm that discursive cognition is not capable of producing its 
object independently of external conditions.14 As a two-stemmed cognitive capacity, discursive 
cognition relies on the contributions of sensibility to stand in a relation of agreement to its object, 
and sensibility is, properly speaking, logically independent from the spontaneity that is essential 
																																								 																				
14 Even more precisely, the two forms of discursive cognition—theoretical and practical—do not produce 
their objects independently of external conditions because (a), theoretical discursive cognition does not 
produce its object at all, and (b) practical discursive cognition does so only insofar as certain additional 
sensible conditions have been met. Unpacking (b) will be a central aim of the present project. 
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to cognition. The answer to our second question also follows directly from the dependence that 
characterizes discursive cognition: because it is dependent on the workings of another capacity to 
meet the material condition on cognition, it is logically possible that this condition might not be 
met. Put differently, because discursive cognition depends on the matter of sensibility to perform 
its function, there arises the possibility that concepts might be misapplied to the logically 
independent deliverances of another capacity. This would result in the mere semblance of unity 
where there is in fact none.15 This is just to say that the agreement between understanding and 
sensibility, concept and sensibly determined representation, cognition and its object, is 
subjectively contingent. It could fail to obtain—an assertion that follows simply from reflection 
on the two-stemmedness of discursive cognition.16 The logical possibility of erring thus emerges 
for the discursively cognizing subject insofar as its understanding is not wholly self-sufficient. 
 We can now take stock of the conditions on discursive cognition in a way that anticipates 
the further distinction between theoretical and practical discursive cognition that will be the topic 
of the following section. From reflection on our subjectivity as beings whose cognitive capacity is 
discursive in nature, we have gathered the following: 1), the formal condition on cognition is met 
																																								 																				
15 See the rest of the passage from (A295/B351) quoted in fn. 17 above:  
“Sensibility, subordinated to understanding, as the object to which the latter applies its function, is the 
source of real cognition. But this same sensibility, insofar as it influences the action of the understanding 
and determines it to judgments, is the ground of error.” 
N.B. Kant is speaking loosely here when he talks of sensibility determining understanding. As we have 
already seen, understanding, as spontaneity, is self-determining, and sensibility, as receptivity, is essentially 
passive. The point to take away is that it is in virtue of discursive cognition’s dependence on sensibility that 
error can arise.  
16 Kant emphasizes this contingency and its tight connection to our subjectivity as discursive cognizers in 
the Critique of Judgment: “our understanding is a faculty of concepts, i.e., a discursive understanding, for 
which it must of course be contingent what and how different might be the particular that can be given to it 
in nature and brought under its concepts” (KU 5:406).	
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in virtue of the spontaneity of understanding, which in our case is a faculty of concepts; 2), the 
material condition on cognition is met in virtue of the receptivity of sensibility, which contributes 
the sensibly given manifold on which the understanding performs its synthetic activity; and 3), in 
virtue of the twofold nature of our cognitive capacity, cognition does not establish agreement with 
its object by causing it to exist unconditionally, i.e., its spontaneity is not completely self-
sufficient. Nevertheless, there must be a different way to characterize the agreement between 
cognition and its object, one which establishes cognition as actual and its object as existing.17 In 
fact, as we will see, there are two ways for this agreement to be established, corresponding to the 
division between theoretical and practical discursive cognition. Either the subject’s cognitive 
activity determines an already existing object, or the subject’s cognitive activity determines an 
object in such a way that the subject is moved to bring about that object’s existence (Bix-x). The 
former can be glossed as cognition of what is, the latter as cognition of what ought to be. 
 
2.4 Practical Discursive Cognition 
 Because we are here concerned with the nature of our practical subjectivity and the extent 
to which it can be grounded in Kantian metaphysics, the current section will only concern itself 
with one half of the distinction, focusing on the structure of practical discursive cognition, or what 
we now know amounts to the same for our purposes, practical cognition as actualized in sensibly 
dependent fallible beings.18  
																																								 																				
17 Cf. Engstrom, “Understanding and Sensibility,” 11. 
18 I say “for our purposes” because some would argue that there is not a strict identity between discursive 
cognition and cognition as actualized in sensibly dependent fallible beings. While all physical beings 
existing in nature require sensibility insofar as they need to be affected by objects to have material cognition, 
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Now that we are focusing exclusively on the practical use of the discursive cognitive 
capacity, we have a new concept to weave into the discussion. Like many philosophers before and 
after him, Kant made extensive use of the term ‘will’ (Wille) in developing his practical 
philosophy. In grasping what Kant means by ‘the will’ or ‘acts of willing’, it is important to 
recognize that this concept does not function as an extra element in his account of practical 
discursive cognition that does not have its analogue in the theoretical case. For in the Kantian 
system, the will is simply to be identified with practical reason, and acts of willing are to be 
identified with practical judgment, as the application of the concept ‘good’ in accordance with 
principles. 
 In a well-known passage from the Groundwork, Kant defines the will as follows: “only a 
rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in 
accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions 
from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason” (G 4:412). We saw above that reason, 
as the faculty of principles, is that which brings unity to the conceptual functions of the 
understanding, which in turn bring unity to the manifold of matter given in sensibility. The ground 
of the unity provided by reason is a principle on the basis of which the universal is apprehended 
in the particular through concepts, i.e., a principle on the basis of which a particular object is 
																																								 																				
there could conceivably be a variety of discursive cognition associated with the conceptual possibility, i.e., 
the mere idea, of non-sensible beings like angels. In this case, there would still be a two-stemmed cognitive 
capacity, but the receptivity branch would not as such be sensible. What this kind of cognition would be 
like is inaccessible to us and difficult to describe. Setting this possibility aside, I will continue to treat 
discursive cognition and sensibly dependent fallible cognition as the same. For Kant on the sensible nature 
of all earthly beings in contrast to angels, see, LE 27:490 and LE 27:519. See also Kant’s affirmation that 
all sensible, created rational beings are fallible at KpV 5:72 
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brought under a concept.19 Kant’s above definition of the will can thus be glossed as the distinctly 
practical determination of discursive reason, for it is simply a more determinate example of this 
same structure. In the practical case, the particular is cognized in the universal insofar as the subject 
judges a particular action to be necessary on the basis of a general principle. Kant suggests that 
this act of apprehension, and the determination of the will that results, looks something like the 
following. Practical principles are “propositions that contain a general determination of the will” 
(KpV 5:19), that is, they specify ends to be pursued. For example, the subject might adopt as a 
practical principle that all debts should be repaid, or that no insult should pass unavenged. If the 
subject recognizes that a particular action is subsumable under a given principle, the action is 
recognized as good on that basis, i.e., it is subsumed under the concept ‘good’ in an act of 
judgment.20 This act of distinctly practical judgment can be identified with an act of willing insofar 
as the former determines the subject to realize the end in question, i.e., the action is pursued or 
supported in whatever way the context specifies.21 We can thus see that Kant identifies the will 
with practical reason because willing is nothing other than a principled representing that is itself 
capable of bringing about what it represents. The will cannot be understood as something extra, 
over and above the power of representing actions as good on the basis of principles, because this 
																																								 																				
19Apprehending the universal in the particular through concepts is the fundamental activity of the discursive 
intellect (KU 5:406).	
20 Recall too that Kant also defines judgment as the faculty of subsuming under rules or “determining 
whether something stands under a given rule” (A132/B171). So in the practical case we could gloss the role 
of the understanding as the faculty of subsuming under the concept good (or evil).   
21 Judgment, as opposed to willing, is however in some respects a more helpful characterization of this 
distinctive activity, insofar it makes more evident that the end is being pursued, not because the subject has 
been moved by forces like instinct or a certain conception of animal desire, but because the subject 
recognizes the action as good on the basis of its being grounded in the practical principle at issue. 
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act is itself practical, i.e., such as to bring about, attempt to bring about, or otherwise support the 
bringing about of the object so represented. Hence as Kant says, “the will is nothing other than 
practical reason” (G 4:412).22  
  
2.4.1 Holy and non-holy wills 
 Now that we have the practical use of our cognitive capacity in view, it is helpful to 
introduce a more determinate version of the distinction between infallible and fallible intellects 
discussed above. Because we are here concerned with practical cognition, or “cognition insofar as 
it can itself become the ground of the existence of objects” (KpV 5:46), we are only concerned 
with one of the two ways in which discursive cognition relates to its object, namely, through 
bringing about its existence. The helpful contrast case to our fallibility in this instance would thus 
be a will that never brings about anything except insofar as it is actually cognized as necessary, 
i.e., as good, in accordance with principles of reason. Kant calls such a will “holy” (G 4:414). 
Central to the way that Kant develops the distinction between holy and non-holy wills in the 
Groundwork are the features used above to characterize the difference between the intuitive and 
discursive intellect. Of the holy will, he says “if reason infallibly determines the will, the actions 
of such a being that are cognized as objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary, that is, 
the will is a capacity to choose only that which reason independently of inclination cognizes as 
practically necessary, that is, as good” (G 4:412). Here Kant ascribes to the holy will the second 
of the two defining features of infallibility described above in §2.2, namely, that cognition and its 
																																								 																				
22From this point forward, I will use the terminology of acts of practical cognition and acts of willing 
interchangeably, switching between the two based on what is called for by context. 	
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object stand in a relation of subjectively necessary agreement. Through his characterization of the 
non-holy sensibly dependent will, we can gather that he also ascribes to it the first defining feature. 
Of the non-holy or fallible will he says, 
“if reason solely by itself does not adequately determine the will; if the will 
is exposed also to subjective conditions (certain incentives) that are not 
always in accord with the objective ones; in a word, if the will is not in itself 
completely in conformity with reason (as is actually the case with human 
beings), then actions that are cognized as objectively necessary are 
subjectively contingent” (G 4:412-13). 
 
Here Kant implies that it is the presence of sensible incentives that conditions the possibility of 
error in a non-holy will. Insofar as we are not holy, we err in exercising our capacity for practical 
cognition by acting on the basis of sensible incentives that have been improperly grounded in 
principles of reason.23 This should not be surprising, insofar as we have shown that the practical 
discursive cognition at issue in this section is just practical cognition as actualized in sensibly 
dependent and therefore fallible beings. Thus, a holy will never errs by subjective necessity insofar 
as sensibility could not possibly provide it with a ground for erring.24 In the paradigm case of 
holiness that is simply a more determinate version of the intuitive intellect, this is because the holy 
will does not rely on a receptive capacity at all, but is rather completely spontaneous in its cognitive 
activity.25 
																																								 																				
23 The details surrounding the possibility of error will be explored at more length in §2.5 of this paper, as 
well as in subsequent chapters. For now it is sufficient to recognize that sensibility is a condition on the 
possibility of error, however it might be realized.  
24 Recall the passage at (A295/B351) concerning sensibility as the ground of error in judgment. 
25 We can understand the angels described in footnote 18 as possessing another kind of holy will, which is 
finite but non-sensible (though this is a mere conceptual possibility we cannot say much about). It is a 
matter of interpretive controversy whether Kant recognizes the real possibility of a finite, sensible holy 
will. I tend to doubt that he does, but do not offer an argument for this in the present work.  
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 As Kant implies above, sensibly dependent fallible beings, in contrast, do rely on the 
deliverances of receptivity for cognition. This can seem especially difficult to grasp in the case of 
practical cognition, since Kant also emphasizes over and over again that pure practical reason must 
be capable of determining itself in accordance with universal laws without relying on any sensible 
incentive.26 The task in the following section will be to develop the role that sensibility plays in 
the exercise of practical discursive cognition without infringing on Kant’s claims regarding the 
autonomy of pure practical reason. This will require returning to the language of form and matter 
developed above.  
 
2.4.2 The Form and Matter of Practical Discursive Cognition 
 In §2.3, I attempted to make the nature of discursive cognition more graspable by drawing 
on the well-known thought that understanding and sensibility relate to one another as form and 
matter. This general thought led to the articulation of a number of more particular form/matter 
unities involving spontaneous representations and sensible content, culminating in the discussion 
of reason as that faculty of thought which provides the highest form of unity, bringing unity to the 
functions of the understanding. Because I was there trying to explain the possibility of there being 
sensible objects for discursive cognition in a general sense, I paid no attention to the order of 
analysis, i.e., whether we began with reason and proceeded through the understanding to 
sensibility, or vice versa. The task was merely to explain how the various functions of mind could 
produce a unified body of cognition. Once we proceed to the particular determinations of 
																																								 																				
26 See, for example, (KpV 5:21): “It is requisite to reason’s lawgiving that it should need to presuppose only 
itself, because a rule is objectively and universally valid only when it holds without the contingent, 
subjective conditions that distinguish one rational being from another.” 
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discursive cognition, however, the order of analysis is of considerable importance, insofar as it 
captures the way in which cognition relates to its object in each case. Since theoretical cognition 
must be given its object, it is more appropriate to characterize it as beginning with objects given 
in sensibility.27 Practical cognition, in contrast, concerns the determining grounds of the will as 
practical reason, and hence must begin with the possibility of practical principles containing 
general determinations of the will and the extent to which we can understand these as having their 
origin in reason alone (KpV 5:89-90). That is, it must begin with the possibility of an a priori, 
necessary law of pure practical reason, known more commonly as the moral law.28  
 Thus although it is true of both forms of discursive cognition that reason accounts for the 
highest level of unity in organizing the functions of the understanding, which in turn provide unity 
to the sensible manifold, the precise way in which discursive cognition makes use of these 
activities in order to build a unified body of cognition is indicative of whether it is practical or 
theoretical. And although practical discursive cognition, as discursive, must grow insofar as it 
apprehends new objects, extends concepts, formulates principles and the like, this activity must be 
grounded in one fundamental a priori determining principle without which it could not function as 
it is, namely, a unified cognitive activity capable of producing its own object. 
																																								 																				
27 See A298-9/B355: “All our cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding, and 
ends with reason, beyond which there is nothing higher to be found in us to work on the matter of intuition 
and bring it under the highest unity of thinking.”  
28 See KpV 5:90: “the Analytic of reason, insofar as it is to be a practical reason..., must begin from the 
possibility of practical principles a priori. Only from these could it proceed to concepts of objects of a 
practical reason, namely to the concepts of the simply good and evil, in order to first give them in keeping 
with those principles..., and only then could the last chapter conclude this part, namely the chapter about 
the relation of pure practical reason to sensibility”.	
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 Thus, following the relevant order of analysis, we will get a more concrete sense of the role 
that sensibility plays in practical discursive cognition by articulating a series of form/matter unities 
beginning, as Kant does, with reason and proceeding through the understanding to sensibility.  
 Recall that a form/matter unity is constituted insofar as form determines or performs its 
essential function on matter, resulting in an object or being or activity exhibiting that form. In the 
case of practical discursive reason, the faculty of practical principles, the relevant form is captured 
by the fundamental formal principle of pure practical reason: “so act that the maxim29 of your will 
could always hold at the same time as a principle in a giving of universal law” (KpV 5:30). This 
ultimate formal principle is expressive of the form of practical cognition insofar as it captures what 
is essential to it as an activity, namely, that it determine itself to act on the basis of grounds that 
are universal and thus objective. The form of the practical principle is thus universality (G 4:43); 
that is, practical principles, insofar as they serve to unify and ground the activity of the 
understanding, prescribe ways of acting that hold as valid, (1) not just for one cognizing subject, 
but for all of them, and (2) not just on one wholly unique, unrepeatable occasion, but on all 
relevantly similar occasions. For cognition, as representation that determines an object, is by nature 
sufficiently general that it can be shared by more than one subject, and extended to any relevantly 
similar object. If it is correct to judge that φ-ing would be good on this occasion, then other 
cognizing subjects should also judge as such. Furthermore, we should all grasp that φ-ing would 
also be good if the features of the occasion that make it good to φ were repeated. These formal 
features of cognition are captured in the fundamental principle of pure practical reason, which calls 
																																								 																				
29A maxim is a subjective practical principle, that is, a principle which is practical for the subject insofar as 
it has been endorsed or taken up as a general determination of that subject's will. 
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for action that can be grounded in a practical law prescribing a general determination of the will 
that holds for all beings capable of practical cognition. 
 In keeping with the idea of nested form/matter unities introduced in §2.3, we can anticipate 
that the matter of practical discursive reason, as that upon which form exercises its activity, is 
provided by the understanding. Kant describes the matter of a practical principle as both “the object 
of the will” (KpV 5:27) and an end (G 4:436). He defines the former as “the representation of an 
object as an effect possible through freedom” (KpV 5:57), and the latter as “the object of a concept 
insofar as the latter is regarded as the cause of the former (the real ground of its possibility)” (KU 
6:219-20). Central to both definitions is the idea that an end, as the object of practical reason, is 
the representation of something that can be brought about through the act of representing it. The 
former uses the language of ‘representing as’ to capture that the object has been determined as 
something the subject can bring about through free choice,30 while the latter specifies that it is the 
conceptual representation of the object as an end that is or would be the cause of its existence. It 
is this representation of an object by the understanding as a possible effect of practical reason that 
stands as matter to the formal principle of pure practical reason. Insofar as the object has been 
determined by the principle, it is represented as good or evil on the basis of whether or not it stands 
in agreement with the latter. So it is not just the representation of an end but the representation of 
an end as good or evil, through its being determined by form, that is properly speaking the object 
or matter of practical reason. Thus Kant claims that the only objects of practical reason are the 
concepts of good and evil (KpV 5:58), which do their determining, unifying work through standing 
																																								 																				
30 We have not yet touched upon the issue of practical freedom, which will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters. Though closely related, it is not to be identified with the spontaneity of cognition in general. Cf. 
Dieter Henrich, “The Concept of Moral Insight,” in The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant's Philosophy, ed. 
Richard L. Velkley, trans. Manfred Kuehn, 55-88 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).  
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under the formal principle of practical reason (KpV 5:67). This is in keeping with what we already 
know about practical reason, as it is not the representation of an object as a possible end that is 
such as to move the subject to bring it about, but the representation of that end as good, that is, as 
necessary.31  
 We now have in view the first form/matter unity constitutive of practical discursive 
cognition: the moral law, as the supreme principle of pure practical reason, functions as form and 
performs its activity on the understanding’s representation of a possible end as matter. The result 
of this activity is the determination of the end through the principle of reason. If the end is cognized 
as good, it bears the form of pure practical reason: it is grasped as universal and objective, and thus 
becomes a necessary end for the practically cognizing subject. Moving on to the next relation of 
form and matter, we can now ask, what does the concept of a good end unify? This is where the 
role of sensibility in practical cognition emerges, since, as we saw in our general account of 
discursive cognition, concepts provide rules that bring unity to sensible representations.  
 Sensibility was introduced above as the power of receiving representations through being 
affected (A51/B75). A representation that does not purport to be objective, which is merely the 
effect of an object on sensibility, is sensation (A19-20/B34). In accordance with the division 
between theoretical and practical discursive cognition, we can recognize two different kinds of 
sensation. Both, as sensation, are merely subjective insofar as their content refers only to the 
subject as a modification of its state (A320/B376). However, despite the fact that all sensations are 
properly speaking subjective, Kant further divides the category between objective sensations 
whose content is an object of sense, as with, e.g., a sensation of colour; and subjective sensations 
																																								 																				
31 Kant equates the good with practical necessity at G 4:412 and KpV 5:58. 
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whose content features no object, but merely represents the effect an object has on the subject with 
regard to pleasure or displeasure (KU 5:206). ‘Subjective sensation’ is thus just another name for 
‘feeling’.32 I must introduce the concept of feeling for my purposes here, because it is feeling, 
specifically the feeling of agreeableness or pleasure, that stands as matter to the concept of an end 
as form. For it is through the feeling of pleasure, as the matter that individuates form, that practical 
discursive cognizers come to have particular ends at all. The moral law, as expressive of the form 
of pure practical reason, may be substantive enough to determine certain general ends as necessary, 
but the will must be put in relation to a possible end as the particular, material effect of willing in 
order for acts of the will to individuate themselves as such. As Kant notes, the faculty of discursive 
reason by itself cannot discover objects of the will (G 4:460, footnote). Thus, in order for there to 
be an object of cognition for the subject to grasp as good and be moved to bring about, sensible 
matter that can be taken up by the understanding is required. This process is initiated insofar as the 
subject is conscious of a feeling of pleasure in response to an object, which is taken up by the 
spontaneous activity of the understanding and conceived as something to be brought about. It is 
thus the experience of the agreeable that provides the manifold of sensible matter upon which the 
understanding exercises its unifying function, in this case through the concept of an end. 
It should be noted that this is not a condition of practical cognition generally, but only 
practical discursive cognition. As we have emphasized, the formal conditions of practical 
cognition are contained in the expression of the moral law, and insofar as this law is capable of 
immediately determining the will to produce its object, that is, insofar as the representation of an 
																																								 																				
32 It is helpful to introduce this kind of representation under the name ‘subjective sensation’ in order to 
show its relation to the structure of cognition in general and theoretical cognition in particular, but it should 
be noted that in general Kant actually uses the term ‘feeling’ in order to avoid confusion. I will follow him 
in this practice. The nature of feeling will be discussed in much more detail in subsequent chapters. 
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object as good is capable of moving the subject to act without any further subjective condition, the 
possibility of practical cognition is fully accounted for. For such a being, explaining what it means 
to say that pure reason is practical of itself alone is a much more straightforward endeavor. That 
said, even for discursive practical beings, this formal condition stands: the recognition that the 
practical principle governing the will is universal, is what brings the subject to will a given end. It 
is the form and not the matter of the practical principle at issue that constitutes the condition under 
which the subject acts. Kant makes this point in a particularly vivid way at the beginning of the 
Religion: 
“since its law binds through the mere form of universal lawfulness of the 
maxims to be adopted in accordance with this lawfulness as the highest 
condition (itself unconditional) of all ends, morality needs absolutely no 
material determining ground of the free power of choice, that is no end, 
either in order to recognize what duty is or to impel its performance; on the 
contrary, when duty is the issue, morality can perfectly well abstract from 
ends all together, and ought to do so” (R 6:3-4).  
 
Nevertheless, as sensibly dependent beings, our form of cognition requires reference to matter—
in this case, an end with sensible content—in order for our actions to be individuated as such. 
Without an end, form would have nothing upon which to perform its activity. So for sensibly 
dependent beings, acts of willing require ends in order to become recognizable as doings (or non-
doings). Hence Kant’s claim that all willing requires an object and thus a matter that rests in part 
on subjective, i.e., sensible, conditions (KpV 5:34). 
We now have in view the second form/matter unity constitutive of practical discursive 
cognition: the understanding, as the faculty of concepts, confers unity on the sensible manifold of 
desire through bringing it under the concept of an end. Starting from the sensible manifold and 
working our way up, we can articulate the whole structure of practical discursive cognition as 
follows: “the agreeable, which as such represents the object solely in relation to sense, must first 
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be brought under principles of reason through the concept of an end before it can be called good 
as an object of the will” (KU 5:208). This formulation captures the extent to which the concept of 
the good, as the object of practical reason, confers objectivity on merely subjective ends through 
its relation to principles of reason. In its emphasis on objectivity, however, the above formulation 
can seem to miss another important aspect of practical cognition, namely, that it is such as to move 
the subject to act. So, we need another way of laying out the structure of practical cognition, one 
which emphasizes the practicality or efficacy of practical reason. We find this in Kant’s 
articulation of the practical syllogism, which he thinks is expressive of the way practical discursive 
cognition begins with reason and proceeds through the understanding to sensibility. This syllogism 
proceeds, 
“from the universal in the major premise (the moral principle), through 
undertaking in a minor premise a subsumption of possible actions (as good 
or evil) under the former, to the conclusion, namely, the subjective 
determination of the will (an interest in the practically possible good and in 
the maxim based on it)” (KpV 5:90). 
 
With this formulation, Kant brings out the extent to which recognizing an object as good does not 
just involve sensibility insofar as sensible representations are presupposed as matter. Recognizing 
an object as good also has a different but related effect on sensibility: through this recognition, the 
will is determined to realize the good end by producing an interest, or a representation capable of 
moving her to act. Though it is not yet clear how, this interest somehow involves sensibility. So, 
the sensible capacity does not just offer up matter for cognition: in determining this matter, reason 
produces a sensible incentive, a driving force, that moves.33 This is what accounts for the efficacy 
of practical reason in a sensibly dependent being.   
																																								 																				
33 The concept of an incentive (Triebfeder) will be examined in much more detail in Chapter 3. 
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 This condition on practical cognition affirms that it is not the agreeable which is the 
ultimate source of motivation. What moves us, rather, is the recognition that our end is to be acted 
upon, or made actual, in accordance with objective principles of reason. Kant is unequivocal that 
meeting this condition must involve saying something about sensibility:  
 “In order for a sensibly affected rational being to will that for which reason alone 
prescribes the ‘ought,’ it is admittedly required that his reason have the capacity to 
induce a feeling of pleasure or of delight in the fulfillment of duty, and thus there 
is required a causality of reason to determine sensibility in conformity with its 
principles” (G 4:460). 
  
Kant ultimately thinks we cannot provide a causal explanation for how consciousness of a principle 
of reason can have an effect on sensibility (G 4:460), but there is nevertheless much more to be 
said about this important condition on practical cognition. The details of this picture will be 
unpacked in more detail in what follows. For now, it suffices to say that we have finally arrived at 
the concept of respect, a distinctive kind of sensible motivation that is grounded in the recognition 
of practical law. This is the unique kind of motivation that is required for a sensibly dependent 
being if we are to understand it as having a will, i.e., the capacity to act on the basis of laws (G 
4:412). Kant thus thinks we can conclude that respect, a rationally grounded sensible response to 
the moral law, must be an important part of the structure of practical discursive cognition. Because 
of the latter’s fundamental nature, we must understand the moral law as “an object of the greatest 
respect and so too the ground of a positive feeling that is not of empirical origin and is cognized a 
priori” (KpV 5:73). 
 The peculiar nature of respect as the proper incentive to action, and its role in Kant’s 
practical philosophy will be explored at length in what follows. For now, I am merely outlining 
the structure of practical discursive cognition with a view to seeing how much of our specifically 
human subjectivity can be grounded in Kant’s metaphysics without relying on empirical facts 
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about human nature. Through reflection on the nature of cognition in general and discursive 
cognition in particular, we have gathered that discursive practical cognition, simply in virtue of its 
discursivity, requires that certain sensible requirements be met. Though the will, as practical 
reason, is capable of producing its own objects, it does not do so in the absence of sensible 
conditions. Two such conditions have emerged. First, practical reason produces its own object, but 
which object it produces is specified through the sensible representation of possible objects as 
agreeable. This representation of agreeableness is, however, as matter, not the ground for 
determining the will. Because it is the recognition of an end as good that motivates, we cannot 
understand the agreeableness of an object to fully account for what is practical or motivating for 
the subject. Instead, and this is the second sensible condition, sensibility is determined by the moral 
law and the subject is thereby motivated by nothing other than the law insofar as it expresses the 
form of practical cognition. That the structure of practical discursive cognition requires sensibility 
to be determined in this way, through the feeling of respect, is as we will see especially important 
for our task of articulating Kant’s account of human practical subjectivity.  
 
2.5 Human Practical Discursive Cognition 
 We saw above that discursive cognition as such is opened up to the logical possibility of 
error in virtue of its dependence on sensibility. In the specifically practical form of discursive 
cognition, our fallibility is conditioned through the will’s dependence on feeling for the discovery 
of subjective ends. That we are fallible, however, only grounds the possibility, not the actuality, 
of our erring. That we actually do err is a fact discovered in the experience of oneself and others. 
Hence, certain characteristics having to do with our fallibility insofar as it is actualized have to do 
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not with sensibly dependent cognizing beings in general, but humans in particular as an example 
of the latter. 
 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant warns against arguing directly from mere logical 
possibility to real possibility.34 Logical possibility implies only that the thought does not contradict 
itself. In the case at hand, because practical discursive judgment depends on having sensible matter 
to determine, it is as least conceivable that judgment could fail to bring its matter into agreement 
with its form. Insofar as the form of practical reason is normative—and of course it must be, insofar 
as it is constitutive of a universal moral imperative—there must be the possibility of disagreement 
between form and the matter it determines.35 Real possibility implies something stronger: namely, 
that the synthesis through which such judgment would come about is proved to be possible. 
Because we are talking about freely self-determined action, this stronger form of possibility is only 
shown in experience. It cannot be determined in advance, for this would be incompatible with 
freedom—we cannot predict that a particular misuse of practical reason will necessarily come 
about. We thus only know for certain that practical wrongdoing is really possible through 
experiencing particular instances of it. 
 Kant discusses the real possibility, the actuality, of practical wrongdoing in Religion within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Because practical cognition concerns the grounds upon which we 
act, Kant refers to our practical fallibility as a propensity to evil. Accordingly, he does not take it 
that only some but not all humans exhibit an evil nature—the term as he uses it does not track what 
we often mean by ‘evil’ in more common speech. For Kant, the concept of human evil simply 
																																								 																				
34 C.f. the footnote at (A587/B625). 
35	Cf. Engstrom, The Form of Practical Reason, 131	
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captures the real possibility of our practical fallibility, something which applies to all of us: “ ‘the 
human being is evil’ cannot mean anything else than that he is conscious of the moral law and yet 
has incorporated into his maxim the (occasional) deviation from it” (R 6:32).  He thus takes it to 
be uncontroversial and a simple matter of experience that evil, so described, is a propensity 
characteristic of human nature in general: “according to the cognition we have of the human being 
through experience...we may presuppose evil as subjectively necessary in every human being, even 
the best” (KpV 5:32). It is because of this propensity that the cultivation of virtue, as the capacity 
to withstand that which opposes the moral law within us (MS 6:380), is so important for human 
beings. 
 Taken on their own, it is this set of claims that can lead to the view that Kant has separated 
his treatment of us as human, i.e., as empirically knowable beings, from the claims of his 
metaphysics in a way that is problematic for his moral philosophy. But the preceding sections have 
laid the groundwork to show that we cannot think of human weakness or fallibility in moral matters 
as having no grounding in how Kant thinks about the structure of practical cognition. For through 
reflection on the nature of cognition in general and practical discursive cognition in particular, we 
can gather the following about our practical subjectivity on a priori grounds: 
First, as subjects capable of practical cognition, we have the power to determine ourselves 
to act merely on the basis of the representation of an end as good. Even in a sensibly 
dependent being, the will does not require a material ground to be determined; it can 
determine itself in virtue of form alone. Hence, we are transcendentally free. 
 
Second, as subjects whose form of practical cognition is discursive, we must be given a 
sensible manifold to have consciousness of the ends that we represent as good and freely 
bring about. Thus, while we do not require a material ground for the determination of the 
 59 
will, we do rely on feeling to individuate the subjective ends that figure in practical 
reasoning.36 
 
Third, as subjects whose form of practical cognition is discursive, sensibility must be 
determinable by reason in order for us to be motivated to act. The possibility of this 
motivation, which Kant calls respect for the moral law, ensures that the objective 
determining grounds of the will can at the same time be the subjective determining grounds 
for the will of a sensibly dependent being.37   
 
From the first point, we can gather that no empirical facts about the sensible constitution of a 
human being can ground their propensity to evil. For as Kant states, the real ground of evil is not 
that one has evil incentives, but that one elects to make the material incentives that are otherwise 
natural and even necessary the determining ground of the will. This point was foregrounded insofar 
as it was shown above that dependence on sensibility is a condition on the logical possibility of 
practical wrongdoing, but is not as such constitutive of its actuality. What does account for the 
latter is an act of willing or practical judgment through which the will is determined on the basis 
of a practical principle. Hence Kant’s claim that “sensuous nature therefore contains too little to 
provide a ground of moral evil in the human being, for, to the extent that it eliminates the incentives 
originating in freedom, it makes of the human a purely animal being” (R 6:35). Much more will 
be said about our a priori nature and the real possibility of evil in Chapters 4 and 5. For now, the 
																																								 																				
36 Kant is especially helpful on these two points at KpV 5:34 : “Now it is indeed undeniable that every 
volition must also have an object and hence a matter; but the matter is not, just because of this, the 
determining ground and condition of the maxim”. 
37 Once again, see G 4:460 : “In order for a sensibly affected rational being to will that for which reason 
alone prescribes the ‘ought,’ it is admittedly required that his reason have the capacity to induce a feeling 
of pleasure or of delight in the fulfillment of duty, and thus there is required a causality of reason to 
determine sensibility in conformity with its principles.”	
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key conclusion is that—though it is only revealed in experience—we cannot ground the human 
propensity for evil in biology, psychology, or any other discipline that considers the human being 
as an object of empirical science. 
 From the third point, we can gather that respect as the moral incentive is a requirement, not 
for human beings insofar as they exhibit an empirically observable propensity for evil, but for all 
sensibly dependent beings as such. The determinability of sensibility by reason in general, and the 
generation of the feeling of respect in particular, are especially important to the concept of virtue, 
which thereby reveals itself to be a priori in origin. In fact, it is only insofar as action is motivated 
by respect that it can be called virtuous: “since the moral capacity to constrain oneself can be called 
virtue, action springing from such a disposition (respect for law) can be called virtuous (ethical) 
action” (MS 6:394). Thus, what is essential to virtue is articulated on the basis of what is 
metaphysically necessary for a sensibly dependent being in general to act well. 
 In addition, the second and third points articulated above helps to prevent us from swinging 
back towards the objection with which we started in §2.1: namely, that in focusing on the nature 
of rationality as such, Kant’s account fails to capture what is distinct about the human experience 
of morality. Requiring that sensibility be determinable by reason, and respect be present as the 
moral incentive goes some way towards countering this objection: Kant’s acknowledgment of the 
crucial role played by our capacity for feeling helps off-set the worry that Kant over-emphasizes 
the role that reason plays in our practical considerations. However, it is our dependence on feeling 
for the articulation of subjective ends that ultimately fills out Kant’s account of the human being 
as an individual with particular goals, passions, and projects that motivate insofar as they are 
recognized as good.  
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 Given that the foundation of ethics as the cultivation of virtue is grounded in a metaphysical 
account of the practical subjectivity of sensibly dependent beings, we can thus conclude that it is 
more faithful to Kant’s texts to understand his claims about humanity as largely shaped by the idea 
that we are the only available example of rational beings marked by such sense-dependence. So, 
to claim that it is only humans who have a propensity to evil is to claim that we are the only group 
of sensibly dependent beings known, through experience, to put our sensibly determined needs 
above the moral law. But this is more owing to a lack of knowledge of other beings than anything 
specific about our biological, psychological, or historical make-up. We are just the only sensibly 
dependent beings who can be seen to make really possible what is otherwise the merely logical 
possibility of error that is inherent to discursive cognition as such. Because of this, the shape that 
ethics takes for us can be metaphysically grounded. But lest this seem to hold human experience 
at arm’s length, it is equally true that the role of sensibility, in providing the matter to be taken up 
by the spontaneity of reason and the understanding, opens the door to contingency and complexity 
in a way that takes the variability and struggle of human experience into account. We thus have 
grounds to defend Kant against both the objections articulated at the outset of this chapter. He is 
neither consigned to an impoverished account of sensibility, nor guilty of severing his 
consideration of human moral experience from his rationalist metaphysics, effectively treating it 
as a separate subject better explained by empirical science. In short, the development of Kant’s 
practical philosophy as a unique ethical system that can account for the universality and objectivity 
of practical cognition, while at the same time maintaining a viable account of human agency, thus 
appears to be a worthwhile project. As I have begun to show, however, this development is only 
possible to the extent that we understand his rationalism as sense-dependent in a unique way that 
warrants much additional exploration. 
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CHAPTER 3 
  




3.1 The Role of Respect in Kant’s Practical System 
 
 In the previous chapter I introduced the structure of practical discursive reasoning, taking 
special care to highlight what it shares in common with its theoretical counterpart. Beginning in 
§2.2 with the idea of discursive cognition in general, its possibility was grasped through the idea 
of reason, understanding, and sensibility standing in various determining relations to one another. 
In §2.3 these relations were developed using the concepts of form and matter, beginning with the 
idea that sensibility provides the material conditions that individuate particular acts of the cognitive 
capacity, acts whose distinctive form traces back to reason as the capacity to self-consciously grasp 
the necessary relations between its objects. In §2.4, I examined the structure of practical discursive 
cognition as a more determinate species of discursive cognition. There the concepts of the 
agreeable and respect for the moral law were introduced as subjective sensations or feelings that 
meet specific sensible conditions on practical discursive reason. At this point, little has been said 
about the nature of either of these feelings or how they relate to one another. All we have in view 
is that practical discursive reason must simultaneously rely on sensibility for matter, and determine 
it in accordance with its own form. The present chapter’s main concern is to spell out the details 
of this picture. Insofar as respect has been identified as that feeling which represents sensibility’s 
capacity to be determined by practical reason, it will be my main focus here.1 
                                                
1For the idea of practical reason determining sensibility, see page 55 of the present work, which quotes (G 
4:460). 
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 Understanding respect and the role it plays in Kant’s system will involve saying something 
about its phenomenology, whether it should be thought of as primarily affective or intellectual in 
character, and whether it should be considered an essential part of or merely an important auxiliary 
to Kant’s account of practical reason. My account will, however, differ from prominent examples 
in the literature insofar as my central focus is not the special character of respect, but its position 
within Kant's system.2 Understanding this position requires thinking of respect as representative 
of the form of practical sensibility in a way that closely parallels Kant’s account of theoretical 
sensibility. Having this structure in view will help us to answer some of the questions that typically 
motivate the discussion of respect, but answering these questions is not my aim here. Rather than 
providing helpful entry-points to understanding Kant’s concept of practical discursive reason, I 
take them to be symptomatic of a fundamental misunderstanding that will be the focus of my final 
chapter. 
 
3.2 What Makes a Practical Representation Practical? 
 To develop a properly systematic understanding of practical sensibility grounded in the 
idea that the two uses of discursive reason share a common form, we must be careful to attend to 
the differences through which these uses constitute themselves. Any account looking to bring out 
the unity inherent in Kant’s system must be equally careful to grasp the various points at which 
the analogy between theoretical and practical reason must be limited. This is especially true when 
                                                
2 Such examples include Andrews Reath, “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral 
Law and the Influence of Inclination,” in Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory, 8-32 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Richard R. McCarty, “Kantian Moral Motivation and the Feeling 
of Respect,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1993): 421-435. For a more recent example that 
cites extensively from the literature, see Owen Ware, “Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (2014): 727-746.  
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giving an account of practical sensibility and the feeling of respect, for if we take on an overly 
theoretical view of practical reason, one which is more concerned with the objective content of 
representations than their ability to move the subject to act, sensibility’s role will be unfairly 
diminished. On such a view, practical reason will also seem susceptible to objections and worries 
that only get a grip with respect to theoretical reason.  
 We must therefore continue to bear in mind Kant’s definition of practical cognition as 
“cognition insofar as it can become the ground of the existence of objects” (KpV 5:46), and 
“cognition having to do only with determining grounds of the will” (KpV 4:20). These descriptions 
were briefly invoked in the previous chapter to explain the various ways in which discursive 
cognition can relate to its object, but some of their more important implications still need to be 
examined. In particular, it is crucial to note that the practical use of reason, as rational causality or 
will, is unlike its theoretical counterpart in that its characteristic activity does not involve the 
synthesis of matter to represent already existing objects given to reason from elsewhere. As that 
cognition which brings its object into existence, practical cognition only concerns objective 
representations insofar as they are efficacious or motivating.  
 
3.2.1 Sensible Representations 
 We can see the influence of this distinction between theoretical and practical cognition 
throughout Kant’s elaboration of the practical system. Attending to the characteristic activity of 
sensibility, understanding, and reason in their practical use reveals that each is associated with a 
different kind of efficacious representation which Kant contrasts with its theoretical counterpart. 
This contrast is exhibited most vividly if we begin with sensibility and the nature of sensible desire. 
At 5:206 in the Critique of Judgment, Kant characterizes the representation of the agreeable, the 
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object of sensible desire, as “subjective sensation,” marking it out as related to but distinct from 
the “objective sensation” that figures in theoretical representations of objects. As noted in §2.4.2 
of the previous chapter, sensation itself does not constitute a properly objective representation: as 
the characteristic representation of sensibility, our capacity for receptivity, it is nothing more than 
mere affect, the effect of an object on the subject that does not purport to have validity of any kind 
(A19-20/B34). Nevertheless, Kant still finds the subjective/objective distinction useful here. The 
kind of sensation that figures in acts of theoretical reason can be called ‘objective’ in order to 
capture that it represents the object that causes it, 3  while its practical counterpart is called 
‘subjective’ to capture that the sensation is related only to the subject, representing a modification 
of that subject which is brought about by an object without thereby representing it (KU 5:206).  
Because subjective sensation does not represent an object through a manifold of sensible matter, 
Kant emphasizes that it can never figure in the theoretical cognition of that object, and 
distinguishes it from theoretical sensation, sensation proper, with the name ‘feeling’.4 
 It is the subjective, or subject-directed, character of feeling that marks it off as distinctly 
practical. As Kant notes, the feeling of the agreeable does not simply denote affirmation or 
agreement; to understand it this way would be to conflate it with acts of theoretical judgment. 
Feeling is something else altogether, it is the ground or condition of sensible desire. Kant affirms 
this in the same passage from the third Critique: in recognizing an object as agreeable, “it is not 
mere approval that I give it, rather inclination is thereby aroused” (KU 5:207). Feeling is thus 
                                                
3 Though to be clear, it does not represent it as an object, with all the complex conceptual activity and 
synthetic unity this requires.  
4 Using the experience of a meadow as his example, Kant helpfully relates these terms to one another in a 
single sentence: “the green color of the meadows belongs to objective sensation, as perception of an 
object of sense; but its agreeableness belongs to subjective sensation, through which no object is 
represented, i.e., to feeling, through which the object is considered as an object of satisfaction (which is 
not a cognition of it)” (KU 5:206).  
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subjective insofar as it tells us something about the subject, namely that she desires the given 
object. And the notion of desire under discussion here must be understood in a radical Kantian 
sense: as he hints when he says that agreeableness is not akin to approval, to say that one finds an 
object agreeable is to say that the object is practically efficacious for the subject. Rather than 
representing an object whose manifold of representation includes the mark of agreeableness, 
feeling denotes that the object itself is such as to move the subject, to arouse inclination and stir 
the faculty of desire into activity. It is this movement, this efficacy, that is communicated through 
the concept of feeling.5 
 Understanding subjective sensation as subject-directed, efficacious representation entails 
one more important difference that emerges in comparison with objective sensation. Although 
feeling can seem quasi-perceptual insofar as its paradigm instance is occasioned by the direct 
physical presence of an object, its nature as subject instead of object-directed precludes any 
straightforward analogy with theoretical perception. While we rely on testimony in the absence of 
the latter, how we feel about a particular object or action is accessible to us regardless of whether 
it is physically present or not. This should not surprise us: practical reason brings its object into 
existence, so it would be absurd to claim that this same object must always be perceptually present 
to the subject who has yet to act or otherwise engage in practical reasoning. Indeed, it is a central 
tenet of Kant’s theory of moral education that feeling can and should be aroused through reading 
historical or even literary accounts of virtue and vice that describe distant or fictitious ends and 
actions. So although vivid sensible presentations may lead to more lively feelings and thus more 
                                                
5 So described, the agreeable does not strictly speaking even have articulable content. It is a conscious 
representation relating to the subject, but feeling does not represent the subject as being a certain way 
(e.g., as disposed to want the object). As merely receptive, feeling cannot represent at all. It must instead 
be understood as an affect that stirs the subject to represent objects in a certain light, namely, as potential 
ends or objects of practical reason. 
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efficacious representations of ends, the perceptual presence of the object is not a necessary 
condition on feeling. Insofar as feeling captures the sensible aspect of practical and therefore 
efficacious representing, it need not be causally related to some present and existing object. 
 
3.2.2 Representations of the Understanding 
 We find the same distinction between practical and theoretical representations at work in 
Kant’s discussion of the practical use of the understanding, located in the second chapter of the 
analytic in the Critique of Practical Reason. This is where he introduces the categories of freedom 
(KpV 5:66), pure concepts of the understanding relating to the determination of the will, which 
correspond directly to the theoretical categories of nature introduced in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. As pure concepts, both sets of categories determine a fundamental kind of unity for 
experience, providing a highly general, individuating framework for sensibly given matter. As 
explained in §2.2.2 of the previous chapter, it is the self-conscious unifying activity of the 
understanding that grounds the possibility of cognition; without it, the systematic character of 
cognition could not be accounted for. This activity can be described at various levels of abstraction, 
the highest of these being the transcendental unity of apperception, the notion of the pure self-
consciousness or ‘I think’ which must be able to accompany every representation. We also saw, in 
§2.3, that concepts exercise a more determinate form of unifying activity. Amongst these concepts 
are the pure concepts or categories which represent the most fundamental functions of the 
understanding, those without which we could not have theoretical or practical representations of 
objects. These functions are both constitutive of the objects themselves, as well as the relations in 
which they stand to one another, and are thus indispensable to the self-conscious unity of cognition. 
In short, the categories represent those a priori acts of synthesis that make the idea of an 
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interconnected body of self-conscious cognitions possible. Having this in common, the distinction 
central to this section emerges insofar as the categories of nature account for the unity of sensible 
intuitions, which take objective sensations as their matter; while the categories of freedom account 
for the unity of sensible desires, which take subjective sensations as their matter.6 In doing so, the 
latter essentially explain the possibility of organizing our sensible desires in accordance with 
principles of reason.7 
 We can see just how different the activity of the understanding is in the practical case by 
unpacking the function of the categories of freedom. What we have here is not just a 
straightforward parallel between theoretical and practical reason, with experience on one side and 
desire on the other. The activity of the understanding in its practical use is fundamentally different: 
here pure concepts delineate conditions that are constitutive of ends, or representations of objects 
as effects possible through freedom (KpV 5:57). As with theoretical reason, the possibility of 
representing such objects is dependent on pure concepts whose functions govern their most basic 
determinations. But since we are here concerned with ends, effects possible through a free 
causality, what conditions the possibility of these objects of cognition is not a set of concepts 
relating to them as objects of experience, but a set of concepts relating to them as effects of a 
rational causality determined by the representation of laws.8  The categories of freedom thus 
                                                
6 See KpV 5:65, where Kant declares that the categories of nature “bring a priori the manifold of 
(sensible) intuition under one consciousness” while the categories of freedom “subject a priori the 
manifold of desires to the unity of consciousness of a practical reason commanding in the moral law.”  
7 This is not to say that all of our desires stand in systematic unity with one another—only a holy being 
could claim this. To say that the categories of freedom bring unity to experience means only that we can 
relate to our desires by organizing them according to certain practical concepts. This is true even of our 
most wayward, alienating desires. 
8 Hence Kant’s description of the categories of freedom as “modi of a single category, namely that of 
causality, insofar as the determining ground of causality consists in reason’s representation of a law of 
causality which, as a law of freedom, reason gives to itself and thereby proves itself a priori to be 
practical” (KpV 5:65). 
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concern the activity of willing that produces these objects of practical reason, picking out the 
formal aspects of the principles or laws that determine this activity.  
 So as with sensibility, the representations most basic to the practical understanding are 
subject-directed or subjective representations: in this case, such representations are constitutive of 
the self-conscious framing of an object as to-be-brought-about by the subject, i.e., as an end. This 
activity can be described as unifying insofar as it is in virtue of these categories that the subject’s 
manifold desires can be organized into a system governed by practical principles of various levels 
of abstraction. But in this case, the understanding does not organize a sensible manifold to 
represent given objects; instead, it brings conceptual order to a manifold of subjective dispositions, 
determinations of the faculty of desire described above as being efficacious for the subject. The 
practical understanding, with its categories of freedom, thus accounts for our ability to represent 
objects of sensible desire as objects of the will or practical reason, and it does so by containing the 
conceptual determinations in virtue of which ends are brought into existence on the basis of self-
consciously recognized grounds for action.  
 The categories of freedom thus include, among others, the concepts of subjective and 
objective motivation, rules of commission and omission, and permitted, forbidden, and dutiful 
action. In short, they enumerate the concepts required for the subject to be able to act in accordance 
with the self-conscious representation of principles. Kant is clear about how wide this range of 
concepts needs to be: because we are dealing with sense-dependent beings, the categories of 
freedom are constitutive of the use of practical reason in general, including both its pure and 
empirical applications (KpV 5:66). Divided into subsets of three under the same four headings as 
the categories of nature, each subset of the categories of freedom proceeds from concepts that are 
“as yet morally undetermined and sensibly conditioned to those which, being sensibly 
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unconditioned, are determined only by the moral law” (KpV 5:66). Under the heading “Of 
quantity,” for example, we have the concept of merely subjective agreement with practical 
principles, a category which concerns an action’s agreement with practical principles only insofar 
as they are legislated by the subject, making no reference to their objective standing in relation to 
the moral law. Under the heading of modality, Kant includes “the permitted and the forbidden,” 
which concern that which harmonizes or conflicts with a possible practical precept. This category 
allows the subject to grasp how her ends relate to some practical principle, regardless of whether  
it is actually held by any subject, or, furthermore, necessary in accordance with the moral law. As 
Kant points out in the preface to the second Critique, this category is thus indispensable for 
practical reasoning as such, regardless of whether it has a pure use conditioned by a priori 
necessary laws (KpV 5:11, footnote). The categories of freedom are thus concepts that condition 
the possibility of acts of practical reasoning in general. Without such a priori concepts, the subject 
could not incorporate sensibly determined objects into her will as the matter of practical reasoning.  
Importantly, however, the categories of freedom are not just a priori concepts that allow 
the subject to amass ends willy-nilly, like a tumbleweed growing in size. As concepts which make 
it possible for there to be objects of practical reason, the categories of freedom ground the 
possibility that ends can be incorporated into the will in a systematic way. To see this, we can turn 
to an example. Imagine our subject takes up an end on the basis of a subjective maxim. Thus, she 
may go for a walk because she recognizes that she happens to find walking pleasant. To fully 
understand what she is doing, however, we cannot simply rest with this explanation. For her ability 
to come to recognize and act on this rule in turn depends on the recognition that there are not 
different ends which should move her to act instead. If she is to be motivated on the basis of the 
rule described above, she must also understand the extent to which it precludes other conflicting 
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ends, and have some idea of which end should be subordinated to the other. Hence the need to be 
able to grasp whether a certain end is permitted with respect to a possible practical principle. To 
be able to explain her activity as that of a practical reasoner, the subject needs not only to recognize 
that she can go for a walk because she finds it pleasant, she also needs to grasp that walking is the 
kind of activity people can pursue in certain situations, for example to the extent that it does not 
conflict with other possible, actual, or necessary ends.  So the subject does not grasp each category 
individually, independently of reference to any of the others. The categories stand in a network of 
conceptual relationships with respect to one another, and to grasp these relationships is to have 
command of the categories themselves. The subject can thus only individuate ends through the 
categories insofar as she relates her ends to one another in what we can call a ‘practical cognitive 
system’. 
From §2.3 of the previous chapter, we are already familiar with the idea that cognition’s 
form is essentially that of a unified system of representations. Each practical cognition agrees with 
every other, and does so through a network of conceptual relations that allows the manifold of 
sensible desire to be incorporated into the activity of a practical consciousness governed by the 
moral law. So as with cognition of any kind, practical cognitions form a system that is determined 
through the activity of the understanding and reason. But because we are talking about distinctly 
practical representations here, we cannot simply understand an end’s membership in this system 
as a metaphysical fact about it. When the subject acts from practical cognition, she at least 
implicitly recognizes her end as part of this system, and it is this consciousness which is practical 
or efficacious. Thus, a practical cognitive system is distinct from a theoretical one insofar as the 
objects of the former are brought about by the subject on the basis of her recognition that they 
occupy their place in the system. This understanding of practical cognition may not seem to reflect 
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the character of common moral consciousness that Kant values so highly, but in fact it does not 
presuppose any special metaphysical cognition on the part of the subject. 
For Kant, to have practical cognition, to identify an object as good, is to identify it as 
practically necessary in virtue of its agreement with the moral law. This law functions as the 
unifying principle of practical consciousness, that which articulates the conditions on practical 
cognition. When applied to the understanding, this highest form of unity yields a more determinate 
form: we get the concepts required to unify the manifold of desire under practical consciousness. 
Now, instead of the abstract formulation of the categorical imperative, we have, in addition, the 
concepts that allow us to organize particular desires with respect to this principle and the conditions 
on practical cognition it expresses. So, to judge that it would be good to pursue this desire, and act 
based on this judgment, is to implicitly grasp that one’s end stands in agreement with the conditions 
on practical cognition, an agreement that is reflected in that end’s relationship to other ends. This 
implicit or explicit understanding manifests itself in a number of ways that mutually reinforce one 
another. For example, consider the subject who enjoys taking walks in her free time. Insofar as she 
acts from practical cognition in going for a walk, she recognizes that her end is good only insofar 
as it does not infringe upon or exclude other necessary ends. She also sees that what makes her 
end good is not some fleeting relation to her sensible desire, but its relation to the constraints of 
morality. She thus grasps that it is not the pleasure she gets from the walk that ultimately makes it 
a good end, though this is an important aspect of its goodness. What ultimately makes it good is 
the fact that it agrees with other ends, not accidentally, but in virtue of meeting the conditions on 
practical cognition expressed by the moral law. And the subject shows that she recognizes this 
agreement—with other good ends and the law that determines them— insofar as she understands 
that her action can be captured by objective principles, principles which explain why she acted as 
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she did, and can be grasped by other subjects, even those who do not enjoy walking as much as 
she. 
 So when I say that the categories of freedom allow the subject to incorporate ends into a 
practical cognitive system, I mean that they make it possible for her to act on the basis of her at 
least implicit recognition of one particular end’s position within a system of ends, all of which are 
governed by the moral law. This recognition of an end’s place in a system governed by objective 
laws is expressed through the judgment that it is good as opposed to merely agreeable, i.e., that it 
is not the object’s relation to sensible desire, but its relation to concepts of the understanding and 
principles of reason that determine her to act. Moreover, to return to our central point in this 
section, because this self-conscious recognition is what determines the subject’s causality, we must 
say that the categories of freedom are distinctly practical concepts in the sense that they represent 
the determinations in virtue of which one is motivated to act. They condition the possibility of 
causally efficacious representation for a rational being with a will. In short, the practical categories 
are not practical simply insofar as they carve up the world of actions analogously to the way that 
the theoretical categories carve up the world of experience. Rather, they show how sensibly 
dependent reason itself can be practical, bringing about that which it represents. 
 
3.2.3 Representations of Reason 
 While we look to the understanding to characterize practical reason’s objects, we look to 
reason itself for the principles that express its activity. The practical principle thus incorporates the 
representations of sensibility and understanding discussed above, and captures the heart of the 
distinction between practical and theoretical representations that is our focus here. It is common 
to both uses of reason that all cognition from principles can be characterized as cognition through 
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which the subject apprehends the particular in the universal through concepts (A300/B357), or 
determines the particular through the general (20:201).9 This abstract characterization of reason 
captures the way that it accounts for the highest form of unity in our cognitive faculty. While the 
spontaneous synthesis of the understanding is required to account for the unity of sensible 
representations, the activity of reason represents an even higher form of spontaneity, one which 
accounts for the unity of the understanding and its synthetic activity (G 4:452; see also §2.3 of the 
previous chapter).  
 We can see that practical reason and its principles exhibit a more determinate version of 
the above structure by looking to Kant’s argument that the will as identical with practical reason. 
He defines the will as “the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, 
in accordance with principles,” concluding that “since reason is required for the derivation of 
actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason” (G 4:412). In the practical case, 
the particular is cognized in the universal insofar as the subject derives the necessity of a particular 
action on the basis of a general principle. Practical principles thus possess the purest form of 
efficacy for the subject: for it is this recognition of the practical necessity or goodness of an action 
that ultimately determines the will and leads the subject to act. As that which brings unity to 
practical consciousness, the moral law represents the highest practical principle, expressing the 
general form of practical cognition which unites more determinate practical principles possessing 
this form into a system. Whether we think of the moral law itself or one of these more determinate 
practical principles with material content as the source of action, it is ultimately the subject’s 
recognition that a particular end can be incorporated into this principled system that is the source 
                                                
9Apprehending the universal in the particular through concepts is the fundamental activity of the discursive 
intellect (KU 5:406), so it is fitting that it should be common to both uses of reason.  
   75 
of its efficacy, what brings about action. This is the idea at stake in Kant’s insistence that it must 
be the form and not the matter of a practical principle which determines the will. Hence although 
both practical and theoretical reason share the common form of cognizing the particular through 
the general, we can recognize the core difference between the two uses insofar as practical reason 
brings about the existence of what is unified through its principles, while theoretical reason 
formulates principles in order to bring unity to what already exists. 
 This represents the purest formulation of the focal distinction for this section.  Theoretical 
principles organize particular representations of existing objects to form a cognitive system. 
Practical principles bring particular objects into existence by representing them as part of an 
organized system of cognition. The former constitutes the activity of science, the latter that of 
morality. Both operate by determining objects according to laws. But the inverse relation just 
described requires the following crucial difference: theoretical principles characterize objects 
given from elsewhere and thus require a manifold of sensible intuition, while practical principles 
require no such object-directed manifold. The sensibly determined objects of practical principles 
are instead brought into existence insofar as they are recognized as necessary in accordance with 
the universal form of practical cognition, expressed by the supreme principle of pure practical 
reason, the categorical imperative. Hence Kant’s definition of practical principles as “propositions 
that contain a general determination of the will” (KpV 5:19). By expressing the conditions under 
which the objects of practical cognition are to be realized, such propositions determine the subject  
who grasps them to will that their objects be brought about.10 
                                                
10 The account of practical principles I have developed here also helps us to understand the hypothetical 
imperatives, or merely material principles, that specify means to ends (G 4:416, and KpV 5:19-21). These 
say nothing about the objective standing of an end relative to the moral law, but instead determine how to 
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3.3 Respect, the Moral Incentive 
 Now that we have a more detailed understanding of the specifically practical use of reason 
and the various practical representations constitutive of its activity, we can turn to the concept of 
respect and the idea that it represents reason’s determination of sensibility. Though Kant identifies 
respect as a feeling in its own right, he describes it in more detail as “an effect on feeling and hence 
on sensibility” (KpV 5:76), as well as the result of the moral law having an “influence” on 
sensibility which “effects a feeling conducive to the influence of the law on the will” (KpV 5:75). 
Though his analysis of respect is much more extensive in the second Critique, the point behind 
these formulations is perhaps best articulated in book three of the Groundwork:  
“in order for a sensibly affected rational being to will that for which reason alone 
prescribes the 'ought,' it is admittedly required that his reason have the capacity 
to induce a feeling of pleasure or of delight in the fulfillment of duty, and thus 
there is required a causality of reason to determine sensibility in conformity with 
its principles” (G 4:460). 
 
From the fact of our sensibly determined nature, Kant infers the need to show that reason can 
determine sensibility in order to produce the objects of practical cognition. My central claim in 
this section will be that respect represents reason’s determination of the sensible capacity 
mentioned in the above passage, and that insofar as it does represent this, respect can be understood 
as the form of practical sensibility. This form’s essential function is to order the efficacy of sensible 
                                                
realize a given end that has already been adopted. Since actually adopting an end involves the kind of 
practical rational activity described above, we can conclude that hypothetical imperatives possess only an 
indirect kind of efficacy. Whether or not they are capable of moving us to act depends on whether we 
actually will the ends they determine. And whether we do this depends on a given end’s relation to the 
moral law, the most fundamental practical principle which characterizes the nature of practical cognition. 
So, we can make room for hypothetical imperatives in the practical cognitive system I have been 
describing without conceding the fundamental character of this system, or suggesting that instrumental 
action requires a completely different framework. 
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desire, and the result of this activity is motivation to act that is properly limited by the conditions 
of practical cognition expressed by the moral law.  
 As we proceed, the previous section will allow us to further develop this key aspect of 
practical reason by comparing it to the theoretical use while keeping in mind where the analogy 
must be limited. I will claim that in both cases sensibility, our capacity for receptivity, is 
determined by a spontaneous cognitive capacity so that its deliverances can be incorporated into a 
system of cognition. Nevertheless, the central distinction between these two uses of reason will 
remain. For practical reason, the requisite relationship between spontaneity and receptivity is 
secured insofar as sensibility is determinable by reason so as to produce the feeling of respect, the 
incentive that determines the will to bring about good ends, the objects of practical cognition. For 
theoretical reason, it is secured insofar as sensibility is determinable by the understanding so as to 
produce spatiotemporally ordered representations of the world, the objects of theoretical cognition. 
 In the previous chapter, I introduced the idea that the feeling of respect represents the 
subjectively motivating aspect of willing for sensibly dependent beings. Drawing predominantly 
from Kant’s discussion of incentives from the third chapter of the analytic in the Critique of 
Practical Reason, we can develop this idea to arrive at the concept of respect as the form of 
practical sensibility.  
 Kant begins his discussion of incentives by reintroducing the distinction between objective 
and subjective determining grounds of the will. This distinction was initially developed in §2.4 of 
the previous chapter, where I argued that our sensible dependency grounds the logical possibility 
of our acting contrary to the moral law. It does this by subjecting the will to empirically conditioned 
sensible motives that do not necessarily accord with what the law commands. Because of this 
possibility, we need to distinguish between objective and subjective determining grounds of the 
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will when talking about beings with practical discursive reason. Only the representation of 
universal and necessary laws of pure practical reason which hold for every rational being can count 
as objective determining grounds, grounds which express how the will should be determined. But 
given our susceptibility to error, we also need to introduce the idea of subjective determining 
grounds which are expressive of what actually determines the subject’s will. This makes room for 
the idea that the subject can act based on both good and bad, objective and non-objective grounds 
of willing. Kant’s term of art for these subjective determining grounds is ‘Triebfeder’. In English, 
this term is typically rendered as ‘incentive’. Though the translation can lead us to think otherwise, 
what is captured by this term is not the object that motivates but the actual motivation itself. In any 
given act of willing, the Triebfeder is the driving spring, the efficacious representing that brings 
about what it represents.  
 In the case of good willing, the driving spring is nothing other than the moral law itself, so 
the subjective determining ground of pure practical reason just is the objective determining ground. 
The main task of the third chapter of the analytic is to lay out what must obtain if the moral law is 
to serve as Triebfeder for a sensibly dependent being (KpV 5:72). This requires giving an account 
of practical discursive reason on which pure practical reason can determine sensibility. As we shall 
see, the feeling of respect emerges at the center of this account.  
Many commentators interpret this requirement as a vestige of Kant’s interest in moral 
sentimentalism, an empiricist strand of moral theory that occupied him during his formative pre-
Critical years.11 In particular, those who seek to bring out the empiricist commitments in Kant’s 
                                                
11 Cf. Karl Ameriks, “Kant, Hume, and the Problem of Moral Motivation,” in Kant and the Historical 
Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation, 89-107 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Paul 
Guyer, “Reason, Desire, and Action,” in Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant’s Response to Hume, 161-
197 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); and Owen Ware, “Kant on Moral Sensibility and 
Moral Motivation,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (2014): 727-746. 
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position take his discussion of incentives to show that he thinks of motivation as predominantly a 
mechanical issue, one having to do with our sensible nature as it functions independently of reason. 
For example, Paul Guyer argues that the positions of Hume and Kant are alike insofar as Kant 
“also assumes that some sort of what Hume would call an ‘affection’ must be the proximate 
phenomenal or empirical cause of any action, and therefore infers that pure reason must produce 
a moral feeling that can in turn cause the action that reason requires.”12 On this view, the concept 
of an incentive in general and respect in particular are necessary for Kant insofar as they facilitate 
an empirical explanation concerning the causal mechanics of human action in the sensible world. 
So, while the moral law is regarded as an object of reason, the incentive it produces is something 
very different, an object of the natural world which can be characterized in terms of its role in the 
economy of mechanical causes. Such a view exemplifies the dualistic conception of human nature 
it has been my aim to overcome from the opening pages of this project.  
Instead, I am building towards the claim that the affective sensible element of moral 
motivation which Kant undeniably recognizes is meant to fulfill a metaphysical condition on the 
possibility of practical cognition, or cognition having to do with the determining grounds of the 
will (KpV 5:20). This requirement concerns what the nature of sensibly dependent reason must be 
like if the deliverances of sensibility are to figure in acts of practical reason as Kant understands 
it. As sensible beings, our practical principles depend on sensible determinations for their matter. 
As I have argued, while pure practical reason provides the form our principles must have, 
sensibility provides the material. The activity of willing, of practical reasoning, takes place insofar 
as this sensible matter is incorporated under a principle that bears the requisite rational form. To 
                                                
12 Guyer, “Reason, Desire, and Action,” 165. 
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make this picture feasible, however, a further requirement must be met, one which was not 
accounted for in the previous section’s study of practical representations. For sensibility itself, 
considered wholly independently of reason, is merely a receptive capacity to be affected by objects. 
Were we simply to rest with this conception of sensibility, we would have to conclude that it 
operates according to its own laws, and is not responsive to the demands of reason. In this case, 
practical cognition would not be possible, because the subject’s sensible desire would not be 
responsive to her recognition of what morality requires, and her representation of the good could 
not move her. The metaphysical requirement I have been circling around can thus be put as 
follows: if we are to be understood as subjects capable of producing objects through the recognition 
that they agree with practical principles of reason, Kant must have an account as to how the 
efficacy of sensible desire can be conditioned based on its relation to such principles. This is a 
fundamental requirement for his position. Otherwise, dependent beings could have no effective 
way of organizing their sensibly conditioned desires. The categories of freedom may enable us to 
relate our desires to one another as the objects of principles, but absent this further sensible 
condition, the efficacy or motivating power these desires have could not be altered on the basis of 
such rational activity. We would have reason on the one hand, sensibility on the other, and the 
former’s influence could not reach the latter. Such an outcome would completely undermine the 
practical system: our sensible inclinations could not be limited by the moral law, and only action 
that accidentally agrees with its command could result. My claim is that Kant’s discussion of 
respect fulfills this metaphysical requirement, accounting for the fact that sensibility must be 
rationally determined and so responsive to the demands of reason in order to serve in acts of 
practical cognition, acts whose efficacy springs from the recognition of principles rather than the 
pull of sensible affect. Far from the domain of empirical psychology and causal mechanics, Kant’s 
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account of moral motivation is thoroughly metaphysical in nature. It is spurred by a priori 
reflections on the nature of cognition and the faculty of sensibly dependent reason.  
 We can see these reflections at work in Kant’s description of the moral incentive. If the 
moral law is to determine the will, he concludes we must posit, a priori, that its representation can 
have an effect on feeling, the affective element of practical reason. Importantly, this effect is 
explained in cognitive rather than mechanical terms: it occurs insofar as the subject recognizes the 
formal conditions on practical cognition expressed by the law, and grasps that practical 
representations of sensible desire based merely in the efficacy of feeling do not as such meet these 
conditions. When this recognition takes place, what would be an unchecked instance of the subject 
pursuing the object of her desire acquires limits. Insofar as these limits are recognized, the efficacy 
associated with the representation of an object simply insofar as it agrees with sensible desire is 
altered and diminished. Kant describes this in terms of a negative infringement upon the 
inclinations which effects a feeling of pain:  
“for all inclination and every sensible impulse is based on feeling, and the negative 
effect on feeling (by the infringement upon the inclinations that takes place) is itself 
feeling...hence we can see a priori that the moral law, as the determining ground of 
the will, must by thwarting all our inclinations produce a feeling that can be called 
pain” (KpV 5:72-3). 
 
Because it is feeling that accounts for the efficacy, the moving force, of sensible desire, limiting 
its scope involves restricting the feeling it is based on. This restriction, however, does not occur 
insofar as the feeling of pleasure associated with inclination is itself diminished: one can of course 
still find that which is not good agreeable. Rather, what is restricted are the conditions under which 
feeling can figure in practical activity. Insofar as it is limited by the moral law, it is feeling’s 
efficacy, its ability to move the subject, that is affected and rendered less powerful. We see this 
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reflected in Kant’s talk of consciousness of the moral law “excluding the influence of self-love” 
(KpV 5:74) and restricting it “to the condition of agreement with the law” (KpV 5:73).  
 Given this picture, the pain that is produced as a result of the restriction of desire, though 
sensible in character, should not be thought of as akin to any other feeling of displeasure. This pain 
is produced insofar as the subject recognizes that her propensity to act on sensible desire, to 
represent its efficacy as grounds for action, needs to be subject to a further condition to be in 
agreement with practical reason. So what appeared to stand in agreement with one’s capacity to 
produce an object by representing it, and was thus a source of pleasure, is now represented as being 
in disagreement with this same capacity, and thus a source of pain.13 This pain, however, comes 
from a source other than our empirically conditioned sensible relation to the object, lying instead 
in our capacity to recognize disagreement or wrongfulness based upon laws of pure practical 
reason. Hence Kant's re-description of this sensible feeling as “humiliation” and “intellectual 
contempt” for our propensity to be moved by merely sensible desire (KpV 5:75). 
In this way, Kant accounts for the need to show how the efficacy of feeling, the object of 
sensible desire, can be ordered through the activity of reason. Consciousness of the moral law 
determines sensibility in such a way that sensibly conditioned objects of the will, though 
potentially or actually the ground of pleasure, are efficacious for the subject in virtue of something 
other than the feeling they bring about. The moral law that we cannot help but acknowledge forces 
us to grasp that our propensity to make sensible desire the condition of action can never be the 
ground of practical cognition, cognition of the good. As a result of this understanding, the efficacy 
                                                
13 In a footnote in the preface to the second Critique, Kant describes the feeling of pleasure as “the 
representation of the agreement of an object or of an action with the subjective conditions of life, i.e., with 
the faculty of the causality of a representation with respect to the reality of its object (or with respect to 
the determination of the powers of the subject to action in order to produce the object)” (KpV 5:10, 
footnote). 
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sensible desire would otherwise have is limited, and compliance with the law becomes the real 
incentive, the ground that determines the subject’s will. This activity thus has both a negative and 
a positive aspect: by giving new limits to sensible desire, it effects humiliation; but, equally, in 
positioning the moral law as the only truly worthy incentive, it allows the subject to recognize her 
true vocation as a moral being. 
 Respect is the name Kant gives to the positive aspect of this activity, through which reason 
determines sensibility and the law is grasped as the will’s only valid determining ground. Though 
he also identifies it as a feeling, it has a special status as non-pathological and “produced solely by 
reason” (KpV 5:76). As such, respect is not a feeling we have toward the law, not a subjective 
sensation directed towards an idea of reason—this would be impossible since the law cannot be an 
object for sensibility. Rather, as the result of reason determining sensibility in accordance with the 
law, the feeling of respect is representative of reason’s structuring effect on sensibility, and the 
efficacy that the true law of pure practical reason has in virtue of this structuring. Kant thus claims 
that “there is indeed no feeling for this law, but inasmuch as it moves resistance out of the way, in 
the judgment of reason this removal of a hindrance is esteemed equivalent to a positive furthering 
of its causality” (KpV 5:75). So respect both has a sensible character, it is a feeling that can only 
be experienced by sensible and thus fallible beings for whom inclination can serve as a ground of 
motivation; and it is brought about insofar as sensibility is determined by reason. So described, 
respect is not a feeling in the usual sense. It is prior to all other merely pathological feelings, 
capturing how we relate to sensible desire in general insofar as we are beings with practical reason. 
As Kant puts it, respect is not just a feeling in the token sense, “respect is an effect on feeling 
(Gefühl) and hence on the sensibility of a rational being” (KpV 5:76).  
 This special character of respect has been a key part of Kant’s position since the 
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Groundwork. In a footnote in the first section, he defends himself against the objection that his 
emphasis on the feeling of respect mires his philosophy in the very sentimentalism he would like 
to avoid, facilitating an account that seeks motivation in feeling rather than concepts of reason. 
Against this he claims, “respect is a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and 
therefore specifically different from all feelings [received by means of influence], which can be 
reduced to inclination or fear” (G 4:402, footnote). Here Kant again emphasizes that respect should 
be thought of as an effect of the law, rather than its cause—an outcome that would affirm 
sentimentalist principles. As Kant will go on to claim in the second Critique, respect is thus not an 
incentive to morality in the sense that it provides sensibly determined grounds for action that 
precede the law; rather, respect is “morality itself subjectively considered as an incentive inasmuch 
as pure practical reason, by rejecting all the claims of self-love in opposition with its own, supplies 
authority to the law, which now alone has influence” (KpV 5:76). Respect thus represents practical 
reason’s determination of the sensible capacity: without it, we could not account for the need to 
demonstrate that sensibility stands within reason’s purview and is responsive to its demands, a 
condition which must be met if we are to understand human beings as subjects moved to act 
through practical cognition.  
Before moving on to the next section, we should take a moment to recognize just how much 
this a priori relationship between reason and feeling transforms the character of desire and practical 
thinking about action.14 The account I am describing goes well beyond the thought, which prevails 
                                                
14 I owe this technical and evocative use of the term ‘transform’ to Matthew Boyle, who distinguishes 
between additive and transformative accounts in roughly the same way as I distinguish between dualist 
and non-dualist accounts. Cf. Matthew Boyle, “Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique,” European 
Journal of Philosophy 24 (2016): 527-555. Cf. also Barbara Herman, “Transforming Incentives: Feelings 
and the Making of the Kantian Moral Agent,” Philosophical Aspects of the Emotions, ed. A. Carlson 
(Stockholm: Thales, 2005), for similarly minded use of the language of transformation. 
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in dualistic interpretations, that reason subordinates or infringes upon the sensible inclinations 
through the feeling of respect. It is true that Kant often uses this and similar language to describe 
the interaction between practical principle and inclination, but there is also much more at stake 
which the dualist does not and cannot account for. Through practical reason’s determination of 
sensibility and the feeling of respect, Kant accounts for the human capacity to be motivated by the 
practical principle itself. With this capacity, what changes is not just the set of ends that we can be 
motivated to act upon—this is all the dualist can claim—but the very nature of our practical 
activity, the way we desire and set ends.  
As we saw in §3.2, the ability to recognize the validity of the moral law enables us to 
organize our sensible desires into a hierarchical system which possesses objective validity. On this 
picture, we recognize that our sensibly determined ends relate to one another not just on the basis 
of how strongly we desire them, or how mutually attainable they are. We also relate them as ends 
commanded, permitted, and prohibited by the moral law which expresses the formal conditions of 
practical reason. The account of moral motivation I’m attributing to Kant holds that this rational 
activity completely transforms the kind of efficacy that sensible desire has. For non-moral agents 
like relatively sophisticated animals and perhaps very young humans, sensible desire operates as 
the driving force of the faculty of desire. Its presence is sufficient to explain the appropriately 
related action—if we can point to the presence of some relevant desire, we have the whole story, 
we know what moved the agent. In contrast, for the moral agent who is responsive to the demands 
of practical reason and capable of feeling respect, sensible desire only has efficacy, only moves 
the agent, in a much more diminished sense. To explain the action of a moral agent, to capture 
what motivates her, the aforementioned system of ends organized by moral principles must be 
called upon. For it is her recognition that a proposed end agrees with these practical principles that 
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ultimately explains why she acted as she did. That said, however, sensible desire still has some 
important characteristic efficacy, for it is feelings of pleasure and pain, and the desires they 
occasion, which highlight possible ends to pursue, candidates to be organized with respect to the 
moral law. So sensible desire is not so much subordinated as it is transformed: the role it plays in 
the system of desire is radically altered for a rational, moral agent. Instead of capturing the essential 
form of her faculty of desire—as it does for the animal—it indicates only the material element, 
picking out the object of action, but not the action’s fundamental character.  
Compare the view just outlined to that of the dualist like Guyer, who thinks that all or even 
part of respect’s primary function is to fulfill an empirically determined, mechanistic requirement 
on the possibility of action.15 On this picture, sensible desire, isolated from reason, represents the 
paradigmatic case of motivation for the human being. The empirical causal laws that pick out the 
relationship of desire which obtains between subject and object are no different in kind from 
analogous laws characterizing merely animal desire. In this context, the feeling of respect does not 
signify rational transformation, it is invoked as a placeholder which explains how reason can 
occupy the same empirical causal terrain as sensible desire. However we fill out the details of this 
picture, this general approach ensures that practical reason, through the feeling of respect, can only 
subordinate or impose upon inclination, giving the agent new, morally determined ends to pursue, 
but without any fundamental change to the structure and function of sensible desire. The 
metaphysical account of motivation I am arguing for rejects this picture and the strange 
amalgamation of rationalist and empiricist principles it is based upon. 
 
                                                
15 As we will see in Chapter 6, Guyer’s view is representative of the affectivist version of dualism. 
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3.4 The ‘Aesthetic’ of Pure Practical Reason 
 We now have the main features of Kant’s account of respect in view. At this point, it is 
common to seek to better understand this account by asking questions about the character of 
respect as a feeling that is nevertheless intellectual in origin, and the role that it occupies within 
Kant’s system. While some commentators emphasize its nature as feeling, concluding that respect 
has to be primarily affective and sensible in order to constrain the inclinations; others argue that 
only the idea of rational grounding can accomplish this goal, instead emphasizing respect’s 
intellectual character as the subjective aspect of a rationalist moral theory. Such questions are 
usually closely connected with views about its relative importance. Some take respect to represent 
the affective consequence of an otherwise accessible, purely rational consciousness of the law; 
others maintain that it must be understood as an essential part of this original consciousness, 
without which human beings could not fully grasp the authority of the law.16 Rather than wade 
into the debate at this point, I want to avoid these issues and attempt to develop a better 
understanding of Kant’s account of respect by looking to the theoretical philosophy and 
constructing an analogy that tracks the relationship between our spontaneous and receptive 
capacities across both uses of reason. By turning our attention towards the relevant similarities and 
their limits, we will emerge with an account of respect that is not beholden to the range of positions 
demarcated by the above questions, which are commonly taken to set the parameters of the debate. 
                                                
16 Cf. the following views, which will be discussed in Chapter 6: Reath, “Kant’s Theory of Moral 
Sensibility”; McCarty, “Kantian Moral Motivation and the Feeling of Respect”; Ware, “Kant on Moral 
Sensibility and Moral Motivation”; and in addition, Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 233-239; Larry Herrera, “Kant on the Moral Triebfeder,” 
Kant-Studien 91 (2000): 395–410; Jeanine Grenberg, “Making Sense of the Relationship of Reason and 
Sensibility in Kant’s Ethics,” Kantian Review 16 (2001): 461–72; Anne Margaret Baxley, Kant’s Theory 
of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, (New York: Cambridge, 2010); Janelle DeWitt, “Respect for the 
Moral Law: the Emotional Side of Reason,” Philosophy 89 (2014): 31-62. 
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 Kant himself alludes to the possibility of this analogy at the end of the analytic in the 
Critique of Practical Reason. Comparing the second Critique to the first, he notes that the 
conditions on the use of pure practical reason are articulated analogously (analogisch) with those 
of theoretical reason, only in the reverse order (KpV 5:90). While the Critique of Pure Reason is 
divided into a Transcendental Aesthetic and a Transcendental Logic, “that of practical reason, 
reversely, into Logic and Aesthetic of pure practical reason (if I may be allowed to use these 
otherwise quite unsuitable terms here merely for the sake of analogy)” (KpV 5:90).17 As Kant 
suggests with his talk of unsuitable terms, he does not actually use the heading of ‘Logic’ to group 
the first and second chapters of the practical analytic, which deal respectively with principles of 
reason and concepts of the understanding; nor does he give the title ‘Aesthetic’ to the third chapter, 
which deals with incentives of sensibility.18 But he nevertheless takes it that a suitably specified 
analogy is appropriate. Both analytics can be divided insofar as they specify conditions on the use 
of various capacities of mind: reason, understanding, and sensibility. In the case of the first two 
capacities, the structure of both practical and theoretical reason can be articulated in terms of 
principles of reason and concepts of the understanding. For sensibility, however, things turn out 
somewhat differently. While the transcendental aesthetic divided itself into two parts “because of 
the twofold kind of sensible intuition,” the structure of practical sensibility admits of only one, for 
“here sensibility is not regarded as a capacity for intuition at all but only as feeling (which can be 
                                                
17 I have significantly modified Gregor’s translation of the text inside the parentheses, which reads as 
follows in the original German: “(wenn es mir erlaubt ist, diese sonst gar nicht angemessene 
Benennungen, bloß der Analogie wegen, hier zu gebrauchen)” (KpV 5:90). Gregor translates this as, “(if I 
may be allowed, merely by an analogy, to use these terms, which are not altogether suitable)” (page 212 
of the Cambridge edition). 
18 The reason for this is that the practical use of reason, understanding, and sensibility relate, instead, as 
the three steps in a practical syllogism. These steps proceed from a universal law, to the subsumption of 
an object under this law via the concept ‘good’, to the subjective determination of the will to action 
through the feeling of respect (KpV 5:90). 
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a subjective ground of desire), and with respect to it pure practical reason admits of no further 
division” (KpV 5:90). Here, Kant touches upon the fundamental distinction between practical and 
theoretical reason that I emphasized throughout §3.2. The practical use of reason, as rational 
causality or will, is unlike its theoretical counterpart in that its characteristic activity does not 
involve the synthesis of matter to represent objects given to reason from elsewhere. Practical 
reason brings its objects into existence, so in relation to it, sensibility is not regarded as a capacity 
for intuition at all. Taken instead as the capacity for feeling, practical sensibility concerns 
representations only insofar as they are efficacious or motivating. In what follows, this will serve 
as the fundamental limit to the analogy being constructed. Keeping this limit in mind, we can go 
on to explore the parallels between theoretical and practical reason in a way that will illuminate 
Kant’s understanding of respect and the role that it plays in his practical system. Specifically, I 
will argue that for both uses of reason, a particular form of sensibility emerges insofar as the 
sensible capacity itself is determined by other spontaneous capacities of mind so that its 
deliverances can be incorporated into a cognitive system. 
 
3.4.1 Space and Time as the Forms of Theoretical Sensibility  
 As Kant mentions in the passage just quoted, his account of theoretical sensibility in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic divides itself into two parts, as the manifold of sensible object-directed 
content is both spatially and temporally structured. Hence the conditions of its possibility must 
have a twofold form, with one part addressing the possibility of spatially structured, the other the 
possibility of temporally structured representations. For my purposes here, I want to bring out two 
important features of this account. First, as the forms of theoretical sensibility, the concepts of 
space and time bring uniquely sensible elements into the picture, elements that could not be 
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provided by the spontaneous capacities of mind. Second, despite their logical independence, such 
forms are perfectly suited to contribute towards the capacity for theoretical cognition. Importantly, 
this is no accident. By enabling systematizable sensible representations of objects, i.e., 
representations of objects that can be connected with one another in space and through time, the 
forms of theoretical sensibility make it possible for us to represent a sensible world that can be 
organized according to laws, which is, not incidentally, the object of theoretical cognition. This is 
no accident because it is the work of the understanding to determine sensibility, the object of its 
unifying activity, in accordance with its own form. So, while the spatiotemporal nature of sensible 
representations is contributed by sensibility, their unity, their fitness to be objects of cognition, 
comes from the understanding. Hence the idea of spontaneity determining receptivity so that its 
deliverances can be incorporated into a system of cognition. 
 Returning to the first feature of Kant’s account of theoretical sensibility, space and time 
account for something unique about the character of theoretical representations that could not be 
attributed to any other capacity. To bring out what this something is, Kant introduces the language 
of form and matter. As the capacity to be affected by objects, sensibility provides the matter, the 
object of theoretical cognition. If we distinguish the merely material element of its deliverances, 
we have what I have been calling ‘objective sensation’. This term captures “the effect of an object 
on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it” (A20/B34). But importantly, 
Kant thinks we must also account for the formal element of these representations, reserving the 
term ‘form’ for “that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain 
relations” (A20/B34). The verb ‘intuited’ here refers to a special kind of theoretical representation, 
intuition, which Kant describes as “that through which [a cognition] relates immediately to 
[objects]” (A19/B33). So while the term sensation identifies the mere matter of sensibility, the 
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sensible manifold insofar as it is not organized and not an object for theoretical cognition, the term 
‘form’ here picks out the ordering relations in virtue of which the subject can enjoy sensibly 
determined representations of objects, or intuitions. Citing the well-known Kantian dictum that 
unity cannot be given but must rather lie a priori in the subject’s cognitive capacity, Kant concludes 
that the a priori form of intuition can and must be considered separately from sensation (A20/B34). 
We arrive at this form by dividing off both what is given a posteriori, and what is accounted for 
through the concepts of the understanding: 
“if I separate from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks 
about it, such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., as well as that which belongs to 
sensation, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., something from this 
empirical intuition is still left for me, namely extension and form. These belong to 
the pure intuition, which occurs a priori, even without an actual object of the senses 
or sensation, as a mere form of sensibility in the mind” (A21/B35). 
 
The idea of extension and form arrived at here gets expressed in a twofold manner: space represents 
the form of outer sense, determining how intuitions are ordered, both internally and with respect 
to one another. When we subtract what is contributed by empirical sensation and the 
understanding, we are left with space as an ordering principle that accounts for the fact that objects 
are represented as outside us and related to one another: “in space their form, magnitude, and 
relation to one another is determined, or determinable” (A22/B37). Space thus represents “the form 
of all appearances of outer sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone 
outer intuition is possible for us” (A26/B42). Time represents the form of inner sense, through 
which the mind intuits its own activity, accounting for the possibility that its representations are 
connected to one another. Time is a necessary, a priori form of sensibility because “only under its 
presupposition can one represent that several things exist at one and the same time 
(simultaneously) or in different times (successively)” (A30/B46). Without time, we could not 
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comprehend the possibility of change, and thus relate successive states of affairs and our judgments 
about them to one another. 
 To secure his theory that space and time represent a priori forms of sensible intuition, Kant 
provides several arguments as to why each must be thought of as an a priori intuition and not a 
concept, emphasizing their respective characters as singular, immediate, and infinite. These 
features stand in opposition to the defining marks of concepts, which are by nature universal and 
mediate insofar as they specify rules for combination that can be applied to any number of 
representations. A concept can contain an infinite set of representations under itself as objects 
determinable by its rule, but because this rule for combination must be articulable, at least in 
principle, a concept cannot contain an infinite set of representations within itself as marks 
(A25/B40). Space and time thus jointly represent subjectively necessary a priori formal conditions 
on the possibility of sensible representation that, owing to their character, must be attributed to 
sensibility. 
 Moving on to the second feature of Kant’s account that needs to be developed here, we 
have just acquired what we need to see how the form of sensibility allows sensibly determined 
representations to be incorporated into a system of theoretical cognition. As I just argued, the 
spatiotemporal structure of sensible intuition makes it possible for us to represent objects that are 
related to one another in space, and successive to one another in time. These sensible conditions 
enable the subject to have an interconnected body of representations of objects, or what amounts 
to the same, theoretical cognition of nature. We might marvel at sensibility’s being so well-suited 
to its role as the receptive element of theoretical cognition, were Kant not explicit that the unity 
these intuitions possess, in virtue of which they enable us to represent spatiotemporally structured 
objects, must be traced to the understanding as a spontaneous faculty of mind. Thus, it is no 
   93 
accident that the deliverances of sensibility can be incorporated into a system of theoretical 
cognition. They can be, because understanding determines sensibility at multiple levels, as form 
determining matter. Hence Kant’s claim that “sensibility, subordinated to understanding, as the 
object to which the latter applies its function, is the source of real cognitions” (A294/B351, 
footnote). More prominently discussed examples of this subordination include empirical concepts, 
which unify already given sensible representations of objects in acts of judgment; and the a priori 
categories of nature, which unify the matter of sensible intuition to yield representations of objects, 
or theoretical experience.19 What is still missing, however, is the thought that sensibility’s own 
form, which stands as form to the matter of sensation, itself stands as matter for the unifying 
activity of the understanding. That is, space and time, as intuitions that determine the form of 
theoretical sensibility, are themselves subject to acts of synthesis that are constitutive of their very 
possibility.  
 As Kant claims in an oft-cited series of passages from the B-edition of the Transcendental 
Deduction, the synthetic unity belonging to these a priori sensible representations of space and 
time, on which every spatiotemporal representation depends, “can be none other than [the unity] 
of the combination of the manifold of a given intuition in general in an original consciousness, 
in agreement with the categories, only applied to our sensible intuition” (B161). So the a priori 
representations of space and time that determine the forms of theoretical sensibility have unity 
only insofar as a sensibly given manifold—in this case, the manifold of pure space and time—is 
combined in accordance with pure concepts of the understanding. Kant is more up front about this 
                                                
19 This was the subject matter of Chapter 2, §2.3. For additional reading, see Thomas Land, 
“Nonconceptualist Readings of Kant and the Transcendental Deduction,” Kantian Review 20 (2015): 25-
51. Land offers an account of the Transcendental Deduction—the heart of the Critique of Pure Reason—
that is compatible with many of the general claims I make here. I consider his work to be another example 
of what I called ‘resolute hylomorphism’ in Chapter 1.  
   94 
in a footnote on the same page, where he admits that it may not always have been clear that 
sensibility’s form is in part determined by the activity of the understanding: “in the Aesthetic I 
ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all concepts, though 
to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but through which all 
concepts of space and time first become possible” (B161, footnote). At this point he plainly 
describes such synthesis as the activity of the understanding determining sensibility: the unity of 
space and time presuppose synthesis, and “through it (as the understanding determines the 
sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions” (B161). Summing up this activity at an 
earlier point in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant concludes, “the understanding therefore does 
not find some sort of combination of the manifold already in inner sense, but produces it, by 
affecting inner sense” (B155). Here Kant is speaking only of time, but we can extend the point to 
space as well. These a priori forms of intuition thus stand as both matter and form in their relation 
to different capacities. As the product of synthesis, they stand as matter to the form of the 
understanding—they are the material upon which the form of understanding exercises its function. 
As the structuring element of sensibility, they stand as form to the matter of sensation. Hence, we 
can conclude that the form of theoretical sensibility is itself the result of a spontaneous capacity of 
mind determining a receptive one, an activity which yields unique forms of sensible representation 
that are necessary for theoretical cognition.20 
                                                
20 Because, as I have pointed out above, the practical analogue I aim to develop does not involve 
synthesizing a manifold of content to represent objects given from elsewhere, I have abstracted from the 
details Kant gives to describe the exact nature of the synthesis that produces space and time as formal 
intuitions possessing unity. For these details, we should look to §24 of the Deduction. Here Kant 
describes that action through which the understanding “is capable of itself determining sensibility 
internally with regard to the manifold that may be given to it [the understanding] in accordance with the 
form of its [sensibility’s] intuition” (B153). That is, he describes the synthesis that determines the a priori 
unity of the manifold of sensibility. Though the nature of this unity is in part dictated by the 
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 Before moving on to complete the analogy with practical reason, we can again pause to 
recognize some important implications the above reading carries for Kant’s conception of 
theoretical reasoning and human experience more generally. Through the understanding’s 
determination of sensibility, which produces the formal unity of space and time, Kant accounts for 
the sensible conditions that must be met if we are to actually cognize, and not just sense, the world 
around us. As I have said, the objective unity possessed by the forms of theoretical sensibility is a 
condition on the possibility of our experiencing a world of objects which relate to one another in 
space and through time. Without this unity, we would enjoy only a series of unconnected 
representations that could be related associatively, i.e., subjectively. A systematically ordered body 
of objectively valid representations would be beyond our grasp. The activity of the understanding 
thus transforms our capacity to sense in a radical way, marking the difference between those beings 
who merely enjoy subjective sensible representations, and those who perceive an ordered world 
which possesses the unity of cognition explored in the previous chapter. This difference goes well 
beyond the mere possession of concepts and the ability to judge. On the view I am suggesting, 
what makes us cognizing beings is not that our independently intelligible sensible experiences—
the deliverances of sensibility—can be taken up as the objects of theoretical judgment. Rather, our 
                                                
spatiotemporal nature of sensibility itself, Kant ascribes its active formation to the transcendental 
synthesis of the imagination:  
 
“insofar as its synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, which is determining and not, like 
sense, merely determinable, and can thus determine the form of sense a priori in accordance 
with the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the 
sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions, in accordance with the categories, must 
be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is an effect of the understanding 
on sensibility and its first application (and at the same time the ground of all others) to 
objects of the intuition that is possible for us” (B151-2).  
 
Though this synthesis is an act of the understanding, its dependence on sensibility means it is not merely 
intellectual, so Kant reserves a separate term—figurative synthesis—for it (B151). 
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cognitive relationship to the world is even implicated in the way we sense, which is altered through 
sensibility’s a priori relationship to the understanding. So just as our capacity to feel respect marks 
us as distinctively moral agents whose desire functions in an entirely new way, our capacity for 
unified spatiotemporal representation marks us as cognizing beings whose capacity for sensible 
representation takes on a completely different character. 
 Consider, again, the case of the non-rational animal or human infant who does not (or does 
not yet) reason. For such a creature, mere sensation, unrelated to a faculty of cognition, operates 
as the essential object of its power of representation. We need only point to such sensations to 
explain the fundamental form of sensory consciousness at work. In contrast, for the being who can 
enjoy experience—theoretical cognition of nature—in the full-blown Kantian sense, the appeal to 
sensation only partially explains the character of her sensory consciousness. To capture what goes 
on when her power of representation is activated, we must appeal to the synthetic activity of the 
understanding and the unified, spatiotemporal world it makes it possible for us to experience. That 
said, however, sensation still plays some important characteristic role, for it is sensation that 
provides the matter for sensible experience. So just as in the practical case, our capacity to sense 
is transformed—acquires a new form—while its deliverances make a key contribution to the 
activity of a higher, spontaneous capacity. With this transformation, instead of capturing the 
essential form of our power of representation—as it does for the non-rational animal—sensation 
indicates only its material element, marking that aspect of representation which the object affects 
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3.4.2 Respect as the form of practical sensibility 
 We now have in hand Kant’s accounts of respect and space and time, as well as some 
general thoughts about the way these representations function to transform the fundamental 
activity of sensibility in both its practical and theoretical uses. At long last, we are finally in a 
position to articulate an analogy between the two uses of reason, as always taking care to recognize 
its limits. In the above section, we saw that theoretical sensibility fulfills a necessary condition on 
theoretical discursive cognition by providing an organized manifold of spatiotemporally structured 
content. Were this condition not met, the subject could not have interconnected representations of 
the sensible world, or theoretical cognition. As we have seen, such representations always involve 
the spontaneous synthetic activity of the understanding, but their spatiotemporal form, and the 
matter organized by this form, are nevertheless uniquely sensible, and cannot be attributed to 
anything other than a receptive capacity. Drawing on our work in §3.2, we can see that sensibly 
determined practical representations differ insofar as the requisite sensible conditions do not 
concern object-directed sensible manifolds, but subject-directed sensations, or feelings. Because 
representations of feeling do not contribute to the cognition of already existing objects in the world, 
our account of sensible form will differ substantially. Given the way sensibility relates to practical 
reason, the formal aspect of practical sensibility must concern only the character of sensible 
efficacy, or that which accounts for the subjective motivation of a sensibly dependent being. 
As we saw, Kant describes the form of theoretical sensibility as “that which allows the 
manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations” (A20/B34). These sensible 
ordering relations allow theoretical representations to be directed towards a world of 
interconnected, law-governed objects. In contrast, the form of practical sensibility, as that which 
allows the manifold of sensible desire to be ordered in certain relations, accounts for sensible 
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conditions on the possibility of practical cognition. As cognition that brings its object into 
existence through the representation of laws, practical cognition creates its object by recognizing 
it to be part of a law-governed system of cognition. So if respect is to be understood as the form 
of practical sensibility, it must be constitutive of the sensible conditions that make this variety of 
cognition possible. 
 The account of respect developed in §3.3 provides us with the resources to make this 
argument. We saw that Kant thinks of respect as the effect that consciousness of the moral law has 
on sensibility, an effect which conditions sensible desire, bringing it into agreement with the moral 
law. Insofar as the efficacy of desire is so ordered, the propensity to act based on merely sensible 
desire is diminished and the efficacy of the law is thereby increased. This structuring effect 
manifests itself subjectively in terms of feeling: as the subject’s representation of the law is 
rendered efficacious, she experiences a positive feeling that is the sensible, subjective aspect of 
the will’s determination to action, what Kant calls “a positive furthering of its causality” (KpV 
5:75). This moving force or incentive is respect, the result of reason determining sensibility to 
yield a unique sensible representation that is necessary for practical cognition.  
 Drawing on the hylomorphic language of the Transcendental Aesthetic, the analogy 
unfolds as follows: just as space and time can be understood as a priori forms of theoretical 
sensibility which allow objective sensations to be ordered in certain relations, respect can be 
thought of as an a priori form of practical sensibility which allows subjective sensations to be 
ordered. Only instead of conditioning the spatiotemporal relations that are necessary for theoretical 
cognition, respect conditions the relations between desires necessary for practical cognition. As 
we saw above, if the will is to be immediately determined by laws of reason, it must be possible 
for the subject to organize and pursue her sensible desires based on the recognition of such laws. 
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This is precisely what respect makes possible, by ordering the efficacy of sensible desire in 
accordance with the demands of morality. With both theoretical and practical reason then, we can 
characterize sensibility in terms of form/matter unities that arise insofar as form determines or 
performs its essential act on matter, resulting in a representation exhibiting that form. While space 
and time stand as form to the matter of objective sensation, respect stands as form to the matter of 
subjective sensation. In the latter case, respect’s essential activity is the ordering of sensible desire; 
and the result of this activity is a sensibly determined, efficacious representation that manifests the 
objective unity of practical cognition.  
 Drawing on the above passages from the Transcendental Deduction, the analogy continues: 
with both uses of reason, the form of sensibility stands as matter to the activity of a spontaneous 
capacity of mind. This characterization brings out the source of these formal representations, 
marking the transformative activity indicative of the non-dualistic, unified reading I am arguing 
for. While space and time depend on the synthetic activity of the understanding, respect depends 
on the activity of reason. As we have seen, Kant speaks of both space and time and respect as the 
result of a spontaneous cognitive capacity determining sensibility (B161 footnote; G 4:460). 
Moreover, these formal representations can be thought of as both constituted through and capable 
of enabling the characteristic activities of these capacities. Space and time as pure intuitions are 
constituted through the synthetic activity of the understanding (B161), and as forms they enable 
this synthetic activity by allowing the manifold of sensation to be intuited as ordered in certain 
relations, thereby ensuring that theoretical cognition can be given an object to cognize (A20/B34). 
Respect is brought about through the determination of the will by pure principles of reason, and as 
form it enables this determination by limiting sensible desire to the condition of compliance with 
such principles, thereby ensuring that practical cognition can produce the object it cognizes. For 
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each use of reason, insofar as sensibility is determined by spontaneity, the possibility that there 
can be the appropriate matter for cognition is ensured. We can thus think of both forms of 
theoretical and practical sensibility as fulfilling necessary conditions on cognition, conditions 
which work by structuring the deliverances of sensibility so that they can be incorporated into the 
relevant cognitive system. The forms of theoretical sensibility condition the possibility of 
organizing particular representations of given objects into a system of theoretical cognition. The 
form of practical sensibility conditions the possibility of bringing objects into existence by 
representing them as part of an organized system of practical cognition. 
 Thus, although Kant does not officially introduce his discussion of practical sensibility 
under the heading of an ‘Aesthetic’ of pure practical reason, we can see why he thought it 
appropriate to draw a limited analogy with the aesthetic of pure theoretical reason when talking 
about respect. In what follows, this analogy will be used to flesh out the idea of sensible conditions 
on practical cognition introduced at the end of Chapter 2, in §2.5.  
 
3.5 Sensible Conditions on Practical Discursive Reason 
 
Now that the idea of practical sensibility having both a form and a matter has been 
developed, we can express the upshot of our analogy with theoretical reason in more succinct terms 
that will prove useful in the coming chapters. While we already had in hand the concept of sensible 
conditions on willing at the outset of this chapter, we can now distinguish between formal and 
material sensible conditions. This will allow us to make sense of Kant’s project in a new and 
fruitful way that sidesteps many of the problems interpreters are commonly faced with. 
Material sensible conditions capture the need for sensible content that was introduced in 
Chapter 2. There I argued that our ends depend on the contributions of sensibility in order to be 
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individuated as objects for practical reason. In the present chapter, this idea reappeared throughout 
§3.2 in various forms. In §3.2.1, it was argued that subjective sensation or feeling, the object of 
sensible desire, is required to represent possible ends. Through the sensible efficacy of feeling, the 
faculty of desire is awakened and practical reason is put in a position to incorporate new objects 
into itself. We also met with the need for sensible content in §3.2.2, during our brief discussion of 
the categories of freedom. There, I discussed how practical cognition depends on a manifold of 
sensible desire that is to be organized into a system of rationally determined ends. Finally, in 
§3.2.3, we saw how this system is organized insofar as these ends are incorporated into the will on 
the basis of practical principles of reason. So, although practical reason determines itself through 
such principles, and does not rely on sensibility for the ground or condition of such incorporation, 
subjective sensation or feeling is still a necessary component for the activity of practical discursive 
reason. Insofar as the paradigmatic instance of feeling is captured through Kant’s concept of the 
agreeable, we can say that the agreeable, the object of sensible desire, functions as an a priori 
material sensible condition on willing. 
In contrast, formal sensible conditions capture what must be the case for material sensible 
conditions to be realized in acts of practical cognition. That is, they capture what must take place 
for the will to be able to incorporate sensible matter into itself in accordance with its own a priori 
law and only valid determining ground. Using the language from the theoretical philosophy 
adopted above, formal sensible conditions on practical reason articulate that aspect of sensibility 
which allows the manifold of sensible desire to be ordered in certain relations. Insofar as the system 
of cognition that results is a practical one, these ordering relations are reflected through the relative 
efficacy that the practical representations in the system have for the subject. Through the work of 
§3.3, we have been set up to recognize that the concept of respect is uniquely suited to fulfill this 
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formal condition. Insofar as it represents practical reason’s determination of the capacity to feel, 
the feeling of respect is what allows the efficacy of sensible desire to be ordered in relation to the 
moral law. We can thus identify the concept of respect as what fulfills this a priori formal sensible 
condition on willing. Together, our two sensible conditions express that there must be sensible 
content, and that this content must, in virtue of its form, be suitable for practical cognition. Insofar 
as respect limits the efficacy of the agreeable, both of these conditions are met and the possibility 
of practical discursive cognition is secured from the sensible point of view.  
This newfound sense of the position that the concept of respect occupies within Kant’s 
system will prove beneficial as we approach various interpretive puzzles in the chapters to come. 
As I will argue, we can develop the implications of the view I give here to rethink Kant’s general 
account of motivation. As I promised above, we can also re-frame the secondary literature about 
respect: furnished with the notion of respect as the form of practical sensibility, questions about 
whether respect should be thought of as primarily intellectual or affective in character reveal 
themselves to be limited and misleading. So do questions about the relative importance of respect 
within Kant’s system, which put one at risk of overemphasizing Kant’s rationalism, or making too 
much of his sympathy with sentimentalist theories and their emphasis on feeling.  
Before we get to these issues, however, we must consider another one suggested by and 
framed through our analogy with theoretical reason. One of the central claims made so far has been 
that our sensible dependency conditions the logical possibility of error. This is as true in the 
theoretical as it is in the practical case. However, due to differences inherent in these two uses of 
reason, our account of error must also vary across the two. As we will see, error does indeed have 
a common form. But the practical case appears unique insofar as instances of moral error or 
wrongdoing seem to take on a more radical departure from the form of practical cognition that 
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should determine acts of practical judgment or willing. We can cash this out in the terms developed 
here by saying that theoretical intuitions, though often the object of erroneous judgment, always 
agree with the pure categories of the understanding and exhibit the spatiotemporal sensible form 
that characterizes our sensibility. Kant takes great pains to show that this is the case in the 
Transcendental Deduction in the first Critique. It is, however, less clear that the analogous version 
of these requirements holds in the case of practical reason. Owing to our propensity to evil, it 
appears that sensible matter is more resistant to reason’s form. Actions that flout the law appear 
instead to have a form of their own, one conditioned not by respect for the moral law, but concern 
for oneself. Indeed, Kant seems to be affirming this very possibility through his description of the 
propensity to evil as the propensity to invert the claims of morality and self-love, so that the moral 
law is subordinate to that of sensibility, and the form of one’s maxim is the inverse of what it 
should be (R 6:36). So, we must ask, are there cases where the matter of practical sensibility can 
resist its own form? This will be the topic of the next chapter, which deals with moral evil in all 
its manifestations. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
Respect and the Possibility of Evil 
 
 
4.1 Must We Break the Analogy for Evil? 
 
 From the Groundwork onwards, Kant is forthright that humans are imperfect beings whose 
sensible dependency precludes the possibility of a certain conception of virtue. Of course, we are 
not holy beings: the moral law is not subjectively necessary for us, we can act on evil principles 
and do evil things. But beyond this, we find in Kant an insistence that however good we manage 
to become, we must always guard against a deeply rooted threat of moral corruption, a threat that 
remains very real because it is inseparable from the nature of sensibly dependent reason itself.  
 We first became acquainted with the possibility of evil in Chapter 2, where I sought to 
clarify Kant’s concept of practical reason by relating it to the concept of discursive reason as such, 
and being mindful of the structural form common to both practical reason and its theoretical 
counterpart. The concept of evil emerged in §2.4.1, where we saw that the logical possibility of 
evil exists for every sensibly dependent being with practical reason, simply in virtue of its sensible 
dependency.1 In this respect, practical evil is no different from theoretical error or false judgment. 
The logical possibility of either can only attach to a discursive intellect, for only discursive 
intellects possess a receptive, sensible capacity, and sensibility is a necessary condition on the 
possibility of corruptible cognitive activity.2  
                                                
1This argument was made on the basis of G 4:412-13. See also G 4:449, LE 27:519, and LE 27:520. 
2 Recall the first Critique passage at A295/B351 quoted earlier: “sensibility, subordinated to 
understanding, as the object to which the latter applies its function, is the source of real cognition. But this 
same sensibility, insofar as it influences the action of the understanding and determines it to judgments, is 
the ground of error.” 
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 I continued to develop the concept of specifically practical wrongdoing in §2.5, arguing 
that the real possibility of evil only emerges for human beings insofar as a universal propensity 
(Hang) to evil can be ascribed to us. Kant incorporates the concept of propensity into his picture 
to safeguard against the objectionable conclusion that moral evil is simply the result of a natural 
state of dependency or finitude, instead of an autonomous act of free choice. Thus, although the 
logical possibility of evil is accounted for just insofar as we are subject to sensibly determined 
desires that condition possible ends not necessarily in accord with morality, the real possibility of 
evil requires something more, namely, a ground on the basis of which the subject can actually 
determine itself to act contrary to the moral law. 3  Neither the general fact of our sensible 
dependency, nor specific objects of desire that press upon the subject because of this dependency 
can supply the ground in question. For Kant, accounting for the real possibility of moral evil 
requires showing that the subject can freely adopt maxims which flout the constraints of morality. 
Sensibly determined desire makes it possible for such maxims to have objects and so is a necessary 
condition for evil, but it cannot ground the free acts of reason that ultimately cause it. As we saw 
in Chapter 2, reason is a spontaneous intellectual capacity, and as such it must be self-determining 
regardless of whether it is intuitive or discursive in nature, theoretical or practical in use. To 
adequately explain the failures of practical reasoning that warrant the name ‘evil,’ Kant invokes 
the concepts of frailty (Gebrechlichkeit), impurity (Unlauterkeit), and depravity (Bösartigkeit). 
Sufficiently developed, these subjective conditions of human reason, which Kant also refers to as 
“grades” of the propensity to evil (R 6:29), allow us to account for the real possibility of human 
                                                
3 Kant defines the concept of propensity in general as “the subjective ground of the possibility of an 
inclination, insofar as this possibility is contingent for humanity in general,” and the propensity to evil in 
particular as “the subjective ground of the possibility of the deviation of maxims from the moral law” (R 
6:29). 
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evil without giving up the central claim that evil results from the free exercise of practical reason, 
and not merely our sensuous nature. For although frailty, impurity, and depravity can only take 
root in sensibly dependent beings, Kant insists that they are the result of a kind of spontaneous 
rational activity that is at once transcendent and yet completely natural to us. It is our proneness to 
this rational activity which constitutes the perennial threat of moral corruption we must guard 
against. 
 So far, we have a rather skeletal account of human evil that respects the central tenets of 
Kant’s metaphysics of mind, and in so doing, maintains an analogy between practical and 
theoretical reason that takes as its basis their common form, what we might call the form of 
discursive reason as such. In Chapter 3, I continued to expand this common form and resultant 
analogy by proposing that we think of respect for the moral law as roughly analogous to space and 
time, the forms of theoretical sensibility that Kant develops in the Transcendental Aesthetic and 
Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason. Taking his arguments about space and 
time as my guide, I developed a more abstract account of the concept of sensible form, describing 
it as the product of a spontaneous activity of mind which structures the deliverances of sensibility 
so that they can figure in acts of cognition. I then made a case for respect being the result of reason 
spontaneously determining sensibility, an activity which has the required structuring effect insofar 
as it limits sensible desire to the condition of compliance with morality. Without respect, the 
deliverances of practical sensibility, i.e., feelings of the agreeable that attach to objects of the 
faculty of desire, could not serve the function they do. Their efficacy—their ability to move us—
would not be responsive to concepts of the understanding and principles of reason, and practical 
cognition would be impossible for the sensibly dependent being. There would be no unified 
subject, and representations of reason could not spur action. The concept of respect thus plays a 
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role analogous to that of the theoretical forms of sensibility, and we can think of it as constituting 
the form of practical sensibility whenever helpful. 
 As we saw at the end of Chapter 3, however, my aim to develop the concept of sensibly 
dependent reason by articulating a common structure shared by both its uses runs into some 
difficulty once the notion of a form of sensibility as such is introduced. The difficulty is this: the 
activity of willing evil maxims appears to depart more radically from the conditions of practical 
cognition than the activity of judging falsely does from the conditions of theoretical cognition. 
More specifically, while all objects of theoretical judgment, whether true or false, exhibit the 
spatiotemporal forms of theoretical sensibility, objects of evil willing do not appear to be 
conditioned by respect as the form of practical sensibility. In the Groundwork, Kant’s measure for 
whether an action has moral worth is whether it has been done out of respect for the moral law, 
implying that a great many actions are not done from respect. He even goes so far as to declare 
that we cannot be sure whether there has ever been a single action performed from the moral 
incentive of respect for law, independently of any other sensible incentive (G 4:407). The sensible 
matter of practical reason thus seems more resistant to the characteristic form I ascribed to it in 
Chapter 3. So we must ask, does the propensity to evil make sensible desire naturally resistant to 
reason? Does it loosen the analogy between practical and theoretical reason, destroying the 
possibility of a common form that reaches all the way down to sensibility? 
 In what follows, I will show that the real possibility of evil does not force us to accept a 
crude impositionism which casts sensibility as resistant to reason, nor does it jeopardize the 
common form of sensibly dependent reason I have sought to develop. We need not worry that 
Kant’s picture entails either of these results, and the interpretive position articulated in the previous 
chapter provides the resources needed to show this. Taking up the distinction between formal and 
   108 
material sensible conditions on practical reason articulated in §3.5, we can account for the 
possibility that respect figures as a sensible condition even for evil willing. Pursuing this line of 
argument will effectively elaborate upon Kant’s claim from the Religion that the human being 
naturally incorporates both moral and sensible incentives into every maxim because the law 
imposes itself irresistibly upon all of us, and cannot fail to elicit our respect for it (R 6:36). Hence, 
despite other fundamental differences between good and evil maxims, both can be said to 
incorporate the feeling of respect for law. So we must conclude that reason cannot fail to determine 
sensibility in accordance with its own conditions.4 If this determination could not take place, the 
possibility of practical cognition would be precluded from the start and, as Kant puts it in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, the subject would be “morally dead” (MS 6:400).  
 So we need not conclude that evil derails our analogy and precludes thinking of respect as 
the form of practical sensibility. Completing my argument to this effect does, however, require 
that we recognize a further limit to the analogy between practical and theoretical reason that is a 
major part of the project at hand. In the Chapter 2, I used Kant’s own articulation of the distinction 
between sensibly dependent reason’s two uses, arguing that any analogy between them would be 
limited by the fact that theoretical cognition determines an already existing object given from 
elsewhere, while practical cognition can bring the object it determines into existence (KpV 5:46; 
Bix-x). This limit was further determined in §3.2 of the previous chapter, where I argued that 
practical and theoretical reason differ fundamentally insofar as practical cognition does not, like 
                                                
4 This is not to say that all sensible matter is necessarily determined by reason to be in accordance with 
the conditions of practical cognition. Were this the case, all action would be morally good and human 
beings would be holy by nature. As we will see, the point is only that sensibility cannot fail to be 
responsive to the dictates of pure practical reason: we necessarily take an interest in morality and feel pain 
when confronted with our wrongdoing. This is what it is to have the feeling of respect irrevocably shape 
the character of our sensibility, turning us into autonomous moral beings who have what Kant calls 
‘personality’. 
   109 
its theoretical counterpart, involve a synthesis of sensible matter yielding representations of 
independently existing objects. Rather, practical cognition relates to representations of objects only 
insofar as these representations are efficacious or motivating, i.e., capable of bringing about the 
cognitive activity that produces, reproduces, or maintains the object’s existence. In addition, as we 
will see in the present chapter, the two uses of reason also differ insofar as each has a uniquely 
transcendent application resulting from a natural dialectic of reason. As Kant tells us in the 
introduction to the second Critique, theoretical reason is transcendent in its pure speculative use, 
while practical reason is transcendent in its empirical use (KpV 5:16). The latter manifests itself 
insofar as empirical practical reason, in the guise of claims to self-love and the preponderance of 
happiness, assumes it can provide the supreme determining ground of the will.5  
 It is precisely this propensity to transcendence that is captured by Kant’s account of evil in 
the Religion, so developing this new analogical limit will help us see how sensibly dependent 
reason can have a common form, despite the fact that its two uses differ in respect of their objects, 
characteristic activities, and natural dialectics. A complete development of the distinctly practical 
dialectic found in Kant’s conception of reason will require an analysis of the different grades of 
the propensity to evil: frailty, impurity, and depravity. This will be my task in §4.3 and §4.4. First, 
however, we must return to the topic of respect and make the case for its being an ever-present 
incentive that shapes the nature of sensibility for dependent rational beings.  
 
 
                                                
5 In the second Critique, Kant describes this propensity to evil using the term “self-conceit,” which he 
describes as “claims to esteem for oneself that precede accord with the moral law” (KpV 5:73). 
Commentators often use this term to discuss respect and the possibility of evil, but I will stick to the 
terminology of the Religion here as I take it to be both more evocative and more precise.  
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4.2 Two Senses of Respect 
 The task at hand is to provide further support for my claim that respect figures as the form 
of practical sensibility by showing how it is consistent with the fact that humanity has a necessary 
propensity to evil, and often acts from incentives other than respect. To do this, we must distinguish 
between the concept of respect as a singular feeling that has more or less efficacy for subjects in 
different situations, and the concept of respect insofar as it signifies the sensible aspect of 
consciousness signifying our responsiveness to morality’s constraints. Doing so allows us to 
recognize how respect can fail to have the requisite efficacy, thus giving rise to evil action, without 
completely disappearing from the picture. The upshot of this section will be a more determinate 
version of my argument that respect can be thought of as the form of practical sensibility, one that 
takes the possibility of evil into account. I am effectively building towards the claim that respect 
necessarily shapes or determines the sensible aspect of all action, regardless of whether the subject 
fails to actually take respect for the law as her determining ground. That respect can be understood 
as a formal condition on sensibly dependent willing in this way belies an ineradicable interest in 
the good that permeates the objective and subjective aspects of all action, good or evil. This is 
what allows the deliverances of practical sensibility to figure in a distinctively ethical life, one 
which is guided by the subject’s capacity for practical cognition.  
The distinction between respect narrowly construed as actual determining incentive, and 
respect more broadly construed as a necessary sensible condition on moral personhood is present 
from the outset of Kant’s mature practical writing. As mentioned above, in the Groundwork he 
introduces the concept of respect as an incentive that excludes all other merely material incentives 
and constitutes the condition of morally worthy action:  
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“an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of inclination and with it 
every object of the will; hence there is left for the will nothing that could determine 
it except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, 
and so the maxim of complying with such a law even if it infringes upon all my 
inclinations” (G 4:400-1). 
 
This description of respect as the only legitimate subjective determining ground of the will 
exemplifies the first use of the concept, the one predominantly taken up in the literature. It focuses 
on respect as what ought to serve as the determining ground for a sensibly dependent, morally 
necessitated will, to the exclusion of all other merely sensible incentives that arise from 
inclination.6 Used in this context, it is clear that respect often and, for all we know, perhaps always 
fails to determine the will.  
 The second sense of respect, the one I am trying to bring out here, emerges in a well-known 
footnote on the very same page that describes the concept as follows:  
“what I cognize immediately as a law for me I cognize with respect, which signifies 
merely consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without the 
mediation of other influences on my sense. Immediate determination of the will by 
the law and consciousness of this is called respect, so that this is regarded as the 
effect of the law on the subject, and not as the cause of the law. Respect is properly 
the representation of a worth that infringes upon my self-love” (G 4:402, footnote). 
 
Note the subtle differences from the first use of the term: here respect is described as both 
consciousness of the will’s subordination to the law, and the representation of its worth when 
compared with principles of self-love. Taken in this sense, respect is not a strictly limited 
determining ground that may never have actually been taken up into the will of a living being to 
the exclusion of all other incentives; instead, it is a sensible precondition on the possibility of 
                                                
6 Recall that Kant uses the concepts of incentive and subjective determining ground more or less 
interchangeably. In the second Critique, he defines an incentive as “the subjective determining ground of 
the will of a being whose reason does not by its nature necessarily conform with the objective law” (KpV 
5:72). 
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morality itself. As we saw in §3.3 of the previous chapter, if sensibility cannot be affected by the 
recognition of laws of pure practical reason, then those laws cannot have efficacy for the willing 
subject.7 Understood as consciousness of the rational force of the law, consciousness that has an 
effect on sensibility in the form of feeling, the second sense of respect meets this necessary sensible 
condition. This gets us to the import of my distinction between two senses of respect: as a condition 
on the very possibility of moral obligation, of being a practical knower capable of grasping and 
being moved by the concepts of good and evil, the second sense of respect remains an ineradicable 
constant in the lives of moral beings like us.  
 We can thus think of the relation between these two senses of respect as corresponding to 
that between a capacity and its actualization. As I argued in Chapter 3, as practical rational beings 
our capacity for sensibility must be responsive to reason—if we are to act from cognition of the 
good, we must be able to order sensible desire in response to the moral law, i.e., we must be able 
to feel respect. Insofar as this is the case, sensibility always already bears the mark of rational 
determination. This level of description simply characterizes the capacity itself, its particular form, 
regardless of how it is actualized. Now, in thinking about the latter, we move to the more 
determinate sense of respect. Because we are fallible creatures, our sensibility might be improperly 
actualized in acts of practical reason.8 That is, our practical judgment and sensible desire might 
fail to be ordered so as to move us to act from recognition of the moral law alone. In this case, the 
                                                
7 Recall the pivotal passage at G 4:460: “In order for a sensibly affected being to will that for which 
reason alone prescribes the ‘ought,’ it is admittedly required that his reason have the capacity to induce a 
feeling of pleasure or of delight in the fulfillment of duty, and thus there is required a causality of reason 
to determine sensibility in conformity with its principles.” 
8 Importantly, it is not that sensibility itself misfires, but that sensible matter is not properly taken up by 
reason. Error arises from the interaction of two logically separate capacities, not the failure of a single 
one. More on this below. 
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subjective determining ground of the will is not what it should be, and I fail to feel respect as the 
incentive that moves me to act on its own, independently of any other incentive.   
  In addition to the philosophical reasons I give to make this distinction between respect as 
the form of a capacity, and respect as a particular feeling, there are terminological reasons to do it 
as well. When Kant talks of respect having an effect on feeling, he typically uses the term Gefühl. 
Consider the following pivotal passage from the second Critique: “respect is an effect on feeling 
(Gefühl) and hence on the sensibility of a rational being” (KpV 5:76). As other commentators have 
pointed out, and the present quote suggests, Kant is using the term in a way that is more expansive 
than its English equivalent would suggest.9  To fully capture Kant’s use of the term usually 
translated as feeling, we need to mark and make use of the difference between feeling as it denotes 
the capacity to feel, and feeling as it denotes a particular sensible episode. When Kant talks of 
reason having an effect on feeling, he is often talking at the level of capacities and their interaction.   
Richard McCarty puts the point especially well for my purposes here: “Kant sometimes used the 
word ‘feeling’ (Gefühl) to refer to particular, datable feelings of pleasure and displeasure. But 
more often he used it to refer to the capacity or susceptibility for such feelings. In the latter sense 
the feeling of respect for law would constitute a central component of moral character.”10 
 The forgoing line of argument that we should distinguish a second, more broadly construed 
sense of respect can be made for all of Kant’s major practical works. I have mainly drawn from 
the Groundwork so far, but it should be no surprise that we find a similar account in the Critique 
of Practical Reason. In the third chapter of the analytic, where the more sophisticated account of 
                                                
9 I thank Stephen Engstrom for emphasizing this point when discussing an earlier version of this chapter 
with me.  
10 Richard McCarty, Kant’s Theory of Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 181. Despite 
the seeming similarity of our views, McCarty turns out to be a hard-line affectivist. His view will be 
discussed at length in Chapter 6. 
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respect I drew upon in Chapter 3 is developed, Kant affirms that respect is a feeling “inseparably 
connected with the representation of the moral law in every finite rational being” (KpV 5:80). As 
I suggested above, this feeling arises insofar as reason has an effect on sensibility that gives 
efficacy to the law by limiting the claims of self-love (KpV 5:75-6). In the Metaphysics of Morals, 
he further substantiates this line of thinking by introducing a set of concepts that “lie at the basis 
of morality as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty,” concepts he also 
refers to as “antecedent predispositions on the side of feeling” (MS 6:399). The first concept named 
is moral feeling, our ability to feel respect for the law and humiliation in the face of our moral 
shortcomings. At this point in the text, there remains almost no trace of the first sense of respect. 
Kant insists that “consciousness of obligation depends upon moral feeling to make us aware of the 
constraint present in the thought of duty,” and thus all human sensibility is set up to experience 
this feeling (MS 6:400). Though we must cultivate and strengthen its particular instantiations, and 
some of us can be more susceptible to respect as a subjective determining ground of the will, it 
must be the case that “no human being is entirely without moral feeling, for were he completely 
lacking in receptivity to it he would be morally dead” (MS 6:400).11  
 We are now in an even better position to see that it is this broader sense of respect which 
was operative in Chapter 3, when I argued that respect can be understood analogously to the forms 
                                                
11 Kant’s terminology wavers at this point in the Metaphysics. Here he lists respect separately from moral 
feeling, describing it in terms that suggest he has in mind the related but distinct concept of respect for 
oneself or self-esteem (MS 6:402-03). In fact, he first introduces the concept as respect for oneself (MS 
6:399), though its section is subsequently given the heading of simply “respect” (MS 6:402). It is actually 
his description of moral feeling that is much more in line with the way he uses respect in the rest of his 
writings and elsewhere in the Metaphysics. This appears less strange when we remember that in the 
second Critique, Kant defines moral feeling as encompassing both the positive practical feeling of respect 
and the negative feeling of humiliation that also results from reason’s determination of sensibility (KpV 
5:75). He also appears to equate the two concepts in the Religion, where he says that “this susceptibility to 
simple respect for the moral law within us would thus be the moral feeling” (R 6:27). 
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of theoretical sensibility. It cannot be the case that respect represents the form of practical 
sensibility insofar as it always serves as the sole subjective determining ground of the human 
subject’s will. Our propensity to evil rules out this possibility. But it nevertheless cannot fail to 
shape the form of our sensibility in a more general sense: our susceptibility to feel respect, the fact 
that reason can effect this feeling by structuring sensibility, signifies the sensible aspect of a moral 
interest that cannot be extinguished, and which has influence on every act of will, good or evil. 
Insofar as respect is representative of the sensible part of our recognition of morality’s constraint, 
it determines the way we feel about practical principles and objects, and the kind of efficacy that 
merely sensible desire can have. Hence my claim that respect represents the transformation of 
sensibility, giving it the shape it must have to be the sensibility belonging to a mind capable of 
having practical cognition, of being moved by principles of reason and concepts of understanding, 
universal laws and representations of good and evil. If sensibility did not have this character, moral 
representations would be inefficacious, and we would be stuck with the objectionable account of 
willing that sets sensibility over against reason as unruly and completely disconnected from its 
influence.  
 Accordingly, we can distinguish our two senses of respect as follows: first, and more 
commonly, we have the narrow sense of respect as subjective determining ground. Here respect 
represents an actual object of the will, what moves us when the will successfully determines itself 
through cognition of the good. It is an incentive to act conditioned by the form of pure practical 
reason itself, which as such excludes all material determining grounds. We could call this first use 
of the concept ‘respect as formal incentive,’ capturing the sense in which this incentive is 
determined by the form as opposed to the matter of practical reason. In contrast, the second, more 
broadly construed use of the concept captures respect as a formal sensible condition on receptivity 
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to the concept of duty. At this level of description, it captures the more general form our sensibility, 
our incentives, must have insofar as they belong to a moral being. Understood at this level of 
abstraction, respect captures not just something the subject might feel, but the particular mode in 
which she does feel. Regardless of whether she misjudges or acts badly, her feeling is 
fundamentally responsive to reason. We might say her capacity to feel is ‘respectful’ insofar as 
she frames what she does in terms of practical principles, and sensible desire has only a relative 
efficacy in comparison to the reasoning that shapes her life. As I have said, this is what her 
sensibility must always be like if practical cognition is really possible.12 
 
4.2.1 Respect in the Religion 
 We come across a helpful albeit very condensed argument covering the same ground as the 
above section in the first part of the Religion. Because Kant is discussing the human propensity to 
evil at this point in the text, he relates the concept of respect more directly to the issue of evil by 
recasting it as a necessary element of our universal predisposition to the good, thus placing the two 
concepts in juxtaposition. This constitutes a shift in terminology, but one that is nevertheless 
                                                
12 This distinction between a formal incentive and the form of incentives parallels what Kant says about 
the forms of theoretical sensibility at B161 in the first Critique. Space “as object” is described as a 
“formal intuition,” which is juxtaposed with the more general conception of space as form of intuition. 
We can expand on this analogy as follows: respect as formal incentive and space as formal intuition each 
represent a priori objects of practical and theoretical reason. They are the result of the determination of 
sensibility by a spontaneous capacity of mind—reason, in the practical case; and understanding, in the 
theoretical. This pure determination produces objects that represent the fulfillment of a priori and 
necessary conditions on cognition for a sense-dependent being. In the practical case, the formal incentive 
of respect fulfills the need for an ordered manifold of desire that allows principles of pure reason to have 
efficacy. In the theoretical case, the formal intuition of space fulfills the need for a mode of sensible 
synthesis whose product is an ordered manifold. The more general concept of a form of sensibility, 
whether practical or theoretical, captures the nature that deliverances of sensibility must have for the 
human cognizing subject, the sensible ordering relations that make it possible for the subject to either act 
on principles of reason, or enjoy representations of objects. 
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consistent with Kant’s earlier formulations of the concept. Insofar as respect functions as the form 
of a being’s practical sensibility, she necessarily takes an interest in morality: objectively, she 
recognizes her subjection to the moral law; and subjectively, she feels respect for it and what it 
implies about her nature as a free, autonomous being. Such a being thus also takes an interest in 
the good, the necessary object of pure practical reason that is determined by the moral law.13 So 
the morally interested being and the being with a predisposition to the good are one and the same. 
Kant also introduces the term “personality” (Persönlichkeit) in reference to this part of our nature, 
arguing that our ability to feel respect constitutes the person-making aspect of our predisposition 
to the good—a predisposition which also includes animal, and rational but amoral elements (R 
6:26). Without respect, we would lack the capacity for practical cognition that makes us 
responsible for our actions and cease to be persons in the technical sense.  
 In the course of making this point, Kant explicitly distinguishes between the two uses of 
respect developed above. First, he invokes the broader use of respect as form of sensibility, 
marking off how it is distinct from respect as formal incentive: “this susceptibility to simple respect 
for the moral law within us would thus be the moral feeling, which by itself does not yet constitute 
an end of the natural predisposition but only insofar as it is an incentive of the power of choice” 
(R 6:27). So, we have on the one hand respect as moral feeling, as receptivity to the law; and on 
the other, respect as end or incentive that actually determines the will to action. Kant goes on to 
insist again that personality requires this susceptibility to respect, “onto which nothing evil can be 
grafted” (R 6:27). As a necessary condition on the part of receptivity, we cannot shake off respect 
and the way it shapes our practical reasoning regardless of how evil our character may become. 
                                                
13 See the second chapter of the analytic in the second Critique for Kant’s most detailed discussion of the 
concepts of good and evil. Especially KpV 5:57-65. 
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This is why respect as form of sensibility is not to be thought of as a predisposition to something 
we may or may not feel, depending on our general character or situation. Insofar as we are morally 
responsible persons, respect is an ineradicable constitutive element of our nature: “the idea of the 
moral law alone, together with the respect that is inseparable from it, cannot be properly called a 
predisposition to personality; it is personality itself” (R 6:28). Actually incorporating respect into 
our maxim as formally determined incentive is, however, something beyond the general sense of 
respect as moral feeling, and hence we can also call personality a predisposition, something we 
are set up to achieve but have yet to, in reference to respect understood in this other sense: “but 
that we incorporate respect into our maxims as incentive, in this sense the subjective ground 
appears to be an addition to personality, and hence to this end it seems to merit the name of a 
predisposition” (R 6:28).14 Hence it is in virtue of the broader use of respect that we are imbued 
with personality; and because of the narrower, that we fully actualize it. Kant’s argument at R 
6:27-8 thus helps us see why we need two senses of respect. We cannot simply say that the only 
important concept of respect is respect for the law as a formal incentive, something which should 
determine the will but often does not. Setting respect up as something we merely aspire to as moral 
beings fails to capture the sense in which it is also a general effect on feeling that must be coeval 
with our kind of practical rationality. The fact that not one among us may have ever successfully 
incorporated it as the sole determining ground of willing does not change this for Kant.   
 
 
                                                
14 I have altered the Cambridge translation here. The original German is: “Aber daß wir diese Achtung zur 
Triebfeder in unsere Maximen aufnehmen, der subjective Grund hiezu scheint ein Zusatz zur 
Persönlichkeit zu sein und daher den namen einer Anlage zum Behuf derselben zu verdienen.” 
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4.3 Practical Reason’s Natural Dialectic  
 Of course, despite the fact that the feeling of respect fundamentally shapes our sensible 
nature, we are still such as to act from material incentives instead of pure respect for the conditions 
of morality. As we saw, the logical possibility of such evil action arises simply insofar as we are 
sensibly dependent, i.e., subject to sensible desire and its object, the agreeable, in virtue of our 
material needs and wants. Because morality does not intrinsically cater to these needs and wants 
which nevertheless press upon us, sensibly dependent reason finds itself caught up in what Kant 
calls a natural dialectic. He introduces this concept in the first book of the Groundwork. The natural 
dialectic is 
“a propensity to rationalize against those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon 
their validity, or at least upon their purity and strictness, and, where possible, to 
make them better suited to our wishes and inclinations, that is, to corrupt them at 
their basis and to destroy all their dignity - something that even common practical 
reason cannot, in the end, call good” (G 4:405).  
 
Because sensibly dependent reason is at once subject to the efficacy of both formal and material 
principles of practical reason, there arises a conflict as these struggle for supremacy. There are two 
ways it can be settled: either the sensibly determined material ends that are jointly constitutive of 
happiness are subordinated to the moral law, or the law is subordinated to these material ends. This 
may seem like a straightforward dilemma of good vs evil, but the situation is not so clear cut. As 
we will see, evil action is brought about through the rational activity of practical judgment, which 
is always directed at the good. We thus cannot allow any explanation of evil to bottom out in the 
motivation to pursue self-interest, considered independently of morally interested rational activity. 
In what follows, I will further develop the practical dialectical activity described above, showing 
it to share a common form with the dialectic of pure theoretical or speculative reason. This 
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common form manifests itself differently in each case, however, insofar as practical reason is 
dialectical in its empirical use, while theoretical reason is dialectical in its pure use. 
 
4.3.1 Natural Dialectics of Discursive Reason 
 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces the concept of dialectic by describing it as 
a logic of illusion (Schein) that arises from the nature of sensibly dependent reason (B 349). Kant 
uses the term illusion in a strict sense here, noting that the source of illusion is not in the object of 
judgment but the judgment itself, a result of the cognitive capacity’s relation to its object. Whether 
or not a given judgment is subject to illusion and prone to error depends on the extent to which 
sensibility exerts influence on the higher cognitive capacities. As I have stressed since Chapter 2, 
the determinations that obtain between sensibility and these higher capacities are both the source 
of much of our cognition, as well as all error.15 This must be the case, for neither the higher 
capacities nor sensibility can by themselves be the source of corruption. Understanding and reason 
have their own laws, and will, without outside influence, determine themselves in accordance with 
them. Sensibility, in contrast, as merely affective cannot determine itself to cognitive activity at 
all. Kant thus concludes that “error is brought about solely by the unobserved influence of 
sensibility on the understanding, through which it happens that the subjective grounds of the 
judgment enter into union with the objective grounds and make these latter deviate from their true 
function” (A294/B351). Of course, because sensibility cannot be the ultimate ground of an activity 
that must be spontaneous and self-determining, this influence takes place insofar as understanding 
and reason confuse certain sensible and therefore merely subjective conditions with objective ones. 
                                                
15 The passage I have been citing in support of this point in fact comes from the beginning of the Dialectic 
of Pure Reason (A294/B351, footnote).  
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It is the work of critical philosophy to reveal this influence, as well as its corresponding form of 
illusion and error, by disclosing the proper functions and principles of each capacity of mind. 
 The specific type of influence and illusion that Kant is concerned with in the Dialectic of 
the first Critique is unique in that it results from otherwise sound subjective principles that take on 
a transcendent use. A transcendent principle “takes away [the limits of experience], or even 
commands us actually to transgress them” (A296/B353). In their transcendent use, such principles 
are adapted to application that goes beyond the limits of the sensible world to which they are 
rightly restricted. But this transgression goes unrecognized insofar as reason takes such principles 
to have objective, and thus universal application in the pursuit its ends. Calling a principle 
transcendent thus captures that it is prone to being misapplied, given an extended use that passes 
beyond its proper limits while nevertheless appearing to be legitimate, even necessary. By Kant’s 
own description, 
“the cause of this is that there are fundamental rules and maxims for the 
employment of our reason (subjectively regarded as a faculty of human cognition), 
and that these have all the appearance of being objective principles. We therefore 
take the subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts, which is to the 
advantage of the understanding, for an objective necessity in the determination of 
things in themselves” (A297/B353). 
 
The form of illusion made possible by these transcendent subjective principles is also unique in 
that it can never be properly destroyed, even when it is brought to the light of consciousness and 
its grounds are understood. This is what Kant means when he calls the respective dialectics of 
theoretical and practical reason “natural.” Unlike errors that arise from ignorance or sophistry, the 
kind of error associated with a natural dialectic is unavoidable because it is inseparable from the 
nature of sensibly dependent reason itself. Though exposing the source of such illusion is 
invaluable, constituting the most important step that must be taken if reason is to make progress, 
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this exposure cannot prevent reason from being generally prone to entanglement in traps of its own 
making. However reduced, however momentary these bouts of illusion may be, we are forever 
susceptible to them (A297-8/B353-5). 
 In the second Critique, Kant affirms that both uses of reason are subject to their own kind 
of illusion (Schein) (KpV 5:107). A major difference emerges, however, insofar as theoretical 
reason is dialectical because of illusions that arise with its speculative use, while practical reason 
struggles in its empirically conditioned use. In the former case, speculative reason’s search for the 
unconditioned burdens it with questions that it cannot answer.16 Absent a determinate way to 
proceed, reason takes up more limited, merely subjective principles whose transcendent 
application can appear to yield truths about such deeply-rooted metaphysical topics as the 
beginning of the world, the nature of corporeal substance and causality, as well as the existence of 
God. One of the Critique of Pure Reason’s most major claims thus emerges: theoretical 
metaphysics, the traditional province of speculative reason, is thoroughly dialectical in its 
assertions. Conversely, practical reason fares much better in its pure use. As we see from the 
beginning of the Groundwork, Kant’s account of pure practical reason takes on an egalitarian bent. 
Unlike theoretical reason which easily falls into error when it ventures beyond the limits of 
experience, pure practical reason is adept at separating out empirically conditioned from purely 
moral incentives (G 4:404). This must be the case insofar as the moral law announces itself to the 
consciousness of every human being, and the conditions constitutive of practical reason’s pure use 
                                                
16 Kant famously makes this claim in the first line of the first edition of the first Critique: 
“human reason has the peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions that it is burdened with 
questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems by the nature of reason 
itself, but which it also cannot answer, since they transcend every capacity of human reason” 
(Avii).  
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are grasped by all; whether intuitively, or through the more precise and abstract formulations of 
the categorical imperative (G 4:403). So, while the pure use of theoretical reason is prone to error 
and speculative cognition is principally negative and limiting in character, pure practical reason 
offers up its determining principle and the possibility of substantive practical cognition to everyone 
in whom the capacity is actualized.  
 But despite this difference, practical reason also finds its natural dialectic insofar as the 
subjective conditions necessary for practical cognition become transcendent by extending beyond 
their limits. This activity shares the same form as that of theoretical dialectic articulated in the 
above quote from A297/B253. As we saw in previous chapters, the subjectively necessary material 
aspect of practical reason is its dependence on ends that have been determined by sensible desire 
and its object, the agreeable. These conditions are necessary because it is through experience of 
the agreeable that finite practical reason has the opportunity to become acquainted with the 
possible ends that are to be incorporated into the will as objects. Taken together, these material 
ends are constitutive of the concept of happiness, the subjectively necessary end of sensibly 
dependent practical life. When properly structured by the moral law, they are objects of practical 
cognition.17 So described, the principles of sensible desire or self-love are subjectively necessary 
if sensibly dependent cognition is to have an object.  
 And just as with the theoretical dialectic, this advantageous, immanent use for the 
principles governing sense-dependent practical reason becomes transcendent insofar as reason 
mistakes subjective necessity for objective necessity, and presumes that such principles hold 
                                                
17Kant even goes so far as to cast sensible desire and the ends it discovers as the first aspect of the human 
predisposition to good. Without this sensible form of desire, which can be presupposed in rational and 
non-rational animals alike—though, as I have argued, in different forms—the crucial drives towards self-
preservation, propagation, and community could not figure in practical rational life at all (R 6:26).  
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unconditionally. This is effectively to assume, erroneously, that the agreeable needs no further 
determination in order to be declared good, and that the principles of sensible desire are sufficient 
for practical cognition and the action it determines. Thus, despite the fact that sensibly dependent 
practical reasoners like us necessarily take an interest in the moral law, we are also necessarily 
subject to a natural dialectic that makes it possible for evil to emerge. Insofar as this dialectic is 
embedded in the nature of sense-dependent practical reason itself, we cannot escape it; but we can 
minimize its influence by exposing it and developing our grasp of the moral law as the only 
unconditioned principle of practical reason. This is one of the principal aims of a Critique of 
Practical Reason, which must “prevent empirically conditioned reason from presuming that it, 
alone and exclusively, furnishes the determining ground of the will” (KpV 5:16). 
 We now have in hand a metaphysical characterization of our natural propensity to illusory 
practical reasoning that shares a common form with its theoretical counterpart. There is still much 
more that can be said about evil, however, for the practical version of this dialectic manifests itself 
in a variety of different ways. To see what these are, we must turn to Kant’s analysis of our 
propensity to evil and its three grades, frailty, impurity, and depravity. Developing these concepts 
will help us better grasp what happens when acts of practical reasoning manifest this dialectical 
structure and furnish subjective grounds for the will’s self-determination to evil. In other words, 
their development will grant us more insight into the real possibility of evil.  
 
4.4 Three Grades of the Propensity to Evil 
 We are already in a better position to understand the description of the propensity to evil 
with which this chapter began. Recall that Kant defines the propensity (Hang) to evil as “the 
subjective ground of the possibility of the deviation of the maxims from the moral law” (R 6:29). 
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We now know that this ground is furnished insofar as practical reason mistakes subjectively 
necessary principles for objectively necessary ones, exhibiting the dialectical rational activity that 
makes self-love or happiness the unconditional determining ground of the will (G 4:405; KpV 
5:16).18 To further determine this general account of the propensity to evil, Kant introduces its 
three distinct grades (Stufen)—frailty, impurity and depravity—each of which accounts for the 
subjective ground of evil in a different way. The differences between these grades correspond 
roughly to the role that sensible desire plays in each of them. That is, we distinguish between them 
based on the extent to which sensible desire has been incorporated into the will as its sufficient 
determining ground. The three grades thus represent, in ascending order, increasingly entrenched 
versions of practical reason’s natural dialectic. 
 As we proceed, we will find that Kant actually has very little to say about frailty, impurity, 
and depravity, in the Religion or elsewhere. We can, however, expand on these important concepts 
by developing what he does say about them within the confines of a few basic conditions on his 
picture of practical reasoning that I have argued for, and that Kant re-articulates in close proximity 
to the passages in question. Above all, we must remember that reason is self-determining, and that 
it necessarily determines sensibility to feel respect for its supreme practical law. The first condition 
rules out the possibility of our attributing the subjective determining ground of evil to sensibility 
alone; the second rules out the possibility of evil serving as its own ground, thus precluding the 
idea of a diabolical will that betrays the law simply for the sake of betraying it.19 Evil must then 
                                                
18Kant sometimes uses the verb ‘rationalize’ (vernünfteln) to describe this unique activity (G 4:405; R 
6:43). I will continue to take up this practice here. 
19 See R 6:35. Covering the first point, Kant says: “the ground of this evil cannot be placed, as is 
commonly done, in the sensuous nature of the human being, and in the natural inclinations originating 
from it. For not only do these bear no direct relation to evil…we also cannot presume ourselves 
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arise from the interaction of reason and sensibility, and reason’s assent to the kind of illusion 
captured by Kant’s description of dialectical reasoning—what, in the Religion,  he calls “perversity 
of the heart” (R 6:37).20 What follows is a more detailed analysis of the propensity to evil that 
meets these conditions. 
 
4.4.1 Frailty 
 The first of the three grades of evil is frailty or weakness (Gebrechlichkeit), which Kant 
describes as follows: 
“the frailty (fragilitas) of human nature is expressed even in the complaint of an 
Apostle: ‘What I would, that I do not!’ i.e., I incorporate the good (the law) into the 
maxim of my power of choice; but this good, which is an irresistible incentive 
objectively or ideally (in thesi), is subjectively (in hypothesi) the weaker (in 
comparison with inclination) whenever the maxim is to be followed” (R 6:29).   
 
The weak or frail subject is one who acts contrary to the moral law that she purportedly takes to 
be a sufficient determining ground of the will. So with frailty, the conflict or perversity 
characteristic of evil in general shows itself at the surface level. As we proceed to the later stages, 
we will see that this conflict gets buried deeper and deeper. In its primary stage, however, 
perversity is manifest insofar as the agent understands herself to have incorporated the moral law 
into her will as its only legitimate determining ground, but nevertheless pursues an object of 
sensible desire that has not been sufficiently limited by that law.21  
                                                
responsible for their existence.” Covering the second, he says: “the ground of this evil can also not be 
placed in a corruption of the morally legislative reason, as if reason could extirpate within itself the 
dignity of the law itself, for this is absolutely impossible.” The term ‘diabolical’ is the English equivalent 
of Kant’s own ‘teuflisch,’ which he uses in this context at R 6:35 and again at R 6:37.  
20 At R 6:29, Kant defines the good or evil heart as “the will’s (Willkür) capacity or incapacity arising 
from [the natural propensity to evil] to adopt or not to adopt the moral law in its maxims.” 
21 As we will see, frailty as Kant conceives it will turn out to be a broader notion than what is normally 
conveyed with the term ‘weakness of will.’  
   127 
 To develop the concept of frailty, we need to be mindful of the two general conditions for 
a Kantian account of evil articulated above. It is especially tempting to overlook the first of these 
here. That is, it is tempting to attribute one’s weakness to the overwhelming power of sensible 
desire. On this explanation, frailty is exhibited when the subject fails to bring about the good 
despite the fact that she has appropriately recognized the supremacy of the moral law, and despite 
the fact that in virtue of this law the subject has practical cognition of what she ought to do. Insofar 
as we make sensibility responsible for frailty in this way, such cognitive achievements are 
effectively irrelevant if sensible desire is strong enough.22 Despite the fact that Kant’s description 
of frailty may seem to suggest this picture, it is precisely the one that we need to avoid. Though 
sensible desire is doubtless a necessary material condition on the possibility of frailty, it cannot be 
its cause. Frailty must be the result of reason’s own activity, activity which is influenced by its 
sensible dependence, but not externally determined by it.23  
 It is this influence from sensibility which is captured by Kant’s description of practical 
reason’s natural dialectic. Reason leads itself astray by taking up merely subjective principles from 
sensibility and framing them as objective. More needs to be said, however, for it is not clear how 
this dialectic can get a foothold, even momentarily, if the subject has acknowledged the supremacy 
of the moral law and correctly identified what she ought to do. Admittedly, there are not many 
places where Kant is explicit that we need something over and above the moral law and its 
attendant feeling of respect in order to both exclude the influence of merely material incentives, 
and have practically efficacious representations that determine the good as the object of practical 
                                                
22 This is what prominent commentator Richard McCarty concludes in building what he calls the 
‘affectivist’ interpretation of Kant’s view. McCarty’s view will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
23 This is not to deny that affective forces can involuntarily determine human behaviour, just that such 
behaviour could not constitute frailty, or any other form of evil. 
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cognition. But we do find one helpful passage in the preface to the Groundwork where Kant says 
something to this effect. Here, he affirms that a priori laws of pure practical reason,  
“no doubt still require a judgment sharpened by experience, partly to 
distinguish in what cases they are applicable and partly to provide them with 
access to the will of the human being and efficacy for his fulfillment of 
them; for the human being is affected by so many inclinations that, though 
capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, he is not so easily able to 
make it effective in concreto in the conduct of his life” (G 4:389).  
 
Read carefully, this passage can offer us a lot of help. From the final clause, we get a restatement 
of the line of thought currently posing a problem: the dependent will beset with sensible desire 
finds it difficult to make the moral law its subjective determining ground, to represent it with the 
efficacy required for concrete action, despite the fact that this same will is moved by the conditions 
of morality in a more abstract sense. From the first clause, we learn what is required to help with 
this problem, namely, a power of judgment sharpened by experience. Developing this idea will 
give us some insight into how one can come to be gripped by frailty. 
 Kant ascribes a twofold purpose to the cultivation of judgment: first, it prepares us for 
dealing with concrete, in-the-moment situations where the constraints of morality are felt. To grasp 
the applicability of moral conditions in the hurly-burly of practical life requires not just an abstract 
grasp of the law’s command to universal maxims, but the ability to read the situation, to 
differentiate particular incentives of self-love from those of morality, to deal with unforeseen 
features that give rise to confusion and usher in the dialectical framework we are concerned with 
here. Second, a cultivated sense of judgment grants more efficacy to the moral law, making it such 
as to actually move the subject to act on its basis. These may seem like separate aims, but the 
account of practical reason I have developed so far gives us the resources to see that they are in 
fact two sides of the same coin, representative of the objective and subjective aspects of the will’s 
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determination. As I have emphasized, practical representations of reason are the source of their 
own efficacy.24 If reason is to be practical, it must be the act of representing itself that brings about 
its object. Practical representations are thus more or less efficacious for the subject on the basis of 
their content, not some other measure of volitional strength that holds independently of this 
content.25 So one cannot obtain a more determinate grasp of the objective constraints of morality 
and the ways they can be tested without also increasing the efficacy that the representation of these 
constraints has for the subject. In short, objective content and subjective efficacy cannot be 
separated; to develop one is to develop the other. When one gains experience and learns how to 
better judge the situation, working out a more determinate picture of one’s moral commitments, 
their implications, and how they can be tested, this cognitive achievement strengthens the 
motivating power of the commitments themselves. 
 What’s emerging is a more sophisticated picture of what moral failure looks like, one which 
acknowledges there can be a break between the bare idea of a good will and the more determinate, 
world-directed judgments required for its efficacy. This picture allows us to cast sensible desire in 
the role Kant so often attributes to it, as an obstacle to good character, without having to conclude 
that sensibility itself is resistant to morality or the source of evil. It also answers my question about 
how dialectical illusion can still grip the subject when she acknowledges the moral law and takes 
herself to have incorporated it into her will as the most general determination of her character. We 
can now offer the following account: dialectical illusion gets a grip when the subject does not have 
                                                
24 See, in particular, §2.4 of Chapter 2, where the concept of practical reason and willing is introduced; as 
well as §3.2.3 of Chapter 3, where the notion of practicality or efficacy is developed through discussion of 
the characteristic representations of practical reason. 
25 This is why we have the capacity to withstand strong feelings of pleasure or displeasure that could lead 
us to act against the course of action we have resolved upon. Representations of reason have their own 
efficacy that prevail against the more limited efficacy of sensible desire. 
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the ability to apply her recognition of the law in concreto, when she finds herself in unfamiliar 
circumstances, brushes up against unforeseen consequences of her commitment, proves 
unprepared to encounter sensible desire in all its efficacious specificity, or otherwise finds herself 
caught up in the moment. Absent a more determinate, practiced understanding of what the 
achievement of good character requires her to give up and why, she is liable to struggle, to fall 
under the illusion that subjective principles of happiness can lay claim to objectivity, to open the 
door to exceptions. In fact, we must acknowledge that even if she does have this hard won 
understanding and sharpened judgment, it can easily be shaken. As sensibly dependent beings our 
world is a cacophonous place of change and need, in which we constantly meet with new situations, 
new ends, new conflicts. It cannot be presumed that our unceasing respect for morality will always 
give us the ability to deftly navigate the infinitely many possibilities that can befall us. Laws of 
pure practical reason yield substantive judgments about what to do in a given situation, but it is 
not always so easy to grasp and thereby actualize the more determinate representation of the good 
that such judgments take as their object.  
 To ground this reading more firmly in the text, consider one of the two examples of 
weakness Kant gives in the Lectures on Ethics. Discussing the general phenomenon of white lies 
told in social situations, Kant brings out the motives that may lead us to utter a deliberate untruth. 
We might represent such lies as permitted because they are told in jest, out of politeness, or indeed 
out of necessity: to prevent harm, or because others do not want to hear the truth (LE 27:701). 
Kant suggests that no such lie could ever be justified—though interestingly, he leaves the matter 
open for careful consideration—concluding that most (if not all) white lies are the result of frailty 
or weakness: 
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“There may, in general, be no unpleasantness in social situations that could 
rightfully seduce us into wrongdoing; yet, given the weakness of human nature, it 
is true nonetheless that the strict laws of duty must here endure many a jolt. A moral 
casuistic would be very useful, and it would be an undertaking much to the 
sharpening of our judgment, if the limits were defined, as to how far we may be 
authorized to conceal the truth without detriment to morality” (LE 27:701). 
 
Here we see Kant use the language of “sharpening” judgment in the context of identifying and 
overcoming a particular weakness. Because the limits of truth-telling in social situations are not 
clearly defined, the subject is likely to meet with situations where a desire to be benevolent or 
shrewd leads her to lie—either unreflectively, or through explicit reasoning that untruth is called 
for. In such cases the laws of morality receive a “jolt” as they are bent out of shape to accommodate 
an end that suddenly manifests itself to the subject. This general picture helps explain why Kant 
insists that virtue is better captured by talking of the strength of the subject’s principles, as opposed 
to her dispositions. As he affirms in the Metaphysics of Morals, virtue is not the result of mere 
disposition or habit, but of an approach grounded in careful principles whose application manifests 
the plasticity needed to grapple with the ups and downs of embodied life: “for unless this aptitude 
results from considered, firm, and continually purified principles, then, like any other mechanism 
of technically practical reason, it is neither armed for all situations nor adequately secured against 
the changes that new temptations could bring about” (MS 6:383-4).26 
 Kant provides further confirmation of this interpretation of frailty with his discussion of 
affect in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.  Here, we get a sustained account of the 
                                                
26 To capture the idea of moral aptitude, Kant often uses the term moralische Gesinnung, usually 
translated as moral disposition. Recently, scholar and translator Stephen Palmquist has suggested 
translating Gesinnung as “conviction” instead. This would better capture the sense in which moral 
aptitude or virtue is first borne of carefully considered judgment. Cf. Stephen R. Palmquist, 
Comprehensive Commentary on Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (Hoboken: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2015). 
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way in which a sudden sensible desire can influence the activity of reason in the unprepared. 
Though Kant often uses the term ‘Affect’ in a more general sense to describe what sensibility’s 
object produces in the subject, in this context the term takes on a more specific meaning: “affect 
is surprise through sensation, by means of which the mind’s composure is suspended. Affect is 
therefore rash, that is, it quickly grows to a degree of feeling that makes reflection impossible (it 
is thoughtless)” (ApH 7:252). Unfortunately, the talk of ‘degree of feeling’ can lead us to conclude 
that Kant is working with an empirical-psychological conception of feeling that focuses on its 
quasi-mechanical strength of force.27 This would pose a problem for the present reading. The 
quasi-mechanical view saddles us with a dualistic conception of reason and sensibility, on which 
feeling is a sensible response to one’s environment that arises completely independently of 
cognitive mental life. But Kant helpfully clarifies that this is not how he means to use the language 
of strength: “in general, it is not the intensity of a certain feeling that constitutes the affected state, 
but the lack of reflection in comparing this feeling with the sum of all feelings (of pleasure or 
displeasure” (ApH 7:254). This clarification helps get us to the desired view. Though we can 
understand the agent’s general capacity to sense and feel—including her more specific dispositions 
towards particular feelings—in terms of psychological laws that track physical causes and degrees 
of force, this is not Kant’s focus in his moral philosophy or even his anthropological writings. 
Instead, we need to consider affect insofar as it relates to our higher capacity to reflect and judge. 
So Kant’s account of affect is not causal. Affect does not lead to thoughtlessness because it 
describes feelings that overpower on the basis of their psychological strength. Rather, it picks out 
the set of feelings we find it difficult to reflect upon. Understanding the scope of this set requires 
                                                
27 This is Richard McCarty’s view.  
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looking not into the mechanics of the mind, but into the subject’s personal history and ability: the 
kinds of situations she has found herself in so far; how self-aware she is about which affects she 
is particularly susceptible to; how she has reacted to similar moments of affect in the past; whether 
she has resolved to make progress; how attentive she is to the possibility of being caught off guard.  
 Consider the example Kant gives of the rich man who flies into a rage when his server 
breaks a rare goblet:  
“[he] would think nothing of this accident if, at the same moment, he were to 
compare this loss of one pleasure with the multitude of all the pleasures that his 
fortunate position as a rich man offers him. However, if he now gives himself over 
completely to this one feeling of pain (without quickly making that calculation in 
thought), then it is no wonder that, as a result, he feels as if his entire happiness 
were lost” (ApH 7:254).  
 
What Kant describes here is an inability to appropriately relate one feeling to all the others that 
help fill out one’s practical life. This inability is, to be sure, dependent on one’s natural propensity 
to feel in particular ways—something over which the subject does not have complete control.28 
But it is fundamentally a failure of reflection, which one can work to control once it is brought to 
consciousness. Consider, for example, Kant’s discussion of courage: as affect, it captures how one 
immediately reacts to sudden danger. This disposition or aptitude lies in part with reason and in 
part with sensibility, expressing both how one feels in representing the sudden appearance of 
danger, and how this feeling tracks (or fails to track) one’s capacity to situate the danger in relation 
to other circumstances and ends. Kant suggests this much in his description of the affect of courage 
                                                
28 How Kant sees our dispositional luck to fit with the autonomous activity of reason is best captured 
through the following statement from the Anthropology. Describing those who are not naturally susceptible 
to affect, he declares: “the natural gift of apathy, with sufficient strength of soul, is, as I have said, fortunate 
phlegm (in the moral sense). He who is gifted with it is to be sure, on that account not yet a wise man, but 
he nevertheless has the support of nature, so that it will be easier for him to become one more easily than 
others” (ApH 7:254). We thus must distinguish between feelings that contingently encourage good 
behaviour, and the cultivation of judgment that leads to the systematically ordered, virtuous soul. 
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as “consequently belonging in one respect to sensibility” (ApH 7:257; emphasis mine). Those who 
possess timidity as affect are especially prone to exhibit moral weakness in response to sudden 
danger. Insofar as reason is tripped up by a strong feeling of fear that makes it difficult to judge 
what is morally required in the present circumstances, one is likely to be moved to do what is 
perceived to be necessary for self-protection. It is here that illusion gets a grip, self-love appears 
to carry the rational force of objective law, and frail action results. But one can also learn to control 
this weakness through the activity of reason. This results in courage, not as affect, but as virtue.  
The latter is rooted in reason insofar as “it rests on principles,” and thereby the possibility arises 
that “reason then gives the resolute man strength that nature sometimes denies him” (ApH 7:256-
7). So those afflicted by the affect of timidity can work to cultivate the determinate principles and 
capacity for judgment that allow them to navigate dangerous situations. Through such work, one 
begins to overcome frailty and cultivate virtue.  
 We can thus see that Kant makes plenty of room for sensible desire to assert itself and 
make reasoning difficult. More importantly, we can account for this desire—the visceral feel of 
frailty—without conceding that its very possibility saddles us with the view that it is the strength 
of sensible desire, independently of reason, which determines weak action.29 But there is still more 
to be said: though these considerations set us on the right track, we can see that giving an account 
of frailty presents additional challenges. As I noted at the outset of our exploration of the concept, 
frailty is unique in that the perversity inherent to all evil is in this case manifest to the subject: she 
occupies a position of instability insofar as her representation of the good is inefficacious, and she 
ends up doing what she acknowledges she should not. Granted, she lacks determinate cognition of 
                                                
29 In much of his work, this is the starting point for McCarty’s argument that we need a quasi-empiricist, 
affectivist reading of Kant’s theory of motivation. See Chapter 6 for further discussion. 
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the good, i.e., a representation capable of bringing about its object, and this makes it possible for 
the transcendent claims of sensible desire to get a foothold; but she is not totally taken in by self-
love’s illusory push towards the unconditioned, at least not enough to incorporate these claims into 
her will as a universal principle capable of moving her to act. So although she acts on an end of 
self-love that has not been properly limited by moral concern, the frail subject does not pretend 
that this end is the object of a maxim that she has taken up. Kant provides a helpful description of 
this kind of case in book two of the Groundwork: 
“If we now attend to ourselves in any transgression of a duty, we find that we do 
not really will that our maxim should become a universal law, since that is 
impossible for us, but that the opposite of our maxim should instead remain a 
universal law, only we take the liberty of making an exception to it for ourselves 
(or just for this once) to the advantage of our inclination” (G 4:424).  
 
To make an exception is to effectively reduce the universality of the law in question to mere 
generality, what Kant in an earlier cited passage referred to as casting doubt on its purity and 
strictness (G 4:405). This activity of weakening the law is also suggested by Kant’s description of 
frailty from the Religion, where he says that the law which should, objectively, be an irresistible 
incentive is subjectively the weaker in comparison with material incentives of sensible desire (R 
6:29).  
 It might be objected that this kind of explanation fails to capture the pain and self-censure 
experienced by the frail subject, but Kant does not mean this account to serve as an excuse or 
justification. As he goes on to say in the same passage from the Groundwork, the activity of 
limiting the law, however minimally, “cannot be justified in our own impartially rendered 
judgment” (G 4:424). The second concrete example of frailty given in Kant’s corpus, from the 
Lectures on Ethics, exhibits the same structure. The subject weakly acts on a material incentive, 
thus downgrading the status of the law; but one’s conscience, the inner judge, remains dissatisfied: 
   136 
“the inner tribunal is correct; it looks at the action for itself, and without regard to 
human frailty, if only we are willing to hear and feel its voice; suppose, for example, 
that I have insulted someone in company, by my words, and return home; it then 
troubles me, and I wish for an opportunity of repairing the situation. By no means 
must I rid myself of these inner reproaches, however many plausible excuses I may 
have, which would certainly be sure to weigh with any earthly judge” (LE 27:295). 
 
Others might be more tolerant of this behaviour, understanding that humanity is often weak and 
liable to, in the moment, transgress its only unconditional practical law. But the weak individual 
herself understands that she has subjected herself to the law, and this constitutes a transgression 
for which frailty is no excuse. The pain she feels upon seeing this failure is evidence of her respect 
for the law, her recognition that claims of happiness must be subordinated to it, so she must be 
prone to regret if impartial judgment is able to take hold. In fact, even if she were so caught up in 
dialectical illusion that she could not yet make this judgment and feel this pain, the structure of her 
rational activity would still manifest respect for the law. As Kant goes on to argue in the same 
Groundwork passage quoted above, the fact that, at the time of action, we merely weaken the law 
instead of overthrowing it, shows “that we really acknowledge the validity of the categorical 
imperative and permit ourselves (with all respect for it) only a few exceptions that, as it seems to 
us, are inconsiderable and wrung from us” (G 4:424).  
 We are now in a position to see why Kant casts frailty as the first grade of the propensity 
to evil. Even people of good character who have incorporated the law into their maxims, and are 
typically able to act in a way that suggests they need no other incentive, can exhibit frailty insofar 
as they experience a momentary lapse in judgment spurred by dialectical illusion. Caught off 
guard, or otherwise situated so that the claims of sensible desire assert their efficacy, the frail 
subject does not have the cognitive and motivational resources to see through the illusion, and evil 
is the result. If this frailty is quickly recognized for what it is, as in Kant’s example of the loose-
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tongued person who regrets his insulting remark, then the subject is pained to acknowledge that 
her judgment and, as a result, the efficacy of the law is lacking in her. This could provide an 
opportunity for improvement, for gaining the valuable experience necessary to cultivate good 
character. Because of our ineradicable propensity to rationalize, however, our frailty cannot be 
totally overcome through such improvement. Understood as the subjective ground of the 
possibility of evil, this manifestation of dialectical reasoning always threatens, no matter how 
practiced we become. As we will see, it is precisely because of this inescapability that we must be 
on guard against frailty. If not properly acknowledged for what it is, what appears to be a 




 Carrying over the more general reflections on the possibility of evil developed for my 
account of frailty in the previous section, we can make quicker work of the two remaining 
determinations of the propensity to evil. Kant describes impurity (Unlauterkeit), the second grade 
of evil, as follows: 
“the impurity of the human heart consists in this, that although the maxim is good 
with respect to its object (the intended compliance with the law) and perhaps even 
powerful enough in practice, it is not purely moral, i.e. it has not, as it should be 
[the case], adopted the law alone as its sufficient incentive but, on the contrary, 
often (and perhaps always) needs still other incentives besides it in order to 
determine the power of choice for what duty requires; in other words, actions 
conforming to duty are not done purely from duty” (R 6:30). 
 
                                                
30 For further discussion of frailty or weakness, see Chapter 6, §6.3. 
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This form of evil is more insidious because, unlike frailty, it is realized in the pursuit of good ends. 
This makes it largely undetectable: for as with frailty, the subject with an impure will still 
prioritizes the formal incentive of morality over material incentives of self-love. As Kant says 
above, respect for the law may even be sufficient to determine the will in certain situations.  Thus 
one can exhibit impurity and still pursue the good because the law commands it. Regardless, 
impurity represents a more entrenched form of evil because the impure will has incorporated 
material incentives of sensible desire into the will as determining grounds. Although frailty leads 
to behaviour that manifestly contradicts the law, the illusory framing of sensible desire only gets 
a grip in passing. With impurity, they have been incorporated as conditions for acting. 
 This stage of evil takes up the language associated with the concept of respect as a formal 
incentive that necessarily excludes the determining influence of all material incentives. In doing 
so, it draws a strict line between the two uses of the concept: however alive one may be to the 
constraints of morality, something is sorely lacking if they do not constitute the sole determining 
grounds of the will. This distinction helps us to pinpoint cases where good intentions and 
favourable circumstances allow us to be complacent in our self-regard, and neglect the kind of 
scrutiny which asks whether we would have been able to carry out our duty if it were not so easy 
for us. In the grips of impurity, practical reason is poised to blindly assume that doing the right 
thing for the right reason in the right situation is good enough; and not stop to consider whether 
other motivating factors were involved. Dialectical illusion thus becomes more deeply entrenched 
at this stage, as the transcendent claim that sensible desire provides legitimate determining grounds 
of the will is internalized to the extent that such claims do not run counter to morality. This may 
seem acceptable since the commands of morality are still grasped as supreme, but it actually 
represents a grave threat insofar as the formal incentive becomes covertly dependent on material 
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incentives in certain situations. This arrangement cannot help but degrade one’s power of 
judgment, as the subject becomes less dependent on the practiced application of a priori law that 
is, among other things, mindful of subtle distinctions between incentives, and more dependent on 
the presence of sensible desire for its efficacy. The subject thereby becomes more susceptible to 
frailty: her capacity for judgment is weakened and she is more likely to falter, once again open the 
door to dialectical reasoning, and act contrary to law if the requisite sensible conditions of self-
love are not met.  
 Despite the characterization of impurity as a deeper form of evil, however, Kant insists that 
it is, like frailty, such as to bring an “unintentional guilt” upon the subject (R 6:38). We cannot 
help that our sensible dependence provides us with material incentives to act. In this respect our 
sensible desire, viewed as material condition on discursive practical reason, is innocent, even part 
of our predisposition to the good. Moreover, we cannot help that this dependence makes it 
impossible to grasp the true character of our maxim, whether its determining ground is principally 
formal or material. Though the concept of impurity tracks a subjective ground of the possibility of 
evil that is reached through autonomous acts of reasoning and is therefore imputable, it is written 
into our sensible nature that it can arise unintentionally. Our true character shows in how we deal 
with this impurity; whether we attempt to confront it and guard against future cases, or let it pass 
unnoticed.  
 We now have a second manifestation of evil in view, one which adds a further 
determination to the evil heart insofar as the subject’s capacity to act from duty is again reduced.31 
When impurity takes hold as a ground of the propensity to evil, even action that succeeds in 
                                                
31 Recall that Kant defines the good or evil heart as “the will’s capacity or incapacity…to adopt or not 
adopt the moral law in its maxims” (R 6:29). 
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bringing about the good for its own sake becomes compromised, the subject’s power of judgment 
degrades further, and she is increasingly likely to exhibit frailty in a wider variety of situations. 
Again, if the subject can come alive to this fact, she is presented with an opportunity to gain 
experience and increase the law’s efficacy. If she ignores it, she is liable to continue on a slippery 
slope towards the final stage of the propensity to evil. 
  
4.4.3 Depravity 
Once the subject makes material incentives of sensible desire the supreme determining 
ground of her will, she has progressed to depravity (Bösartigkeit), the third and final grade of the 
propensity to evil. Kant describes it as follows: 
“the depravity or, if one prefers, the corruption of the human heart is the propensity 
of the power of choice to maxims that subordinate the incentives of the moral law 
to others (not moral ones). It can also be called the perversity of the human heart, 
for it reverses the ethical order as regards the incentives of a free power of choice; 
and although with this reversal there can still be legally good actions, yet the mind’s 
attitude is thereby corrupted at its root (so far as the moral disposition is concerned), 
and hence the human being is designated as evil” (R 6:30). 
 
The most advanced examples of depravity constitute the limit for human evil, our corruptibility 
fully actualized. We cannot progress beyond this stage without completely destroying our moral 
interest, and as we have seen, Kant declares that this is impossible if we are to remain moral beings 
subject to the constraints of morality. Accordingly, depravity (Bösartigkeit) is not to be understood 
as malice (Bosheit), the pursuit of evil for evil’s sake (R 6:37). Depravity is rather the result of the 
most entrenched form of dialectical illusion, which leads the subject to fully incorporate the 
subjective principles of happiness that she mistakes for objective principles of reason as 
unconditional determining grounds of the will. This act of will does not eradicate all 
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responsiveness to the feeling of respect; it merely subordinates the moral incentive, which is still 
capable of occupying us, though not to the detriment of our happiness.32 
 That depravity constitutes a deeper form of evil is reflected in the fact that it incurs 
deliberate rather than unintentional guilt. This guilt is built up insofar as the inability to see one’s 
moral shortcomings is now the result of some effort, what Kant calls “a certain perfidy on the part 
of the human heart (dolus malus) in deceiving itself as regards its own good or evil disposition” 
(R 6:38). The impure will is culpable for not being more vigilant about covert incentives, but these 
incentives arise quite naturally, and insofar as they are still subordinate to the moral law they can 
easily slip by unnoticed. The depraved will must be more active in the construction of its illusion: 
once sensible desire is taken to condition morality; once, as I put it above, the agreeable is taken 
for the good; it becomes increasingly difficult to represent oneself as possessing good character. 
Depravity thus represents the highest form of perversity: the will’s formal and material 
determining grounds are reversed, and the subject is less and less capable of seeing this because 
her power of judgment has degraded even further. As Kant puts it, the propensity to evil has “[put] 
out of tune the moral ability to judge what to think of a human being” (R 6:38). 
 It is helpful to return to the Anthropology at this point, to consider Kant’s account of 
passion, affect’s counterpart. This can help us get a grip on how particular expressions of depravity 
could take place. While affect is a temporary, sudden sensible response that one has difficulty 
reflecting upon, “passion (as a state belonging to the faculty of desire) takes its time and reflects, 
no matter how fierce it may be, in order to reach its end” (ApH 7:252). Placing this distinction in 
                                                
32 See Kant’s remark at R 6:36: “hence the difference, whether the human being is good or evil, must not 
lie in the difference between the incentives that he incorporates into his maxim (not in the material of the 
maxim) but in their subordination (in the form of the maxim): which of the two he makes the condition of 
the other.” 
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the context of the narrative I have been developing in this section, we could say: If the frail, 
affected person does not do the work required to strengthen her judgment, firm up her principles, 
and thereby cultivate virtue, what starts out as a natural but passing reaction to sudden 
circumstances becomes a more deeply rooted aspect of one’s character. In short, affect turns to 
passion as one progresses towards the latter stages of evil and incorporates sensible desire into her 
maxims as an unchecked source of justification.33 Kant is particularly evocative in describing the 
difference between these two perversities of the soul:  
“affect works like water that breaks through a dam; passion, like a river that digs 
itself deeper into its bed” (ApH 7:252);  
 
“if affect is drunkenness, then passion is an illness that abhors all medicine, and it 
is therefore far worse than all those transitory emotions that at least stir up the 
resolution to be better; instead, passion is an enchantment that also refuses 
recuperation” (ApH 7:265-6). 
 
This talk of illness is meant to capture the way that passion distorts reasoning to prioritize one end 
over all others. Fully entrenched in our character, passion presupposes maxims directed at the ends 
it prescribes, maxims which rationalize the end in question. Consider, for example, Kant’s 
discussion of the passionate desire for vengeance. He insists that it is one of the most deeply rooted 
passions the human being is capable of developing, since it can so easily be framed as directed at 
a just end:  
“hatred arising from an injustice we have suffered, that is, the desire for vengeance, 
is a passion that follows irresistibly from the nature of the human being, and, 
malicious as it may be, maxims of reason are nevertheless interwoven with the 
inclination by virtue of the permissible desire for justice, whose analogue it is” 
(ApH 7:270). 
                                                
33 In this respect, I disagree with Iain Morrison, who builds an interpretation of weakness or frailty around 
the claim that it functions like a passion. On my reading, passions are too deeply rooted in one’s character 
to be representative of weakness. Since Kant is insistent that we form practical principles around them, 
passions must reflect a more entrenched form of evil. Cf. Iain Morrisson, “On Kantian Maxims: A 
reconciliation of the Incorporation Thesis and Weakness of the Will,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 
(2005): 73-89. 
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This loose talk of subjective and objective principles “interwoven” with one another corresponds 
to the language of dialectical illusion used above. Insofar as what is really an expression of self-
love is fully accepted as directed towards the good, the incentives of happiness and morality are 
reversed in their order of priority and the passion-afflicted person manifests the deepest form of 
evil. Even passion for something seemingly benign, like beneficence, belongs at this level. For the 
reasoning directed at ends of passion, which makes a mere part of one’s final end into the whole, 
“directly contradicts the formal principle of reason itself” (ApH 7:266). Affects, as sensations that 
we have difficulty reflecting upon, are “merely unfortunate states of mind full of many ills,” which 
do “momentary damage to freedom and dominion over oneself” (ApH 7:267). In contrast, passions 
are always evil, finding “pleasure and satisfaction in a slavish mind” (ApH 7:267).34 To the extent 
that passion distorts one’s ability to judge, perverts the heart, and thereby reduces one’s capacity 
to act according to the moral law, it severely impacts our freedom. While some might see affect as 
possessing a kind of benefit—Kant points to the example of people who wish they could get 
angry—no one in their right mind would desire passion as Kant describes it: “For who wants to 
have himself put in chains when he can be free?” (ApH 7:253).  
 Once moral corruption has progressed to this point, it becomes almost intolerably difficult 
to recover. The most evil human heart has such a reduced capacity to act from the law, such a 
distorted power of judgment, that it can be difficult to grasp how far one has fallen and what can 
be done moving forward. But of course, because our predisposition to the good cannot be totally 
                                                
34This distinction between affects as unfortunate and passions as resolutely evil corresponds to some of 
the language Kant uses to describe the difference between frailty, impurity, and depravity in the Religion. 
As I said above, though all evil action is imputable, frailty and impurity can be described as bearing 
unintentional guilt, while depravity always bears deliberate guilt, owing to the self-deception and more 
entrenched form of rationalization it requires to take root (R 6:38). 
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eradicated, there remains hope for improvement. Kant describes the recovery process in biblical 
terms, invoking the imagery of rebirth and declaring that a revolution must take place in the reason 
of the would-be reformer (R 6:47-8). But as we know, even if the subject is able to grasp the 
objective conditions of morality and install them as determining grounds of her will, the 
inescapable possibility of dialectical illusion remains. Grounded in our sensible dependence and 
capable of furnishing subjective determining grounds to evil, this rational activity constitutes a 
fundamental part of our nature. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 My aim here has been twofold: to strengthen the ongoing analogy between practical and 
theoretical discursive reason, and show how it can be compatible with Kant’s view of evil. 
Continuing to develop the concept of respect as the form of practical sensibility, and introducing 
the general form of discursive reason’s dialectic served both of these aims. As a result of the 
former, my account of evil meets Kant’s condition that incentives of both morality and self-love 
are necessarily present in all acts of will. Respect for the moral law must be part of the driving 
force of every maxim. The human being cannot help but take an interest in morality. As the form 
of practical sensibility, respect is the sensible expression of our practical rational form of life, our 
ability to act on the basis of reasons rather than through the pull of affect. Accordingly, we can 
think of the feeling of respect as having a transformative effect on sensibility. Through it, we 
become the kind of sensible beings capable of being moved by commands.  
 From the latter project, i.e., developing the concept of reason’s dialectic, I was able to flesh 
out Kant’s unique conception of virtue, a conception grounded in his recognition that sensibly 
dependent reason is by nature apt to entangle itself in a special kind of illusion that leads to vice. 
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We are thus finally in a position to put Kant’s claims about virtue in their proper context. The idea 
that virtue is “a disposition conformed with law from respect for law, and thus consciousness of a 
continuing propensity to transgression or at least impurity” (KpV 5:128), 35  does not only 
communicate our radical fallenness, the idea that we are such as to freely bring evil upon ourselves 
and others. It also implies deep metaphysical reflections about the nature of sensibly dependent 
reason. Because of this nature, we are at once free, responsible for our own character, and 
dependent in a way that casts moral struggle as an inevitability. This is, in part, how the concept 
of grace gains foothold in a philosophical system that decries most theology as empty speculation. 
Let us now turn to this topic, and Kant’s understanding of faith as a necessary element in the life 
of a sensibly dependent moral being. 
  
 
                                                
35 See also Kant’s additional remarks about virtue: “virtue, that is, moral disposition in conflict, and not 
holiness in the supposed possession of a complete purity of dispositions of the will” (KpV 5:84); and “the 
true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind with a considered and firm resolution to put the law of virtue into 










Emerging from the previous chapter is an account of our moral experience that is firmly 
grounded in Kant’s understanding of the structure of sensibly dependent reason. Drawing on what 
I have been calling his ‘metaphysics of mind,’ as opposed to claims about our particular 
psychological constitution, Kant frames our propensity for moral weakness and transgression as 
grounded in a natural dialectic of reason. Far from being fatalist or trivializing in its presentation 
of the human propensity for evil, the above interpretation allows us to maintain that evil action is 
morally imputable without presenting the will as inscrutably voluntaristic in its choice to 
subordinate the moral law to selfish concerns. The evil will freely chooses to determine itself from 
immoral grounds, but this determination is itself based in our susceptibility to a natural illusion 
through which we take merely subjective principles of practical reason to have objective purport. 
We are obliged to overcome this illusion through the cultivation of virtue, and can make steady 
progress in this direction, but the susceptibility to make illusory judgments remains as a necessary 
element of our sensibly dependent rational nature.  
With this account we find the human being presented as a complex but unified subject 
rather than a being divided by warring factions. Sensibility is a necessary condition on the 
possibility of evil, but cannot be its source. It is reason’s activity that produces the subjective 
determining ground of the will, but again, not in isolation from sensible conditions and the dialectic 
they enable. If we ignore this unified conception of sensibly dependent reason, we fail to heed 
Kant’s warning and end up with a skewed picture that either leans too heavily on sensibility, 
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making animals of us, or diminishes the practical interest of reason casting us as diabolical beings 
who can clear-eyedly subordinate morality to self-love (R 6:35). On the picture I have been 
articulating, evil is neither the result of natural necessity nor the product of a fundamental choice 
between two competing principles, each of which is attractive on its own grounds. So we are not 
necessitated to evil, but, importantly, nor does our practical freedom entail that we stand at a 
crossroads, faced with the choice between pursuing happiness or morality. Both of these pictures 
are too simplistic for Kant’s rich vision of our moral experience. 
In short, the concept of dialectic provides us with a framework to show how evil can arise 
through our failure to properly represent a natural principle of reason—the principle of happiness 
or self-love—as opposed to a failure to be motivated by the moral law. As I have argued, it is only 
because practical reason can become embroiled in misrepresentation and self-contradiction that 
evil is possible. Otherwise, reason could not furnish a subjective determining ground sufficient to 
bring about such action. In the Groundwork, Kant describes this propensity for dialectic as the 
capacity to call the law into question, to draw up principles that admit of exceptions or smuggle 
merely empirical incentives into the grounds for determination.1 Building on this formulation in 
the previous chapter allowed me to develop a unique account of evil. In the present chapter, I will 
turn to Kant’s description of practical reason’s dialectic in the Critique of Practical Reason, where 
he abstracts from the concepts of rationalization and doubt, claiming that practical reason’s self-
contradictions arise because of its attempt to find “the unconditioned for the practically 
conditioned” (KpV 5:108). Unpacking this thought will allow us to deepen our understanding of 
																																																						
1 See G 4:405, where Kant describes the natural dialectic of practical reason as “a propensity to 
rationalize (vernünfteln) against those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity, or at least 
upon their purity and strictness, and, where possible, to make them better suited to our wishes and 
inclinations.” 
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the concept of practical dialectical illusion, and in so doing, further specify the limits of our 
ongoing analogy with theoretical reason.  
So far, each chapter has made a unique contribution to the determination of the concept of 
sensibly dependent practical reason and its analogy with theoretical reason. This development is 
useful for understanding the systematic nature of Kant’s philosophy, but it also helps us to clarify 
certain misconceptions surrounding his view of practical reason. By arguing for a reading of Kant’s 
moral philosophy that is deeply grounded in the necessary character of sensibly dependent reason, 
we can rule out interpretations that rely on purported facts about our empirical psychology and 
make our volitional attitudes out to be too disconnected from the cognitive content of our practical 
representations. A central tenet of the reading under development here is that Kant’s equation of 
the will with practical reason entails that our ability to will an end cannot be sharply separated 
from our ability for conceptually articulated thinking about the grounds for willing that end. Hence 
acts of the will must be understood through reference to the cognitive standing of their 
representational content as much as through reference to the efficacy that marks them as acts of 
the faculty of desire. 
The analogy I have developed between practical and theoretical reason provides support 
for this view by articulating the differences between each use of reason in a way that nevertheless 
identifies them both as determinations of the discursive cognitive capacity.2 In the Chapter 2, I 
took up Kant’s own articulation of the distinction between sensibly dependent reason’s two uses, 
arguing that any analogy between them would be limited by the fact that theoretical cognition 
determines an already existing object given from elsewhere, while practical cognition brings the 
																																																						
2 Recall that I am using ‘discursive’ and ‘sensibly dependent’ interchangeably here. See Chapter 2, §2.4, 
footnote 18. 
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object it determines into existence (KpV 5:46; Bix-x). This limit was further determined in §3.2 
of chapter three, where I argued that practical and theoretical reason differ fundamentally insofar 
as practical cognition does not, like its theoretical counterpart, involve a synthesis of sensible 
matter yielding representations of already existing objects. Rather, practical cognition relates to 
representations of objects insofar as these representations are efficacious or motivating, i.e., 
capable of bringing about the cognitive activity that produces, reproduces, or maintains the object’s 
existence. In the previous chapter, I focused on each use of reason in its capacity for dialectical 
activity, differentiating them insofar as theoretical reason is transcendent in its pure use, while 
practical reason is transcendent in its empirical use. In the present chapter, I will argue that this 
inverse relation is constitutive of one of the most striking and controversial differences between 
the two uses of reason: because sensibly dependent practical reason is immanent in its pure use, it 
is licensed to assume the objective reality of the ideas required for it to realize its necessary ends—
even if the objects of these ideas are ideal and thus transcendent for the same faculty in its 
theoretical use.  
Continuing to specify our analogy will thus lead us to the position that moral faith occupies 
in the Kantian system. Because the treatment of this issue will be framed through our discussion 
of the necessary structure of discursive practical reason itself, it will cut against empirically or 
historically based interpretations that understand the appeal to God to be based on merely 
psychological facts about us, or the result of Kant’s attempt to find a place for his religious 
commitments within his system.3 Instead, I will argue that the human need for religious life will 
																																																						
3 For the former, see Paul Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, (New York: CUP, 2000), pp. 
333-371. For the latter, see Andrews Reath, “Two conceptions of the highest good in Kant,” Journal of 
the History of Philosophy, 26, vol. 4 (1988): 593-619.  
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emerge directly from consideration of the a priori nature of sensibly dependent reason and its 
objectively necessary practical law. To make this argument, I start with the abstract 
characterization of practical reason’s dialectic introduced above, and develop the idea that reason’s 
self-contradictions emerge from its natural attempt to seek the unconditioned for the practically 
conditioned. This will require building upon the general concept of dialectical reasoning 
introduced in Chapter 4, developing the concept of the highest good, and showing how doubts 
about its possibility enable the dialectical illusion that was my focus in the previous chapter. In 
§5.3, I show how proving the possibility of the highest good, practical reason’s unconditioned 
totality, leads to a series of practically grounded judgments about the objective reality of 
supersensible ideas. Here I argue that the intelligibility of practical reason’s unconditioned totality 
requires us to postulate our freedom, immortality, and the existence of God. We thereby reach the 
desired conclusion: moral faith emerges as a necessary element in the life of a sensibly dependent 
practical being because without it, practical reason could not grasp the real possibility of a 
systematic totality of ends organized by the moral law. 
 
5.2 Practical Reason’s Search for the Unconditioned 
Kant opens the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason by describing practical reason’s 
natural conflict in terms quite different from those he used in the Groundwork. He begins with the 
idea, by now familiar to us, that pure reason gives rise to a natural dialectic in both its uses. Then 
he specifies the practical variety as follows: 
“As pure practical reason it likewise seeks the unconditioned for the practically 
conditioned (which rests on inclinations and natural needs), not indeed as the 
determining ground of the will, but even when this is given (in the moral law), it 
seeks the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason, under the 
name of the highest good” (KpV 5:108). 
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This passage agrees with Groundwork 4:405 insofar as both cite our dependence on sensible needs 
and inclinations—what Kant here calls the practically conditioned—as that which enables the 
dialectic at issue. But while the Groundwork passage claims our sensible dependence leads reason 
to quibble with the law and recognize exceptions to it, the passage above from the second Critique 
insists that pure practical reason already recognizes its determining ground in the moral law, and 
yet still seeks an unconditioned totality in practical reason’s necessary object, the highest good.  
 We might take this to be grounds for thinking Kant changed some aspects of his view after 
he wrote the Groundwork, but it remains clear from other parts of the second Critique that Kant 
still thinks we need to resolve the dialectic. Otherwise, it can lead us to assume other, non-moral 
determining grounds of the will. In the Introduction, he declares that one of the second Critique’s 
tasks is to “prevent empirically conditioned reason from presuming that it, alone and exclusively, 
furnishes the determining ground of the will” (KpV 5:16). As the Dialectic progresses, we learn 
that the Antinomy to which reason is inevitably led, which manifests practical reason’s dialectic, 
concerns whether the desire for happiness is the motive for maxims of virtue, or the maxim of 
virtue is the cause of happiness (KpV 5:113). Thus despite the achievements of the Analytic, in 
the Dialectic we are inevitably back to entertaining the possibility that empirically conditioned 
practical reason could be the source of an objectively valid law instead.  
This should come as no surprise considering Kant’s more general statements about what 
constitutes a dialectic of reason. In the previous chapter, I introduced the general structure of 
dialectical reason with the idea that it comes into being when immanent, subjectively dependent 
principles take on a transcendent use and appear to be objective.4 This can ground the illusory 
																																																						
4 See chapter 4, §4.3.1. 
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reasoning that is distinctive of dialectical thought in a number of ways. Most commonly, the 
appearance of objectivity leads a principle to form an antinomy, a seemingly irresolvable 
contradiction, with another purportedly objective principle.5 Now importantly, for this to be 
possible, the principles in question must claim to be universal in character. As Kant says in the 
third Critique, the dialectical faculty of mind in question must be “rationalistic (vernünftelnd), i.e., 
its judgments must lay claim to universality, and indeed do so a priori, for the dialectic consists in 
the opposition of such judgments” (KU 5:337). The possibility of a practical dialectic thus requires 
that the moral law be called into question by an opposing principle claiming universality. 
So why does Kant open the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason by insisting that 
pure practical reason does not seek a determining ground other than the one that is given to it, the 
moral law? Drawing on several passages that have already been discussed, we can see that Kant 
does not deny that happiness can appear to be a sufficient determining ground of the will. In the 
passage at issue, his aim is rather to trace the origin of the possibility of this appearance.  In doing 
so, he is clear that the moral law has an original primacy insofar as it presses upon us and demands 
our interest. As he claims in the Analytic, the moral law is given to us as a fact of reason, something 
which cannot be argued from antecedent premises but simply announces itself in our consciousness 
(KpV 5:31). Kant reiterates this language of givenness in the passage under discussion, claiming 
that even after the moral law is given to us as the only determining ground of the will, reason still 
seeks the unconditioned for the will’s necessary object, the highest good (KpV 5:108). We thus 
find the source of dialectical activity in practical reason’s natural attempt to find an unconditioned 
																																																						
5 Depending on the nature of the antinomy in question, one or both of the propositions forming the 
contradiction at issue may be true. Or more accurately, conditionally true given the assumption of 
transcendental idealism. As we will see, this is the case with the antinomy of pure practical reason. 
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totality for its object, rather than in the attempt to find its own determining law. For as Kant insists, 
the latter is already given, present in our consciousness as soon as we attempt to draw up practical 
principles for ourselves (KpV 5:29). Were this not the case, the law could not figure as one of the 
two contradictory claims constitutive of practical reason’s antinomy. 
This line of reasoning echoes the discussion of respect as a necessary form of sensibility 
that was my focus throughout much of chapters 3 and 4. Regardless of what else we say about our 
propensity for dialectical reasoning in general, or for evil in particular, we cannot deny our 
unwavering ability to recognize the moral law’s authority and feel respect for it. This would be to 
deny the above claim that the law is given as a fact of reason. It would also jeopardize my ongoing 
project to show how the sensibly dependent will can be understood in a robustly cognitivist 
manner, as identical to practical reason, yet without necessitating an impositionist picture on which 
sensibility is fundamentally resistant to reason and the practical subject is necessarily divided. A 
project which involves, among others, the argument that respect should be understood as the form 
of practical sensibility because recognition of the moral law fundamentally shapes our affective 
nature, making it possible for us to be moral agents capable of taking an interest in the moral law, 
and thus of having cognition of the good. 
Having explained why Kant thinks practical reason’s dialectic is logically posterior to and 
dependent upon our original consciousness of the moral law, the next task is to show how the 
practical antinomy arises from the search for the unconditioned totality of practical reason. The 
latter concept is more commonly known as the highest good, which Kant describes as “happiness 
distributed in exact proportion to morality” (KpV 5:110). Though the idea of the highest good has 
not received much discussion up to this point, many of the arguments necessary to understanding 
it have already been made. For to grasp this concept is essentially to grasp the concept of 
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hylomorphic unity which was my focus in Chapter 2. As we have seen, reason legislates the 
necessary form of our practical principles, while the deliverances of sensibility that are determined 
by this form individuate their matter.6 As happiness conditioned by morality, the highest good 
captures this aspect of Kant’s position in the concept of a final, necessary end of pure practical 
reason.  
Recall that happiness is understood as the sum of all materially determined ends, the 
realization of which would bring about “a rational being’s consciousness of the agreeableness of 
life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence” (KpV 5:22). Kant is clear, from the 
Groundwork onwards, that this concept is a mere ideal of the imagination that is inherently 
indeterminate because its components are conditional ends and desires grounded in the feeling of 
the agreeable (G 4:418).7 Since our desires and the ends they fix are subject to constant change, 
we can never be certain what our happiness as a whole will consist in. Nevertheless, as we have 
seen, as sensibly dependent beings we depend on such desires, and it is a matter of subjective 
necessity that we desire happiness insofar as it contains them all under one concept. Happiness 
thus constitutes the material element of the object of practical reason. In contrast, reason supplies 
the formal determining ground of the will, setting limiting conditions on how we can pursue our 
material ends. Insofar as we are both sensibly dependent and capable of recognizing objectively 
																																																						
6 See Chapter 2, §2.4.2. 
7 We must distinguish between ends and desires here because some objects that would contribute towards 
our happiness cannot be realized by our own actions. Kant defines ends as “the concept of an object 
insofar as it at the same time contains the ground of the reality of this object” (KU 5:180). Hence desired 
outcomes cannot be called ends unless the subject recognizes her ability to cause the outcome in 
representing it. This is why Kant also describes happiness as “the state of a rational being in the world in 
the whole of whose existence everything goes according to his wish and will” (KpV 5:124). Happiness 
includes not just the ends I will, but those I would will if I could, i.e., the objects of wishing. This point 
will become crucial in subsequent sections, when we turn to practical reason’s antinomy, and the 
postulates we must assume to resolve it. 
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necessary laws of pure practical reason, i.e., insofar as we both aim at happiness and take an 
interest in morality, we recognize that the realization of our happiness under the formal conditions 
of the moral law constitutes the necessary object of the will.  
So the highest good is not so much an additional aspect of Kant’s moral picture, something 
which involves extra premises and grounds new duties,8 as it is an expression of the general 
conditions of sensibly dependent moral life that have been my focus all along. But instead of 
pulling these conditions apart through distinctions between formal and material practical 
principles, concepts of the good and the agreeable, and formal and material incentives, the highest 
good presents them as unified in a final end. This end is the complete good of practical reason, 
including as its elements both the formal law of pure practical reason as the unconditioned supreme 
good, and happiness as the materially determined conditioned good which completes it (KpV 
5:110). The highest good is thus arguably the most prominent hylomorphic unity in the practical 
system, representing both pure practical reason’s formal determining ground and the sensible 
matter which it determines as elements of a unified practical system.9  
We are now in a position to see why Kant thinks of the highest good as the unconditioned 
totality of pure practical reason’s object, that which finds the unconditioned for the practically 
conditioned. For it is through the concept of the highest good that contingent empirically 
conditioned ends are determined by the unconditional law of pure practical reason, and thus 
brought into agreement with one another as members of an objectively valid system of ends. This 
																																																						
8 Though largely dismissed at this point, some commentators have held the opposite view.  
9 See KpV 5:109-110: “If the moral law is already included as supreme condition in the concept of the 
highest good, the highest good is then not merely object: the concept of it and the representation of its 
existence as possible by our practical reason are at the same time the determining ground of the pure will 
because in that case the moral law, already included and thought in this concept, and no other object, in fact 
determines the will in accordance with the principle of autonomy.”  
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system forms an unconditioned totality insofar as the plurality of ends constitutive of the concept 
of happiness are unified under a single practical law which articulates the conditions under which 
such ends can be pursued.10  
 Despite the fact that the concept of the highest good requires no extra arguments and 
follows simply from fundamental features of practical reason that have already been discussed, 
Kant insists that showing its real possibility on practical grounds is no simple matter. This task is 
in fact the source of the practical antinomy that marks practical reason’s dialectical use. Thus 
although the accomplishments of the preceding Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason enable 
us to elucidate the concept in some important respects, a more determinate account is still called 
for. Moreover, the foregoing work of the Analytic has made the task at hand even more difficult 
by showing that morality and happiness are heterogeneous elements that cannot form an analytic 
unity. As a purely formal condition on action, morality does not directly concern itself with 
whether our materially determined ends are met. Hence showing the possibility of the highest good 
cannot be a matter of resolving concepts to show that one is virtuous simply in seeking happiness, 
or happy in demonstrating virtue (KpV 5:113). Instead, the two necessary components of the 
highest good must be combined synthetically, such that one component is taken to be the cause of 
the other.11  
 In this way we reach the Antinomy of practical reason, which returns us to the question of 
the objective determining ground of the will. Since the possibility of the highest good requires that 
																																																						
10 See B 111 in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant describes the concept of totality as “plurality 
considered as unity.” 
11 We must posit a causal relation because our concern is to show how the highest good can be brought 
about through action, which is itself a kind of causality: “Since, as has already been shown, the given 
combination cannot be analytic, it must be thought synthetically and, indeed, as the connection of cause 
and effect, because it concerns a practical good, that is, one that is possible through action” (KpV 5:113). 
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virtue and happiness must be related causally, we have two options. Either the desire for happiness 
is the motive for adopting principles of virtue, or the autonomous adoption of virtuous principles 
brings about our happiness. Kant labels the first option “absolutely impossible” on the basis of the 
arguments of the Analytic (KpV 5:113). But the second proposition too appears impossible, for as 
the Analytic also established, the formal a priori law of morality does not directly concern itself 
with realizing the material ends constitutive of happiness. Kant’s claim that happiness and morality 
are two heterogeneous concepts commits him to viewing the systematic unity of ends determined 
by the latter as a formal characteristic, one that is quite separable from the empirical question of 
how to actually bring these ends into existence. Although virtue and happiness stand to one another 
as condition and conditioned in the highest good, it is far from clear how morality could actually 
bring about happiness. As Kant insists, “any practical connection of causes and effects in the world, 
as a result of the determination of the will, does not depend upon the moral dispositions of the will 
but upon knowledge of the laws of nature and the physical ability to use them for one’s purposes” 
(KpV 5:114). 
 Pure practical reason’s Antinomy thus emerges when reason both recognizes that one of 
the two propositions articulated above must be true if the highest good is to be an objectively real 
concept, and sees that it cannot grasp the possibility of either. In this way the very possibility of 
morality is called into question: since the highest good is the necessary object of pure practical 
reason, the impossibility of the former would lead us to question the possibility of the latter. In 
other words, if the critique of the faculty of practical reason reveals that its pure use has no possible 
object, the pure use of the faculty itself will be revealed as impossible insofar as its form is 
determined by a false principle that has no object and thus no objective validity.  
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 I will unpack Kant’s resolution of this antinomy in the following section. For now, my aim 
is to discuss how this conflict fits with the broader concept of dialectical illusion introduced in the 
previous chapter. Specifically, I need to show how Kant’s description of practical reason’s 
dialectic in the second Critique is consistent with the more informal characterization from the 
Groundwork that I drew upon. The above discussion of the highest good and the practical antinomy 
that it figures in gives us the resources to make this argument. For as I have shown, it is only upon 
asking how the unconditioned totality of pure practical reason can be realized that the determining 
ground of the will is called into question. The moral law itself cannot help but interest us, 
impressing itself upon practical consciousness as the formal condition of good conduct. But once 
the subject looks towards the sensibly conditioned final end of her action, and sees that a good 
moral disposition does not as such help to realize happiness in the world, the conditions that enable 
practical reason’s natural dialectic fall into place. Insofar as practical reason is gripped by its 
antinomy, there is no clear way towards realizing the highest good, and the side of the Antinomy 
that privileges self-love can seem to present the best way forward.12  
 This is exactly how Kant describes practical reason’s activity in the Groundwork. As we 
have seen, the natural dialectic that arises there is described as the propensity to quibble with the 
law—to recognize exceptions to it, and cast doubt upon its purity. In the surrounding passages, 
Kant also makes reference to our capacity to respect the moral law, and the fact that our focus on 
																																																						
12 As we will see, the practical postulates provide relief by giving the subject objective practical grounds 
for taking the highest good to be possible. They thus help with motivation by enriching the determinacy 
of her practical representations of the good. So we are not saddled with the reading on which God and 
immortality serve as ideas that provide a psychological boost for the subject insofar as they dangle the 
prospect of eternal reward before her eyes. I will discuss the postulates in more detail in §3 and in chapter 
six.	
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materially determined ends and their relationship to the law continues to put pressure on its 
validity. He describes the nature of practical reason as follows; 
“the human being feels within himself a powerful counterweight to all the 
commands of duty, which reason represents to him as so deserving of the highest 
respect—the counterweight of his needs and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of 
which he sums up under the name happiness. Now reason issues its precepts 
unremittingly, without thereby promising anything to the inclinations, and so, as it 
were, with disregard and contempt for those claims, which are so impetuous and 
besides so apparently equitable (and refuse to be neutralized by any command). But 
from this there arises a natural dialectic, that is, a propensity to rationalize against 
those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity, or at least upon their 
purity and strictness, and where possible, to make them better suited to our wishes 
and inclinations” (G 4:405). 
 
From this description of practical reason’s lot, Kant concludes that common human reason is 
compelled to philosophy despite its natural grasp of the conditions of morality and predisposition 
to respect for it. So rather than providing a new principle of morality, Kant’s moral philosophy is 
meant to safeguard the one we already grasp implicitly. Doing the metaphysical work of finding 
its source and precise determination is thus important insofar as it helps practical reason avoid the 
dialectical reasoning, what he here calls rationalization,13 that is enabled once practical reason 
grasps its antinomy. Kant thus ends the first section of the Groundwork, which is aptly entitled 
“Transition from common moral rational to philosophic cognition,” by calling for a critique of the 
faculty of practical reason that might allow it to “escape from its predicament about claims from 
both sides and not run the risk of being deprived of all genuine moral principles through the 
ambiguity into which it easily falls” (G 4:405).  
																																																						
13 Recall that in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant says that dialectical faculties must be 
inherently “rationalistic” (vernünftelnd), that is, such as to make purportedly universal judgments that 
oppose one another and ground a natural dialectic of reason (KU 5:337). 
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 The account of practical reason’s dialectical use found throughout Kant’s mature works is 
thus consistent in character. We can account for the major differences between the two accounts 
under discussion through two different but related points. First, the Groundwork formulation is 
expressed in non-technical, subject-centered terms that capture the pre-philosophical structure of 
dialectic from the perspective of desire. Insofar as our inclinations are infringed upon by the law, 
the question of how to satisfy both arises and we respond by questioning the stringency of 
morality’s commands in an attempt to reconcile the two components of the highest good. Though 
this may not be obvious to the subject, giving in to such quibbling inevitably involves making 
happiness the determining ground of the will. In contrast, the second Critique characterizes the 
dialectic in more abstract concepts that are fitting to the idea of a Dialectic in general. This should 
not be surprising, since here Kant is more concerned to trace the elements that a critical account 
of practical reason shares with the corresponding account of theoretical reason undertaken in the 
first Critique. His language thus captures practical reason’s dialectic from the perspective of more 
neutral, technical concepts concerning cognition in general. Second, the Groundwork formulation 
picks out particular acts of reason that manifest dialectical structure, gesturing towards concrete 
moments of weakness and impurity like those described in the previous chapter. The second 
Critique, in contrast, remains at a more abstract level, discussing the general character of the 
antinomy, the principles involved, and the high stakes that loom insofar as it cannot be resolved. 




particular ends, the latter takes the whole system of ends and their organization into account.14 
 Despite these differences, however, the core details of the view remain constant, and 
provide a rich account of how we can reconcile our ineradicable interest in morality with our 
propensity to dialectical illusion. For as we have seen, it is only when we look to the materially 
determined ends of happiness and their relation to morality that ambiguities arise. If we abstract 
from this relationship as we ought to do when we appraise the actions of others or find ourselves 
confronted with examples of virtuous conduct, Kant takes it to be uncontroversial that we can 
separate empirical motives from pure moral ones, and judge from our implicit recognition of and 
respect for the moral law. But when we are led to think about morality and happiness together, i.e., 
to think of our nature and the ends conditioned by it as forming an unconditioned totality that is at 
once rational and sensibly dependent, reason naturally falls into dialectical illusion.  
It is in this context that practical reason can determine itself to evil in the manner discussed 
in the previous chapter. In the second Critique, Kant describes this activity with the declaration 
that practical reason is transcendent in its empirically conditioned use, and is naturally set up to 
make an illegitimate claim to absolute rule by furnishing merely contingent, material determining 
grounds that purport to be objective and universal (KpV 5:15). In the Groundwork, he does the 
same by foreshadowing the account of evil he will later give in the Religion, articulating three 
ways in which we cast doubt on the law by questioning its strictness, purity, or validity (G 4:405). 
																																																						
14 This difference can help us place the Groundwork discussion in relation to the second Critique and the 
resolution of practical reason’s antinomy through the practical postulates. I do not mean to suggest that 
belief in the postulates will help fill out one’s reasoning in concrete circumstances directed at a particular 
end. For example, heading into a tempting situation that will present ample opportunity for weakness, the 
subject will not necessarily be helped by avowing belief in her freedom or the existence of God. Kant’s 
discussion of the issue suggests he situates the postulates at a more general level of analysis. They 
respond to a holistic, theoretically motivated scepticism that threatens the possibility of the highest good 
as such. It is this attitude that weakens the moral disposition, and makes the agent more vulnerable to the 
particular weak, impure, and depraved actions discussed in Chapter 4. 
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These correspond roughly to the three grades of evil—frailty, impurity, and depravity—developed 
in Chapter 4. Whether we look to the first-personal, desire-focused language of the latter, or the 
third-personal and highly general technical vocabulary of the former, we have in hand an account 
of practical reason’s natural dialectic that can be understood as both consistent across Kant’s 
mature practical writings, and analogous to the dialectic that emerges out of speculative reason’s 
search for the unconditioned in the first Critique.  
 
5.3 Resolution Through the Practical Postulates 
Now that we have a better grasp of practical reason’s dialectic, we can turn to its resolution. 
This will lead us to the practical postulates and a further limit to our analogy with theoretical 
reason. In the previous chapter, I gave an account of evil that located its possibility in the fact that 
practical reason is transcendent in its empirical use, unlike theoretical reason which is transcendent 
in its pure speculative use. In the present section I take up a corollary of this difference, namely, 
that practical reason is immanent in its pure use. I will show how pure practical reason is licensed 
to postulate the ideas of reason that are subjectively necessary for the resolution of the above 
antinomy, and thus also subjectively necessary for the faculty of sensibly dependent practical 
reason from which the antinomy naturally emerges. In this way, the central concepts of 
metaphysics—freedom, immortality, and God—find their place in the Kantian system as 
postulates of practical reason. As such, the objective reality of these concepts is shown, and we 
can affirm speculative propositions about the existence of freedom, God, and immortality on 
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practical grounds.15 Unlike its theoretical counterpart, pure practical reason is thus capable of 
grounding cognition of supersensible objects.  
Grounding an account of the practical postulates in the structure of sensibly dependent 
reason itself will allow me to meet some commonly recognized interpretive challenges in a novel 
way. Attempting to grasp the proper role of the postulates in Kant’s system is akin to walking a 
tightrope: the reader must accord them their rightful place as the objects of subjectively necessary 
belief. But in doing so, she must be careful not to inadvertently undermine the philosophical edifice 
she is trying to support. First, one wrong move can swiftly turn the good will’s formal ground of 
determination into a merely material one. If, for example, belief in God is tied to the reward of 
everlasting happiness, and this latter hope is incorporated into the determining ground of the will, 
Kantian morality will no longer be autonomous in character. We must be wary of interpretations 
which understand this kind of belief to be what explains the motivational boost the postulates 
enable for the subject. Second, Kant’s reader must avoid denying that those who reject the 
postulates would still possess the cognitive and motivational resources required to be subject to 
the moral law.16 In other words, she must do justice to Kant’s claim that the postulates are only 
subjectively necessary objects of belief. So, we must also be careful not to build so much into the 
postulates that they become necessary conditions on the possibility of moral action as such.17 As 
																																																						
15 The closest Kant comes to a definition of the term ‘practical postulate’ is at KpV 5:122: “by which I 
understand a theoretical proposition, though one not demonstrable as such, insofar as it is attached 
inseparably to an a priori unconditionally valid practical law.” 
16 For an excellent breakdown of this issue and the various positions it determines, see Christopher Insole, 
“The Irreducible Importance of Religious Hope in Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good,” Philosophy 
83 (2008): 333-351. 
17 Some commentators simply bite the bullet and accept that moral faith is the ratio essendi of the moral 
law. Cf. Frederick C. Beiser, “Moral faith and the highest good,” The Cambridge Companion to Kant and 
Modern Philosophy (New York: Cambridge, 2006), p. 607. As we will see, there are strong textual 
grounds for rejecting this reading. 
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Kant affirms with his vivid discussion of a godless Spinoza in the Critique of Judgment, the 
faithless are still morally interested persons. 
My arguments in this section will meet these challenges by drawing on one of the major 
gains for the view of motivation currently under development. As I said in §5.1, and as follows 
from the central arguments of Chapters 3 and 4, the content of a practical representation and its 
capacity to motivate the subject should not be understood as separable from one another. Taking 
up this principle, I will show that the practical postulates provide motivation to be virtuous, not by 
shoring up one’s moral resolve with extra-moral or psychological concerns, but through rendering 
the subject’s practical representations themselves more cognitively determinate. As I will argue, 
the postulates respond to limits on our cognition that can be directly attributed to our sensible 
dependence and the specifically spatiotemporal form it takes. Belief in our immortality, freedom, 
and God’s existence each allow us to transcend a particular limit by extending the content of our 
thought in a certain direction. Each of these extensions involves determining some aspect of the 
highest good through one of the three categories of relation: substance, causality, and community, 
and helps fill out the subject’s conception of how the highest good is possible. Since the cognitive 
content of a representation is immediately related to its efficacy—its capacity to motivate—this 
added determinacy strengthens the moral disposition.  
This understanding of the practical postulates meets the conditions of adequacy articulated 
above. Because I do not take a clean separation between objective content and subjective 
motivation to apply to Kant’s account of the postulates, there is no worry that merely subjective 
material determining grounds, such as one’s happiness, might be working independently to 
determine—or, more accurately, corrupt—one’s moral disposition.  In this case, the postulates 
motivate by extending, or adding determinacy to, our practically grounded representations. On this 
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reading, the postulates also do not figure as objective conditions on the possibility of morality. If 
the subject’s practical representations lack the added determinacy brought by the postulates, they 
will be less practically efficacious. When her subjective need to be assured of the possibility of the 
highest good is unmet, her moral resolve may falter. But she will not fail to be obligated as a moral 
subject: her original ability to recognize and feel respect for the law will remain ineradicable. 
Hence we can understand the practical postulates as grounding the real possibility of the highest 
good, without worrying that they may be covertly serving as material determining grounds of the 
will, or objectively necessary grounds for morality that reach beyond the moral law itself.18 
 
5.3.1 Theoretical Propositions Grounded in Pure Practical Reason 
As we will see, each postulate requires its own unique argument to explain its place in 
Kant’s system. But we can nevertheless turn to the concept of the practical postulate in general 
and enumerate a few necessary features common to each account. The first important point to 
grasp is that Kant thinks of the postulates as propositions of speculative reason asserted on practical 
grounds. Thus although the fact of their necessity is determined by moral laws, their assumption 
itself is an act of speculative reason in general: 
“these postulates are not theoretical dogmas but presuppositions having a 
necessarily practical reference and thus, although they do not indeed extend 
speculative cognition, they give objective reality to the idea of speculative reason 
in general (by means of their reference to what is practical) and justify its holding 




18 Some commentators simply bite the bullet and accept that moral faith is the ratio essendi of the moral 
law. Cf. Frederick C. Beiser, “Moral Faith and the Highest Good,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant 
and Modern Philosophy, ed. Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge, 2006), 607. As we will see, there are 
strong textual grounds for rejecting this reading. 
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Kant thus distinguishes between what justifies our belief in the postulates, or what the postulates 
reference as grounds, and the speculative activity of judging these ideas to have objective reality. 
While the former are purely practical cognitions of the moral law and its necessary object, the 
highest good, the latter are theoretical or speculative propositions in their own right.19  
Second, though the postulates are practically grounded theoretical propositions, they are 
not the objects of theoretically determinate cognitions. Theoretical reason is forced to grant “that 
there are such objects” (KpV 5:135) because of a need of practical reason, but it cannot further 
determine them for its own purposes, restricted as it is to objects of possible experience. Kant thus 
does not violate the conditions of theoretical cognition set out in the first Critique in understanding 
the postulates as objects of speculative reason in general. He remains committed to the idea that 
freedom, immortality, and God are supersensible ideas of reason that could not be presented in 
sensible intuition as objects of theoretical cognition. We cannot know how any of these ideas are 
theoretically possible, but we can and must assume their objective reality on practical grounds. We 
must therefore be careful to distinguish, as Kant does, between propositions that do and do not 
extend the limits and content of theoretical cognition. Insofar as they are grounded by practical 
need, as opposed to sensible experience or a priori cognitions about the conditions of the possibility 
of sensible experience, the practical postulates do not extend theoretical cognition.  
Third, practical justification for the postulates is obtained insofar as the objective reality of 
these ideas of reason must be assumed to answer the question that spurs practical reason’s 
antinomy, namely, how is the highest good possible? This is the practical need of which Kant 
speaks. As we saw in §5.2, being unable to judge the possibility of the highest good leads to 
																																																						
19 Recall also Kant’s loose definition of a practical postulate at KpV 5:122, where he affirms that they are 
theoretical propositions. 
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dialectical illusion and the possibility of evil action. But, importantly, the justification to assume 
the objects that fulfill this need does not come from the need itself. To take this reading would be 
to psychologize a key aspect of Kant’s moral metaphysics. The justification for assuming the 
postulates is better understood as follows: because reason recognizes the highest good as its 
necessary end in connection with an apodictically certain moral law, it must assume the objective 
reality of the conditions required to realize this end.20 In other words, because the moral law 
commands us to realize the highest good, and the moral law is unconditionally valid, the highest 
good cannot be an empty concept—it must be really possible. Hence, we can assume the objective 
reality of any ideas that are required for us to show this real possibility. In this way, ideas that 
would otherwise be transcendent for speculative reason “become immanent and constitutive 
inasmuch as they are grounds of the possibility of making real the necessary object of pure practical 
reason (the highest good)” (KpV 5:135).  
The practical postulates are thus theoretical propositions that affirm the existence of 
supersensible objects on the basis of practical grounds that do not, as practical, extend the limits 
of theoretical cognition. Insofar as the ideas of freedom, immortality, and God are recognized as 
conditions on the possibility of a necessary, objectively valid end, pure practical reason is licensed 
to assume their objective reality. In this way, pure practical reason is assured of the possibility of 
																																																						
20 Stephen Engstrom makes an excellent version of this point in “The Concept of the Highest Good in 
Kant’s Moral Theory,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 747-780. He 
distinguishes between contingent ends of practical reason and necessary ends of pure practical reason, 
arguing that the former are reached by determining what is empirically possible for the agent. For 
example, in deciding which career to pursue, I have to take into account my various aptitudes, skills, 
likes, and resources to arrive at an actual end, something I can represent as possible through my own 
agency. In contrast, “pure practical reason, because its ends are necessary rather than contingent, reverses 
this order of determination: it postulates the powers of agency—e.g., freedom and the existence of God—
needed to realize its necessary ends” (774). 
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the highest good, and the subject’s representations of morally determined ends are more likely to 
be sufficiently efficacious.  
 
5.3.2 The Postulate of Freedom 
Turning now to the individual postulates, one typically finds that freedom is in some 
respects the easiest and in others the hardest of the three ideas to develop. Unlike the concepts of 
God and immortality, freedom does not obviously have the potential to undermine Kant’s system 
by serving as a material determining ground of the will. In the Analytic of the second Critique, 
Kant even goes so far as to suggest that one could define (definiren) freedom through the concept 
of the will’s independence from anything other than the moral law (KpV 5:94). Freedom is also 
unlike the other postulates, however, in that Kant never explicitly argues for it as a postulate of 
practical reason in the Dialectic. The concept only comes up in the closing sections, where Kant 
takes stock of what has already been accomplished, and reaffirms that practical reason can resolve 
questions about the objective reality of ideas that speculative reason could not. Here Kant describes 
but does not argue for freedom as a postulate, claiming that the objective reality of its concept is 
established through our aiming at the highest good, insofar as the latter contains the moral law as 
its determining ground “and with it the law of an intelligible world as well” (KpV 5:133).  
So we must look back to the Analytic and Kant’s discussion of the moral law itself to better 
understand freedom as a postulate. This is no easy task, since here too we find no explicit argument 
to this effect. Kant even makes declarations that appear to count against freedom being something 
we are merely entitled to postulate, asserting instead the apparently stronger claims that freedom 
reveals its reality through the moral law, and that the other postulates get their objective reality 
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through the concept of freedom (KpV 5:4).21 The interpreter’s task is thus a difficult one. We can, 
however, arrive at a reading that fits with the text as a whole by drawing upon the general features 
of the postulates articulated in the previous section. Most importantly, we need to distinguish the 
foundational account of freedom that Kant gives in chapter one of the Analytic from the claim 
about its being a postulate that this account enables. The argument that we become conscious of 
our freedom through the moral law is thus not itself an argument for freedom as a postulate, but 
instead grounds for the subsequent claim that it is one. To argue for the latter goes beyond Kant’s 
exposition of the moral law as a fact of reason and its status as the ratio cognoscendi of freedom 
(KpV 5:5, footnote), to the warranted presupposition of freedom’s objective reality as an 
intelligible causality.22 
The characterization of the practical postulates developed in the previous section suggests 
the distinction at the core of my argument here. As theoretical propositions about objects whose 
objective reality is grounded in practical cognition, the postulates, or more accurately, the act of 
postulating, must be distinguished from the grounds for the act itself. As we also saw, these 
grounds are secured insofar as the objective reality of each idea is a necessary condition on the 
possibility of the highest good. So we must pinpoint an argument which shows, on practical 
grounds alone, that freedom is necessary for the highest good to be realized as the final end of pure 
																																																						
21 Kant also confirms that freedom has a special status in the third Critique, where he claims that the 
reality of freedom as a kind of causality can be established in experience insofar as laws of pure practical 
reason give rise to actions observable in the world (KU 5:468). Hence freedom “is the only one among all 
the ideas of pure reason whose object is a fact and which must be counted among the scibilia [or facts]” 
(KU 5:468). 
22 This view differs substantially from a common one which argues that freedom is used in two different 
senses in the Analytic and Dialectic. In the former, freedom as autonomy, as the bare possibility of acting 
independently of sensible causes, is asserted; while in the latter, freedom as autocracy or self-rule is 
potulated by the imperfect finite subject as an object of hope. Notable proponents include Lewis White 
Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1960), 207-8; and Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (New York: Cambridge, 1990), 285. 
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practical reason. If we can do this, we will be licensed to make the speculative judgment that 
freedom is an objectively real concept on the basis of such grounds. I suggest that we find such an 
argument in the first chapter of the Analytic, specifically in §5-7, where Kant gives what has 
become known as the reciprocity thesis—the thesis that freedom and the moral law reciprocally 
imply each other.23 This argument asserts that a will determinable by the form of law-giving must 
necessarily be independent of the material determining grounds given in nature, hence it must be 
free (KpV 5:28). Conversely, a free will must, as free, be capable of determining itself through 
something other than the material conditions constitutive of natural mechanical laws, hence it must 
be determinable through the concept of law-giving form (KpV 5:29). This foundational claim is 
nothing new: since the Groundwork, Kant has been clear that the moral law follows analytically 
from the positive concept of freedom (G 4:447). But it is only in the second Critique that he spells 
out how we come to cognize this relation between the two concepts. Drawing on arguments from 
the first Critique, Kant reminds us that we can have no theoretical cognition of transcendental 
freedom in experience, because all experience is determined by temporally structured laws of 
nature. Nor can we have a theoretically grounded speculative grasp of the positive concept of 
freedom a priori, we can only understand it negatively as independence from these natural laws. It 
is thus only through practical cognition that our freedom could be disclosed to us. Hence Kant’s 
claim that the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom, the ground through which the concept 
becomes available to us:  
“it is therefore the moral law of which we become immediately conscious (as soon 
as we draw up maxims of the will for ourselves), that first offers itself to us and, 
inasmuch as reason presents it as a determining ground not to be outweighed by 
any sensible conditions and indeed quite independent of them, leads directly to the 
concept of freedom” (KpV 5:29-30). 
																																																						
23 See Henry E. Allison, “Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis,” The Philosophical Review 
95 (1986): 393-425. 
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The crucial point here is that the concept of freedom asserts itself when we recognize a purely 
formal determining ground of the will, something which happens whenever we engage in practical 
reasoning about what to do. This activity must be understood as ‘practical’ in the full sense of the 
concept that was developed in Chapter 3. It is not merely awareness of the law that reveals our 
freedom, but awareness of the law as binding, as a practical principle that interests us and has 
efficacy. Insofar as the practical subject is conscious of this efficacy, she is conscious of her ability 
to act on principles whose determining ground is established, not by nature, but by reason itself.  
It is thus through our cognition of the moral law as a fact of reason—as an a priori 
proposition that forces itself upon our consciousness, and cannot be based on any sensible intuition 
or antecedent data—that the positive concept of freedom appears in practical consciousness and 
we are put in a position to recognize it as a necessary condition of morality. Here it helps to invoke 
Kant’s reciprocity thesis again: once the subject recognizes her freedom in response to the moral 
law, she is put in a position to realize that it is only if she is free that she can be commanded by 
such a law. Freedom and the moral law thus imply one another, and do so necessarily (KpV 5:29, 
5:46). Kant even goes so far as to suggest that they might be one and the same, such that “an 
unconditional law is merely the self-consciousness of a pure practical reason, this being identical 
with the positive concept of freedom” (KpV 5:29). The idea of freedom is thus unlike the other 
postulates insofar as it is immediately and necessarily connected with consciousness of the moral 
law. We find grounds for postulating freedom in our everyday moral consciousness, hence Kant’s 
claim that freedom reveals its objective reality through the moral law (KpV 5:4). 
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As I have been insisting, however, the reality we can attach to freedom does not extend 
theoretical cognition. It is not a reality graspable through sensible intuition. Take, for example, 
one of Kant’s most radical statements about freedom at 5:468 in the third Critique:  
“But what is quite remarkable, there is even one idea of reason (which is in itself 
incapable of any presentation in intuition, thus incapable of theoretical proof of its 
possibility) among the facts, and that is the idea of freedom, the reality of which, 
as a particular kind of causality (the concept of which would be excessive from a 
theoretical point of view) can be established through practical laws of pure reason, 
and, in accordance with these, in real actions, and thus in experience”  
 
Here Kant both reaffirms that freedom could never be an object of intuition, and concludes that its 
reality can be established in experience through human actions. The only way to avoid flat-out 
contradiction is to understand the latter as practically grounded in a way that could never serve to 
extend the limits of theoretical cognition. It is in virtue of the moral law, or more precisely, its 
efficacy, that we become conscious of practical reason’s pure use, of the ability to judge and 
produce actions based on their relations to formal principles. It is thus through the practical use of 
reason alone that we can recognize real actions as the effects of freedom. Without the characteristic 
practical principles, concepts, and incentives that were the focus of §3.2, we could not account for 
the subject’s ability to grasp the necessary grounds for freedom, and thus its objective reality. To 
the extent that we can experience freedom, it is an object of practical thought, something 
determined in consciousness by the moral law, the categories of freedom, and the incentive of 
respect. As Kant repeatedly emphasizes, it cannot be an object of theoretical experience.24 So when 
we postulate the existence of freedom, thus affirming a theoretical proposition, we do so on 
																																																						
24 Though, importantly, practical freedom must not contradict theoretical experience. Kant rules out this 
possibility in the Critique of Pure Reason, and reaffirms his conclusion throughout the practical works, as 
when he states that the categories of freedom must agree with the categories of nature (KpV 5:65). Cf. 
also KpV 5:93-4. 
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practical grounds alone and do not extend theoretical cognition by giving it a new object to 
determine.  
The above account can lead us to question why freedom needs to be included among the 
postulates at all. If the reality of freedom is so inextricably bound up with our common moral 
consciousness, why do we need to make a separate judgment affirming its objective reality? My 
suggestion is that the further act of postulating our freedom adds cognitive content which is 
necessary to show the real possibility of the highest good. We are now in a position to see how the 
postulate of freedom can have this character. For even given the necessary connection between 
freedom and morality, the strict separation between the two uses of reason and their respective 
limits implies that we can never cognize how freedom is possible from a theoretical point of view. 
Such metaphysical uncertainty can threaten the whole moral edifice, leading the subject to endorse 
moral scepticism on theoretical grounds. Kant describes this possibility at the end of the Analytic: 
“For, there are many who believe that they can nevertheless explain this freedom 
in accordance with empirical principles, like any other natural ability, and regard it 
as a psychological property…and they thus deprive us of the grand disclosure 
brought to us through practical reason by means of the moral law, the disclosure, 
namely of an intelligible world through realization of the otherwise transcendent 
concept of freedom, and with this deprive us of the moral law itself, which admits 
absolutely no empirical determining ground” (KpV 5:94). 
 
The need to postulate the existence of freedom in the full, transcendental sense thus emerges from 
our inability to cognize it as an object of theoretical reason, and the possibility of doubt that this 
conditions. This need is subjective insofar as it is based on our cognitive makeup, i.e., limitations 
on the theoretical use of sensibly dependent reason. We cannot have theoretical insight into the 
possibility of our being determined by anything other than temporally conditioned empirical laws 
of nature, and this poses a threat to the reciprocal relationship between morality and freedom that 
is posed in everyday practical consciousness. We thus find a compelling reason to separate the act 
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of postulating freedom from the practical consciousness that grounds this act: were they identical, 
the postulate of freedom would be inseparable from our everyday consciousness of the moral law. 
If this were so, postulating freedom would be an objective condition on the possibility of moral 
obligation, effectively synonymous with recognizing the moral law itself. This view would not 
only fail to meet one of the conditions of adequacy specified above, it would leave no room for 
the kind of doubt Kant envisions.25 This theoretically motivated scepticism responds to our 
common practical consciousness, and fuels the need for our avowed belief in the reality of 
transcendental freedom. The postulate of freedom asserts itself because reason must respond to 
this sceptical threat: if it does not, practical reason’s dialectic emerges, as the possibility of 
determining one’s will through the moral law, and thus the possibility of the highest good is called 
into question.  
Importantly, however, it is not this need to avoid doubt and corruption that justifies the 
postulation of freedom. As I argued, this would result in a psychologized account of our moral 
motivation, one that takes contingent facts about various interests, propensities, and faculties to 
justify making assumptions about the reality of objects. Instead, the grounds for postulating the 
existence of freedom must be objective. They must therefore be tied to the objectively necessary 
law of pure practical reason and its final end, the highest good. Hence although the need for the 
postulates is a subjective one, the grounds for postulating are themselves objective. Kant himself 
affirms this in prefacing the above passage on scepticism. Given that no insight can be had into 
																																																						
25 This is the heart of the difference between my view and that articulated by Marcus Willaschek. Insofar 
as he thinks the Fact of Reason argument is the argument for freedom as a postulate, the latter becomes an 
objective condition on the possibility of morality as such, and his view fails to meet one of the conditions 
of adequacy specified at the outset of this paper. Cf. Marcus Willaschek, “Freedom as a Postulate,” 
forthcoming in Kant on Persons and Agency, ed. Eric Watkins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2017). 
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the possibility of freedom, he claims, “we are fortunate if only we are sufficiently assured that 
there is no proof of its impossibility, and are now compelled and precisely thereby also justified to 
assume freedom through the moral law, which postulates it” (KpV 5:94).26 Confined to the 
theoretical use of reason, the best we can hope for is the absence of contradiction, the mere logical 
possibility of the idea of freedom. But through the practical use of reason, the idea of 
transcendental freedom—a particular species of causality—acquires new content that is justified 
through practical reason’s apodictic law, whose necessity licenses us to postulate the reality of the 
conditions that make realizing its command possible. 
So we can see it is reason’s two different uses, with their corresponding limits, that 
condition the need for postulating freedom. The pure practical use of reason, which reveals itself 
through the moral law, requires, indeed is nothing other than, transcendental freedom. The limits 
and nature of theoretical reason, on the other hand, preclude theoretical cognition of this object 
insofar as it transcends the sensible realm, yet at the same time demand proof of its possibility. 
Hence the need to affirm the objective reality of freedom in a theoretical judgment. Kant is 
especially clear about this conflict in the third Critique: “the moral way of thinking has no way to 
persevere in its collision with theoretical reason’s demand for a proof (of the possibility of the 
object of morality), but vacillates between practical commands and theoretical doubts” (KU 
5:472). The practically grounded theoretical judgment that we are free helps to alleviate this 
propensity to doubt. It does so as an act of reason which grasps the connection between a necessary 
																																																						
26 I have significantly modified Gregor’s translation of the last clause for the sake of clarity. The German 
is: “glücklich! wenn wir nur, daß kein Beweis ihrer Unmöglichtkeit stattfindet, hinreichend versichert 
werden können und nun, durchs moralische Gesetz, welches dieselbe postulirt, genöthigt, eben dadurch 
auch berechtigt werden, sie anzunehmen” (KpV 5:94). Gregor’s original translation is “we are fortunate if 
only we can be assured that there is no proof of its impossibility, and are now forced to assume it and are 
thereby justified in doing so by the moral law, which postulates it” p. 215. 
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object of pure practical reason and the conditions of its possibility, affirming that we are entitled 
to the latter on the basis of the former, and thereby ensuring a more determinate representation of 
freedom’s objective reality. Though this judgment, we grasp not just that we are motivated by or 
interested in the law—this is all that is suggested by our grasp of the fact of reason—but, further, 
that we are licensed to assume the objective reality of freedom revealed by this interest. Through 
this act of postulating, we determine ourselves through the concept of causality (in thought, not in 
sensible intuition) and assert that the practical conception we have of ourselves as causally 
independent of temporally conditioned natural law has objective reality. It is this cognitive activity 
that adds determinacy to our representation of the highest good and strengthens the moral 
disposition. For it determines, in a speculative judgment, the kind of causality required if the 
subject is to limit her pursuit of happiness by bringing it under the condition of virtue, or steadfast 
adherence to morality’s formal law. Kant describes this activity using much of the same language 
in the following passage from the second Critique: 
“That unconditioned causality and the capacity for it, freedom, and with it a being 
(I myself) that belongs to the sensible world but at the same time to the intelligible 
world, is not merely thought independently and problematically (speculative reason 
could already find this feasible) but is even determined with respect to the law of 
its causality and cognized assertorically; and thus the reality of the intelligible world 
is given to us, and indeed as determined from a practical perspective, and this 
determination, which for theoretical purposes would be transcendent (extravagant), 
is for practical purposes immanent” (KpV 5:105). 
 
So although this judgment does not amount to an extension of theoretical cognition, its content 
increases the efficacy of our practical representations by combating the theoretical scepticism that 
threatens to corrupt the sensibly dependent moral subject. Held up to the subject’s belief in freedom 
and the other postulates, doubt cannot move her and the moral disposition prevails. We see this in 
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Kant’s description of the upright person who insists upon her belief in freedom and the other 
postulates: she says,  
“I stand by this, without paying attention to rationalizations, however little I may 
be able to answer them or to oppose them with others more plausible, and I will not 
let this belief be taken from me; for this is the only case in which my interest, 
because I may not give up anything of it, unavoidably determines my judgment” 
(KpV 5:143).  
 
This statement succinctly captures the character, purpose, and grounds of the practical postulates. 
The affirmation of freedom is a theoretical judgment, yet one made on practical grounds that does 
not have the status of theoretical cognition. Nevertheless, it helps combat the scepticism, the 
rationalization and doubt, that threatens insofar as we do not have theoretical proof of the 
conditions that must obtain for the highest good to be possible. And perhaps most importantly, it 
is pure practical reason’s efficacy, the interest it commands in virtue of its necessary law, which 
warrants practical reason’s extension into the supersensible realm. The subject’s interest in the law 
and its object, the highest good, justifies, compels her to assert the objective reality of these ideas 
of reason. But this compulsion is not psychological in character—it is rational, the dynamic force 
of a judgment that recognizes objective necessity. 
 Finally, we are also in a position to grasp why freedom is set apart from and made the 
condition of the other two postulates. As I have shown, the ground to assume our freedom is 
revealed directly by our consciousness of the moral law. In contrast, the grounds to assume the 
objective reality of God and immorality are only revealed through the necessity of the highest good 
as the synthetic combination of morality and happiness. As we saw in the previous section, the 
moral law is the unconditioned condition that serves as the determining ground of the highest good 
(KpV 5:109-110). Hence the warrant to assume freedom is grounded in the need to show the 
possibility of the determining element of the highest good, the moral law; and the warrant to 
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assume God and immortality is grounded in the need to show the possibility of the determined 
element of the highest good, namely, morality and happiness related proportionately to one 
another. So freedom is necessary for the moral law, and without the law the highest good would 
not be an objectively necessary concept capable of grounding the postulates of God and 
immortality. Hence, we can understand freedom as the condition of the latter. 
 
5.3.3 The Postulates of Faith: Immortality and God 
Compared to the postulate of freedom, those of immortality and God pose a radically 
different set of difficulties to the interpreter. While freedom is so integral to Kant’s picture as to 
seem in need of no further account, the latter two postulates can appear completely foreign to the 
spirit of his Enlightenment project. Kant of course explicitly distances himself from those of his 
predecessors who would ground the authority of moral command in the will of a divine being 
(KpV 5:125-6). But when discussion turns to the postulates of immortality and God, it is common 
for his interpreters to wonder whether these antiquated ideas have taken up an unfortunate position 
in Kant’s otherwise progressive system, representing a conscious or unconscious need to 
incorporate elements of the religious culture that dominated his time.27 Even those who are 
sympathetic to the role that Kant assigns to religious belief struggle to square it with the rest of his 
system. Given the priority of the moral law, which must serve as the objective ground for willing, 
it is typical to relegate the role of faith to the level of empirically based human psychology. On 
this reading, belief in God and the afterlife is helpful insofar as it provides added motivation to do 
																																																						
27 See, for example, Andrews Reath, “Two conceptions of the highest good in Kant,” Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, 26, vol. 4 (1988): 593-619. 
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what we otherwise would, unflinchingly, were we less flawed creatures.28 These interpretations 
risk undermining Kant’s emphasis on formally determined willing, instead giving cognitive or at 
least motivational weight to the representation of God as an omnipotent being who can reward us 
with happiness, practical reason’s materially determined end, the conditioned element of the 
highest good.  
Against these readings, I suggest we account for immortality and God as I accounted for 
freedom in the previous section. Rather than tearing apart our objective and subjective determining 
grounds for action, I will argue that we should understand them as inseparably connected, so that 
the ideas of immortality and God help motivate the subject by contributing to the determinacy of 
her cognitive representations concerning the highest good. Importantly, they do not do so by 
providing separate motivation to pursue our final end—they do not offer motives that function 
independently of the aims set by our interest in the moral law. Rather, the postulates of immortality 
and God ground the possibility of the highest good as a necessary end of reason by providing a 
more determinate representation of how this end could be reached. This added determinacy is 
reached by thinking key conditions on the possibility of the highest good through the categories of 
substance and community. Through the former, we think the kind of being capable of realizing the 
completely moral disposition commanded by the highest good; and through the latter, we think the 
coordination of ends required for the attainment of both virtue and happiness. This cognitive work 
enables a more efficacious representation of one’s moral vocation, one that is resistant to 
theoretically motivated doubt. The upshot of this argument then, is that the postulates do not 
																																																						
28 See, for example, Paul Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 333-371; and Lara Denis, “Autonomy and the Highest Good,” Kantian Review 
10 (2005): 33-59. 
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motivate by soothing an extra-moral or extra-rational psychological concern that could compete 
with practical reason’s necessary goal. Instead, belief in the postulates contributes to the moral 
disposition from within the practical cognitive system itself. Belief motivates by adding to the 
determinacy, the representational content, of the subject’s concept of the highest good and its real 
possibility, and it is this cognitive achievement, this sharpening of the concept, which accounts for 
pure practical reason’s efficacy.  
So we will see that, as with freedom, belief in immortality and God are grounded in a 
subjective need that springs from the structure of sensibly dependent reason itself. That is, 
something about the dependent nature of our cognitive faculty and the resultant division into its 
theoretical and practical uses creates a systematically grounded problem for the moral disposition. 
This subjective problem, however, can be overcome on objective practical grounds, through appeal 
to pure practical reason’s necessary law and the final end that it determines. Kant’s account of the 
postulates of faith is thus situated well within the limits of his metaphysics of mind: though based 
on a subjective need, we need not appeal to anything other than the fact of our sensible dependence 
to account for the role that God and immortality must necessarily play within the Kantian system. 
Interpreters therefore need not appeal to empirically based psychological factors to account for 
Kant’s position. In light of this reading, it will also be much more difficult to argue that the 
postulates of faith represent an undesirable “tacked-on” element of Kant’s moral picture that is 
spurred by extra-philosophical religious concerns.  
If we look to the Dialectic of the second Critique, we find Kant introducing the postulates 
of faith by appealing to certain subjective limitations on our reason that can lead us to call the 
possibility of the highest good into question. Beginning with the postulate of immortality, he 
argues that the command to realize the highest good contains the command to realize a disposition 
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that is in complete conformity with the moral law. This containment relation holds because, as we 
have seen, the highest good is both the supreme and complete good of pure practical reason. That 
is, it does not merely represent our most noble or worthy end, the highest good also represents a 
complete totality of all ends insofar as they take the moral law as their determining ground. So the 
command to realize the highest good entails that all willing, insofar as it is directed at the highest 
good, takes the moral law as its determining ground. At this point, the limits of reason assert 
themselves and a subjective need emerges. For the complete conformity of one’s disposition with 
the moral law is holiness, and Kant is adamant throughout the practical works that holiness is “a 
perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment (Zeitpunkte) 
of his existence” (KpV 5:122).29 Insofar as the subject is dependent on sensible desires that could 
potentially serve as material determining grounds of the will—a condition that is met simply 
insofar as practical reason is both self-determining and dependent on the deliverances of sensibility 
for its matter—holiness is ruled out. The possibility of the highest good is thus thrown into question 
on grounds that are inseparable from the nature of practical discursive reason itself. This is an 
important step in my argument for the postulates of faith. Kant and his readers often appeal to our 
inscrutably evil nature to explain certain elements of the practical picture, but we must take care 
to note that this reference to our fallenness is couched less in literary and psychological trope than 
it is grounded in a metaphysical account of our finitude. It is the subject matter of Chapter 2, the 
distinction between intuitive and discursive intellects, which ultimately explains the need for the 
postulate of immorality.  
																																																						
29 This foundational claim was introduced way back in Chapter 2, §2.1., by appeal to G 4:412-3, where 
Kant introduces the distinction between holy and unholy wills. 
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As we saw in §2.3 of Chapter 2, the discursive intellect is marked by a dependence on 
sensibility, which stands as matter to the form of cognition. The proper part of the cognitive 
faculty, reason and understanding, account for the spontaneous, unifying activity that is 
constitutive of this form, while the deliverances of sensibility serve to individuate it, accounting 
for that which is determined, the material aspect of cognition. This activity of determining sensibly 
given content is definitive of the discursive, sensibly dependent intellect, which characteristically 
expresses itself in acts of judgment. As we saw, such judgment must relate to its object, that which 
is determined, in one of two ways: either it determines what already exists, and is theoretical, or it 
brings what it determines into existence, and is practical (KpV 5:46). In the latter case, the relevant 
cognitive activity occurs insofar as objects are incorporated into practical reason as ends to be 
realized in the world.  
Now it is precisely because sensibly dependent practical reason functions through such acts 
of incorporation that the possibility of holiness is ruled out. Made up of individual acts of rational 
determination involving sensible matter, the activity of practical reason is by nature contingent 
and drawn out. Though such activity is subject to necessary laws that capture the form of practical 
cognition, it is quite contingent whether the moral law actually is the sole determining force. As I 
have been arguing since Chapter 2, the subject’s dependence on sensible matter opens up the 
possibility that such matter might be wrongfully incorporated. Though reason strives for unity, the 
logically heterogenous elements required for its activity entail that it is essentially a combinative, 
synthetic power, and this foundational aspect of its character accounts for the possibility that such 
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combination might be badly executed.30 Practical reason’s discursive character also entails that its 
activity is drawn out, unfolding through discrete acts of judgment that involve universal formal 
constraints—expressed through principles and concepts—but particular instances of temporally 
determined sensible matter. Understood as a sensibly conditioned judgment that takes place in a 
particular context, at a particular moment, such activity cannot be expressive of a complete 
disposition, which encompasses the subject’s practical determining grounds considered as a 
totality. So when Kant rules out our holiness on subjectively contingent grounds having to do with 
our discursive, sensibly dependent nature, we should not only think of the account of evil that he 
develops in the Religion. Lest we mistake this metaphysically grounded picture for a scripturally 
based commitment to original sin, we must recognize the extent to which humanity’s evil nature 
is, for Kant, bound up with the fundamental structure of our mindedness. We fail to be holy not 
just because we encounter wayward inclinations that can become the ground of evil action, but 
insofar as the character of holiness implies a completeness and necessity that can never be 
exhibited by beings who exercise their practical rationality in judgment. Hence Kant’s description 
of holiness as “an idea that can be contained only in an endless progress and its totality, and hence 
is never fully attained by a creature” (KpV 5:123, footnote). In fact, as we are now in a position to 
see, the inclination-centered explanation of evil depends upon this more general metaphysics of 
mind for its foundation.31 
So as Kant claims in the Dialectic, the complete conformity of moral disposition that is 
precluded through a critique of our practical reason must be accounted for in another way. Since 
																																																						
30 This thought is further specified in Chapter 4 and §5.2 of the current chapter, through my discussion of 
practical reason’s natural dialectic and the propensity to evil. It is crucial to remember that although error 
would not be possible without sensibility, it is reason’s activity that actually gives rise to it.  
31 This point has long been appreciated by Allen Wood, though even he frequently loses sight of its full 
application. Cf. Allen Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), 3-4. 
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we are not holy, he concludes, we can only attain the requisite disposition through a moral progress 
that seems to us endless, but which conceived as a totality can demonstrate the required 
commitment to morality. For this endless progress to be possible, we must assume immortality of 
the soul, what Kant describes as “the existence and personality of the same rational being 
continuing endlessly” (KpV 5:122). The concept of immortality is thus what enables us to represent 
the possibility of a complete disposition (Gesinnung) that transcends the cognitive capacity of our 
sensibly dependent discursive intellect, but is nevertheless a necessary requirement on the 
possibility of the highest good. As beings whose judgment is sensibly conditioned and thereby 
temporally extended, we need to represent our rational activity in a manner that is not so 
conditioned and extended. It is through the idea of immortality that we acquire the cognitive 
resources to understand ourselves as beings existing outside of sensible and temporal constraints, 
whose practical activity can be understood as a totality. So we are not so much helped by the idea 
of a time with no end, as we are by the concept of a being outside time, of itself having no temporal 
extension and thus no end. Kant himself suggests this in his description of what our disposition 
would look like to an atemporal being:  
“the eternal being, to whom the temporal condition is nothing, sees in what is to us 
an endless series the whole of conformity with the moral law, and the holiness that 
his command inflexibly requires…is to be found whole in a single intellectual 
intuition of the existence of rational beings” (KpV 5:123).  
 
Through the idea of immortality, we come as close as possible to representing ourselves as beings 
free from the subjective limitations conditioned by our sensibly dependent discursive intellect. In 
this way, the idea of endless progress can function analogously to the representation of a non-
discursive, holy being with a complete moral disposition.32 It does so by abstracting from particular 
																																																						
32 For a more detailed discussion of this kind of intellect, see Chapter 2, §2.2.1. 
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sensible determinations, instead thinking the subject through the unschematized category of 
substance.33 This is how we reach the concept of immortality: a being’s atemporal or endless 
existence. In this way, we are able to think ourselves as possessing the kind of complete and 
necessary disposition required for the highest good to be possible.  
As Kant’s appeal to the intuitive intellect shows, however, the need to overcome the 
limitations of temporally determined existence and thus to appeal to the concept of immortality is 
subjectively based. Though, as I have argued, we are justified to postulate the objective reality of 
what is necessary for the possibility of the highest good, the subjective character of the need and 
the practical nature of the grounds that serve to meet it ensure that any cognitive gains do not 
amount to the theoretical determination of an existing object. That is, the necessity of the moral 
law gives us objective practical justification to postulate immortality, but does not thereby extend 
our theoretical cognition. As a practically grounded response to a subjective need, the postulates 
of faith cannot contribute to theological argument. 
 We find the same argumentative structure at the core of Kant’s treatment of God. In the 
Dialectic of the second Critique, the appendix to the third Critique, and the Religion, we find him 
claiming that our sensible dependence conditions the need to believe in the existence of a moral 
author capable of ordering happiness in proportion to virtue. As we will see, the need met by 
postulating God’s existence addresses the heart of the problem introduced in the discussion of the 
																																																						
33 Kant hints towards this use of the categories at the end of the Transcendental Deduction: he writes, “so 
that one may not prematurely take issue with the worrisome and disadvantageous consequences of this 
proposition, I will only mention that the categories are not restricted in thinking by the conditions of our 
sensible intuition, but have an unbounded field, and only the cognition of objects that we think, the 
determination of the object, requires intuition; in the absence of the latter, the thought of the object can 
still have its true and useful consequences for the use of the subject’s reason, which, however, cannot be 
expounded here, for it is not always directed to the determination of the object, thus to cognition, but 
rather also to that of the subject and its willing” (B166).  	
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highest good from §5.2. To show that pure practical reason’s final end is really possible, Kant must 
account for a causal connection between morality and happiness. That is, he must show how 
reason’s necessary formal and material ends can be synthetically related as unconditioned and 
conditioned. Given the strict separation between morality, which concerns only the form of 
practical principles, and happiness, which concerns their matter, we have no objective grounds to 
cognize this synthetic relation. Here again, if we lose sight of its real possibility, the necessary end 
of morality and thus morality itself can be called into question.  
 In keeping with the argumentative structure that has been outlined, our inability to cognize 
an objectively determined causal relationship between morality and happiness is the result of 
reason’s subjective limitations. In the Dialectic, Kant makes this argument by appealing to the 
different, heterogenous laws governing nature and morality, and the fact that we are incapable of 
controlling nature to meet the end of happiness through action guided by the moral disposition. 
Though he does not appeal explicitly to the nature of discursive reason, our sensible dependence 
does figure prominently:  
“there is not the least ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between 
the morality and the proportionate happiness of a being belonging to the [sensible] 
world as part of it and hence dependent upon it, who for that reason cannot by his 
will be a cause of this nature and, as far as his happiness is concerned, cannot by 
his own powers make it harmonize thoroughly with his practical principles” (KpV 
5:124, emphasis mine).   
 
Here Kant suggests that our dependence on the sensible world is tantamount to a dependence on 
various temporally determined natural laws whose causal power is the source of our happiness. 
We are not the cause of such laws and have no control over them: the means required to realize 
our material ends; their feasibility; and the extent to which they depend on other people and events 
beyond the sphere of the actionable is not up to us. Insofar as this law-governed nature is beyond 
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our control and utterly heterogenous to our ability to act from practical laws, we cannot make it 
harmonize with the latter and the possibility of the highest good hangs in the balance. To ascertain 
this possibility, we need to presuppose the existence of a causal power that can harmonize these 
disparate ends. Thus, like immortality, we appeal to the concept of God because it contains certain 
representational resources we require because of certain limitations on our cognitive power. In this 
case, through the idea of God, the sphere of all possible ends is determined by the category of 
community, and represented as a coordinated whole.34 By adding this conceptual determinacy to 
the idea of the highest good, the agent again grasps a crucial element that contributes to its real 
possibility.  
At the end of the third Critique, Kant offers a consistent argument that makes even more 
explicit the extent to which the subjective need to postulate God’s existence, and thereby show the 
possibility of the highest good, is grounded in the nature of sensibly dependent reason itself. To 
explain that the practically based postulate does not amount to theoretically determined cognition 
of God as an intelligent, moral being, Kant draws directly on the limited nature of our intellect. In 
short, the judgment postulating God’s existence is not a theoretically grounded determining 
judgment with objective validity: 
“For we cannot presume to understand that just because the principles of morally 
practical reason are essentially different from those of technically practical reason 
in us, they must also be so in the supreme cause of the world if it is assumed to be 
an intelligence, and that it needs a special and different kind of causality for the 
final end than for mere ends of nature” (KU 5:455). 
 
																																																						
34 See B112 for Kant’s description of the category of community in the first Critique. Community 
corresponds to the logical function of disjunctive judgment, exhibiting a similar form of unity or 
connection which “is thought of in an entirety of things, since one is not subordinated, as effect, under 
another, as the cause of its existence, but is rather coordinated with the other simultaneously and 
reciprocally as cause with regard to its determination (e.g., in a body, the parts of which reciprocally 
attract yet also repel each other)”. 
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The need to appeal to God is thus grounded in the fact that practical reason is sensibly dependent, 
and so reliant on both pure formal principles directed towards the final end, and technical or 
material principles directed towards natural ends. We can only harmonize these disparate 
principles insofar as we postulate the existence of a non-dependent being who is both intelligent 
and moral, i.e., who can cause this harmony through representations of reason guided by the moral 
law. Appealing to the category of community is especially helpful here. In thinking the possibility 
of the highest good through this category, we transcend the limitations on our intellect, which can 
only subordinate laws of happiness to laws of morality, but not think them together as synthetically 
coordinated. Through the idea of God, we determine the totality of ends in thought as coordinated, 
or reciprocally related through a single kind of causality. Through this reciprocal coordination, 
happiness in accordance with virtue is thought as really possible.  
 So once again, this judgment that God is necessary for the possibility of the highest good 
does not extend theoretical cognition. Though it is a theoretical judgment, it is one carried out on 
practical grounds, grounds that as practical cannot determine the relevant object for theoretical 
purposes. We are licensed to assume, and indeed must assume, any conditions on the possibility 
of the highest good because the highest good is itself necessary, determined as it is by an 
apodictically certain law of pure practical reason. However, as was the case with freedom and 
immortality, the subjective character of this need and the practical grounds that serve to meet it 
ensure that the resultant judgment concerning God’s existence does not amount to theoretical 
cognition. By the time he writes the third Critique, Kant expresses the character of the postulates 
in terms of regulative as opposed to determining judgments. Because there is no theoretical object 
to determine, the judgment that God exists is instead regulative—something we must presuppose 
on subjective grounds. For as Kant has it, “given the constitution of our faculty of reason, we could 
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not even make comprehensible the kind of purposiveness related to the moral law and its object 
that exists in this final end without an author and ruler of the world who is at the same time a moral 
legislator” (KU 5:455). So once again we have a practically grounded response to a subjective 
need, a response that cannot as such contribute to theological argument about the existence of God 
as an independent object beyond the scope of our reason. 
Turning now to the issue of motivation, we are in a position to see that the postulates of 
faith, like that of freedom, help protect sensibly dependent reason from the sceptical attitude that 
invites dialectical illusion and weakens the moral disposition. The ideas of immortality and God 
provide the representational resources needed to form a more determinate conception of how the 
highest good is possible, and in so doing, strengthen the moral disposition, or what amounts to the 
same, the efficacy of practical representations of the good. In §87 of the third Critique, Kant 
vividly communicates this through his discussion of Spinoza, a philosopher who he takes to be 
sound of morals but lacking faith in God and immortality because of his theoretical beliefs. The 
many ills and injustices that such a person would witness could not help but make manifest Kant’s 
earlier argument, namely, that the moral disposition cannot be brought into complete harmony 
with the sensible world. In short, Spinoza would nowhere find evidence that the highest good is 
possible. Kant thus concludes,  
“if he would remain attached to the appeal of his moral inner vocation and not 
weaken the respect, by which the moral law immediately influences him to 
obedience, by the nullity of the only idealistic final end that is adequate to its high 
demand (which cannot occur without damage to the moral disposition), then he 
must assume the existence of a moral author of the world, i.e., of God, from a 
practical point of view, i.e, in order to form a concept of at least the possibility of 
the final end that is prescribed to him by morality” (KU 5:452-3). 
 
By adding determinate representational content to the conception of the possibility of the highest 
good, the ideas of immortality and God prevent the cognitive and motivational damage that would 
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occur if pure practical reason’s final end were taken to be empty. So just like the postulate of 
freedom, those of immortality and God help to combat the scepticism that would deprive the moral 
law and its object of influence. The concept of faith thus has a particular technical use within 
Kant’s system, though one that is not totally divorced from its more common usage. Faith is 
“reason’s moral way of thinking in the affirmation of that which is inaccessible for theoretical 
cognition” (KU 5:471-2). But importantly, and in keeping with Kant’s critical system, this 
affirmation stems from a distinctly practical source: faith is not just the disposition to assume the 
existence of God and immortality of the soul; rather,  
“it is the constant fundamental principle of the mind to assume as true that which it 
is necessary to presuppose as a condition for the possibility of the highest moral 
final end, on account of the obligation to that, although we can have no insight into 
its possibility or into its impossibility” (KU 5:471-2).  
 
So although morality inevitably leads to religion, it does so on grounds that are internal to the 
nature of sensibly dependent reason and thus the practical system. For Kant, faith is a matter of 
pure rational belief that springs from pure reason itself (KpV 5:126). 
 
5.4 The Immanent Use of Pure Practical Reason 
 We are finally in a position to see the full significance of my emphasis on how we think 
about practical representations and the way they motivate. If, as many commentators would have 
it, our explanation begins with sensible desire and the extent to which it can pose as an obstacle to 
the moral disposition, we end up with a heteronomous account of morality that understands the 
postulates as a response to empirically governed psychological issues. Accepting this picture 
entails that we think of the postulates as providing motivation that is external to the demands of 
pure reason: we only need to appeal to freedom, immortality, and God insofar as our moral 
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incentives are lacking, and morally permissible but sensibly based desires are needed to reinforce 
what pure practical reason cannot accomplish on its own. In this case, the postulates—especially 
the postulates of faith—are useful because they function as further springs of right action based in 
the desire for happiness. Regardless of how much these sympathetic commentators maintain that 
their reading is compatible with Kant’s commitment to autonomy, their projects are doomed to 
fail. Though, as I have shown, the postulates are intimately connected with our sensible 
dependence and thus our propensity to evil, we cannot understand them as providing supplemental 
motivation that works by appealing to the very kind of materially based reasoning that precludes 
good conduct in the first place. This is ultimately to embrace the battle of forces model that pits 
sensible desire against the moral disposition as an already existing obstacle, one that requires extra-
moral, subjectively based motivation if morality is to win out.  
In contrast, I have argued that we must articulate the need and warrant for the postulates in 
cognitive rather than desiderative or motivational terms. It is because of limitations on our 
representational powers that we need to appeal to these concepts, which provide the resources to 
improve our cognitive situation by sharpening our representation of the possibility of the highest 
good through determinations of the categories of substance, causality, and community. It is only 
thereby that the moral disposition, our interest in the good, is secured. The postulates of freedom, 
immortality, and God are thus crucial not for the happiness their joint actuality may promise us, 
but because they allow us to transcend cognitive limits that render opaque the real possibility of 
our own nature and the system of ends we aim at. The desiderative element germane to this picture 
is thus nothing over and above the efficacy that the subject’s practical representations possess in 
virtue of the increased determinacy of their content. In short, the materially determined wish to 
enjoy everlasting happiness forms no part of Kant’s picture. So the postulates do not help the moral 
	 192 
disposition from without, as a kind of sensibly based motivational spring that appeals to our extra-
moral desires and reinforces the moral disposition’s directedness towards the highest good. The 
postulates instead buttress from within, and in so doing prevent the dialectical illusion natural to 
practical reason’s use. Rather than a battle of forces model that depicts sensibility as external to 
reason and in need of soothing on its own terms, we have the unified cognitive power I spoke of 
in the opening paragraphs of this chapter. 
My account of the cognitive resources that the postulates provide also helps us see why 
Kant claims that practical reason is immanent in its pure use. As I highlighted at the outset, this 
represents a further limit to our ongoing analogy with theoretical reason, which in its pure use is 
wholly transcendent. Were the postulates merely psychologically based contingent beliefs that 
provide added motivation, the claim that they serve to further our cognition would look like a 
massive overstatement. Kant, however, insists that the postulates do just this. At the end of the 
Analytic, he is explicit that, through the concept of freedom, 
“the reality of the intelligible world is given to us, and indeed as determined from 
a partial perspective, and this determination, which for theoretical purposes would 
be transcendent (extravagant), is for practical purposes immanent” (KpV 5:105). 
 
Once practical reason’s use is lawfully extended through the concept of freedom, the warrant for 
practical reason’s further extension through the concepts of God and immortality is also secured.35 
Only the reading I have developed here can secure Kant’s grand claim that freedom is the keystone 
of the entire system of pure reason, both practical and theoretical (KpV 5:3-4); an idea which 
extends practical reason’s reach beyond the sensible realm, and secures everything else required 
																																																						
35 See the text following the passage just quoted, where Kant says of the idea of God “we could not rise to 
it from the sensible world without the mediation of the first dynamical idea [freedom]” (KpV 5:105). 
Recall also my argument in §5.3.2 that freedom is the condition of the other postulates.  
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for the its unconditioned totality. Thus without the proper understanding of how practical 
representation and motivation relate to one another, Kant’s interpreter not only risks coming away 
with an undesirable moral psychology that many unsympathetic philosophers would dismiss, she 
also risks losing sight of the central tenets of the Kantian vision. This is why it is crucial that we 
carefully develop the structure of sensibly dependent reason: if we fail to arrive at an adequate 
understanding of the relation between the rational and sensible elements of our cognitive faculty, 
we risk distorting every facet of Kant’s system. 
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Against Dualism:  





 The preceding chapters interpret Kant’s theory of practical reason with particular focus on 
how the metaphysical interdependence of reason and sensibility shapes practical life. This view, 
which I take to be well captured by the term ‘sense-dependent rationalism,’ has three major 
commitments: 
First, it accepts a broadly cognitivist account of practical reason, one which holds that 
practical reason shares a common form with its theoretical counterpart. Although there are 
obvious limits to the analogy I have built over the last four chapters, I take it that practical 
and theoretical reason manifest the same structure, a structure which permeates all the way 
down to sensibility and the way it relates to—and is transformed by—the higher cognitive 
capacities that determine it. 
 
Second, sense-dependent rationalism holds that reason and sensibility are logically 
independent but metaphysically inter-dependent capacities which relate to one another as 
form to matter. It is only through understanding the hylomorphic unity they constitute that 
the nature of practical cognition and its role in human life is properly grasped. On this view, 
reason and sensibility together constitute a unity which possesses a common form and 
makes practical rational life possible.  
 
Third, the cognitivist commitment and resolute hylomorphism detailed above imply that 
we misunderstand practical cognition and motivation if we pull them apart as separate 
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elements assigned to different capacities. Instead, I claim that the cognitive content of a 
practical representation and its ability to motivate the subject cannot be understood as 
separable from one another. The desiderative element germane to this picture of practical 
reason is thus nothing over and above the efficacy that the subject’s practical 
representations possess in virtue of the determinacy of their content. Sensible desire 
certainly contributes to this content, but it is only one part of a unified whole that is 
ultimately shaped by reason’s form. 
 
As we have seen, the above view facilitates new ways of interpreting the feeling of respect, the 
possibility of evil, and the practical postulates. In the present chapter, my aim is to discuss these 
interpretive gains in relation to the secondary literature, and a particular framework for debate that 
has emerged over the last few decades. This is the intellectualist/affectivist framework, which is 
expansive enough to touch upon all of the issues I have discussed in the present study.  
 In Chapter 1, I stated that this framework inevitably divides the interpretive landscape 
according to two factions that both exhibit the dualism I claim we need to leave behind. Now, 
having developed the positive view that I suggest should take its place, I can turn to the framework 
itself to highlight its shortcomings. The remaining three sections will be divided according to the 
major interpretive issues discussed in Chapters 3-5: the feeling of respect, the possibility of evil, 
and the practical postulates. In each case, I will survey a number of dominant views from both 
sides of the debate, and argue that my view is preferable. Sense-dependent rationalism, I claim, is 






6.2 Respect and Moral Motivation 
 In Chapter 3, I presented an account of Kant’s theory of moral motivation in line with the 
commitments of sense-dependent rationalism articulated above. Instead of viewing respect as a 
singular feeling, I sought to develop an analogy between the practical and theoretical uses of reason 
that would shed new light on this crucial concept. Informed by the inversely parallel structures of 
the Analytics from the first and second Critiques, I argued that we can understand respect as a 
practical analogue of space and time, the forms of theoretical sensibility. This analysis attempts to 
understand Kant’s theory of moral motivation by looking to his broader metaphysical system and 
the deep philosophical questions that motivate it.  
 To situate my approach in relation to the wider sphere of Kant literature, it is helpful to 
first look to a radically different account of respect offered by Carla Bagnoli in her paper “Respect 
and Loving Attention”. This work contains a number of claims about respect that are extremely 
complex. Consider the following examples: 
1. “Caused by the representation of the moral law, respect is the feeling of being bound by 
the requirements of reason in deliberating about what to do” (487). 
 
2. Respect is…the evaluative attitude that is appropriately elicited by the recognition of others 
as having dignity” (489). 
 
3. “It is the subjective experience of rational agency” (491). 
 
4. “Respect is a certainty, a given in the sense that it is the way we are aware that a pure idea 
of reason, the moral law, has a foothold in our character” (492).1 
 
I should be clear at the outset that it is not Bagnoli’s aim to give the kind of account I am focused 
on in the present work. Her goal is to recover the philosophical value in Kant’s idea of respect in 
direct response to critics like Iris Murdoch, who argue that it leads to an impoverished conception 
																																																						
1 Carla Bagnoli, “Respect and Loving Attention,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2003): 483-515. 
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of agency, emotion, and inter-subjectivity. Though this task involves unpacking a good deal of 
Kant’s view, Bagnoli is looking outward, to see how Kant can handle subtle literary examples and 
worthwhile objections. Nor would I disagree with any of the claims from the above list: they are 
all either directly grounded in the text, or skilled moments of interpretation. But I do think what 
they can teach us about Kant’s view is severely limited. These rather diverse claims may constitute 
a more nuanced philosophical position than the one Murdoch constructs on Kant’s behalf, but how 
they relate to one another, and how precisely they are grounded in a Kantian account of our mental 
faculties has yet to be determined. For example, we might ask, how can respect be at once a feeling 
and an evaluative attitude? While the former sort of representation is attributed to sensibility, the 
latter is a much more sophisticated representation that involves reason: it is a response to the 
recognition of moral worth. Picking up on the third quote, we might also ask how a sensible feeling 
could be identical with the self-conscious experience of a rational capacity—paraphrasing Kant, 
Bagnoli insists that respect just is the subjective experience of morality.2 In short, there is much 
more to say about how complex, conceptual activity can at once cause and be identical with a 
special feeling. To really grasp Kant’s position, we need what I have been calling a metaphysics 
of mind, which locates the nature and function of respect by unpacking Kant’s account of reason, 
sensibility, and their complex interdependence.  
 
6.2.1 The First Generation of Debate: Intellectualism vs. Affectivism 
 Towards the end of the 20th century, a number of Kant interpreters contributed to an 
emerging debate that addresses the type of question posed above. In a 1989 paper entitled “Kant’s 
																																																						
2 See KpV 5:76, where Kant claims that “respect for the law is… morality itself subjectively considered 
as an incentive”. 
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Theory of Moral Sensibility”, Andrews Reath advanced what has come to be known as an 
intellectualist conception of respect. This characterization was suggested by Richard McCarty, 
who described the positions in the debate as follows in a 1993 paper on the subject: 
“Intellectualists hold that respect for the moral law is, or arises from, a purely 
intellectual recognition of the supreme authority of the moral law, and that this 
intellectual recognition is sufficient to generate moral action independently of any 
special motivating feelings or affections. Opposed to the intellectualist 
interpretation is what I shall call the affectivist view. Affectivists need not deny that 
Kantian moral motivation initially arises from an intellectual recognition of the 
moral law. Contrary to intellectualists, however, they maintain that it also depends 
on a peculiar moral feeling of respect for law, one consequent to the initial 
recognition or moral judgment the intellectualists emphasize exclusively.”3 
 
These positions mark out two possible views on the relationship between reason and sensibility, 
but, as I will go on to argue, they do not represent the full range of possible positions. The way 
McCarty and others understand the debate, respect is either primarily intellectual or sensible in 
nature.  On the former view, moral motivation stems exclusively from acts of reason: the subject’s 
ability to recognize the universal validity of the moral law is the source of action. On the latter 
view, which McCarty himself adopts, this intellectual recognition is thought to be insufficient. 
What Kant intends to account for with the concept of respect is not the way that cognition itself 
can move us, but the way that it can give rise to a special sensible feeling that is the source of our 
motivation. Cast in these terms, the debate essentially boils down to whether it is reason or 
sensibility that does the driving work attributed to respect. McCarty thus claims that “the central 
question of the dispute is wholly psychological: whether the affective component of respect plays 
any role in the mechanism of moral motivation.”4 
																																																						
3 Richard McCarty, “Kantian Moral Motivation and the Feeling of Respect,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 31 (1993): 423. 
4 McCarty, “Kantian Moral Motivation,” 430.	
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 As I emphasized in the opening pages of the introduction, how one understands the 
relationship between reason and sensibility has direct implications for interpreting Kant’s relation 
to his early modern predecessors. These commentators all recognize that the central question 
motivating this debate is framed to capture whether one thinks Kant’s theory of motivation has 
been deeply influenced by empiricism and its mechanistic, naturalized view of human psychology. 
As McCarty and others understand the landscape, affectivists take respect to be representative of 
Kant’s attempt to bring pure practical reason into the economy of competing affective forces. 
Intellectualists, on the other hand, think respect takes on a different function with a more rationalist 
influence: insofar as the feeling represents our ability to be moved by reason alone, it must remain 
separate from the sensible realm and its deterministic battle-of-forces model of motivation.  
 Though he does not use the intellectualist/affectivist dichotomy introduced by McCarty, 
Andrews Reath was arguably the first to advance a reading of respect against the current wave of 
this interpretive backdrop. He advances a version of intellectualism that leads to the following 
conclusion:  
“Kant does not think that the moral law determines the will through a quasi-
mechanical or affective force. Such a view is implied by his remark that respect is 
not an ‘incentive to morality’, but the moral law itself regarded as an incentive. 
This qualification to the account of respect is added to make it clear that moral 
motivation does not require, or occur, through any feeling that exists independently 
of moral consciousness.”5 
 
Reath justifies his reading by acknowledging that there is an affective aspect to the feeling of 
respect, but arguing that Kant means it to be stripped of all motivating power. Through this 
strategy, he accounts for the peculiar characteristics of respect articulated above in connection with 
																																																						
5Andrews Reath, “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of 
Inclination,” Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 12. 
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Bagnoli’s reading. As we saw, the feeling is both caused by and somehow identical with 
consciousness of the moral law. Reath accounts for these features by suggesting that although it is 
one’s rational consciousness alone that motivates, recognition of the moral law has an unavoidable 
effect on our sensible nature that is phenomenologically indistinguishable from the rational activity 
that has true explanatory power. As he claims, “one’s inclinations are held in check simply by the 
recognition of the moral law (the practical aspect of respect), and this interaction between practical 
reason and sensibility gives rise to the feeling of respect (the affective aspect).”6 So respect has 
two logically separable aspects, with the rational one serving as both the cause of the affective 
aspect, and the resulting act of will. But these aspects are treated as inseparable from a 
phenomenological perspective, and together make up the felt character of moral life: “the resulting 
moral emotion ends up being something like the way in which we experience the activity of pure 
practical reason.”7  
 Importantly, however, respect has these two aspects because we just happen to be creatures 
with contrary motives originating in sensibility. Given this fact, action produced by the moral law 
cannot help but interact with these motives and produce the affective dimension of respect. Good 
willing itself, though, is produced through reason alone, as it would be for any other being 
possessed of pure practical reason. Ultimately then, while respect’s intellectual and sensible 
components are lumped together and treated as identical, this is merely because of certain 
psychological facts about our nature, facts which do not affect the purely intellectual source of 
moral motivation.8 On Reath’s view, respect may be “morality itself subjectively considered” 
																																																						
6 Reath, “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility,” 12. 
7 Reath, “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility,” 12. 
8 Cf. Reath, “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility,” 12: “It turns out that there is a tight connection between 
these two aspects of respect, due to certain facts about our nature, and this explains why Kant tends to treat 
them as identical.” 
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(KpV 5:76), but the relevant practical element, what accounts for the efficacy of moral thinking, 
is rational and not sensible in character. 
 In Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Henry Allison expresses the other prominent intellectualist 
reading of respect. Citing Reath’s view, Allison agrees that Kant does not mean to embrace an 
empiricist battle of forces model with his account of moral motivation: “the conflict is not between 
psychic forces but between principles, each of which claims to be the supreme ground for the 
selection of maxims.”9 Recognizing what is at stake in the debate, he moves away from the 
empiricist reading of respect and develops an account that remains consistent with his own 
Incorporation Thesis and the strong rationalism it implies. On Allison’s view, our faculty of desire 
does not work through being determined by the strongest desire. Its activity is rational: inclinations 
operate only insofar as they are incorporated into practical principles and recognized as sufficient 
reasons for action. Respect must therefore motivate through the force of reason, and the affective 
aspect of the feeling can only be understood as the effect this rational activity has on sensibility. 
He thus concludes: 
 “Kant’s phenomenology of respect can be regarded as his account of the 
psychological effects on the ‘human faculty of desire’ of this account of 
recognition. In both its negative and positive aspects, respect is produced by the 
consciousness of a rationally compelling value or norm (the moral law), not by the 
conquest of a weaker by a superior psychic force.”10 
 
As with Reath, it is key to Allison’s account that any effect on sensibility is mediated through the 
activity of rational recognition. From this, he surmises that the affective dimension to the feeling 
of respect—in either its positive uplifting, or negative humiliating component—is essentially an 
indirect effect of rational activity. Once again, reason is cast as practical all on its own, and respect 
																																																						
9 Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 126.	
10 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 127. 
	 202 
can be classified as a feeling only to the extent that this rational activity has particular sensible 
side-effects that can be predicted a priori, but are not essential to Kant’s theory of moral 
motivation.  
 McCarty articulates his own affectivist position in response to both of these views. 
Preoccupied by Kant’s distinction between the objective and subjective determination of the will, 
he accepts the prevailing interpretive stance that Kant typically looks at explanations from two 
different points of view and suggests that respect makes up one of these. He thus unequivocally 
accepts a bifurcated account of the motivational process, one that asserts both an intellectual and 
an affective aspect. McCarty seizes upon what he takes to be moments of obvious empiricist 
influence in Kant’s texts, and objecting to those who would discount them as inconsistencies that 
should be overlooked, attempts to square them with Kant’s more rationalist principles and his 
doctrine of radical freedom. McCarty’s chief concern are passages like the following, where Kant 
talks of recognizing the constraints of morality, but failing to act on them: “when I judge by 
understanding that the action is morally good, I am still very far from doing this action of which I 
have so judged. But if this judgment moves me to do the action, that is the moral feeling” (LE, 
27:1428). Since similar passages can be found throughout Kant’s major practical works, he 
concludes that we must distinguish between the objective perspective of reason and judgment, and 
the subjective perspective of sensible, motivational strength. Although rational recognition 
remains a key component, McCarty argues that the latter is just as necessary if we are to give a 
full explanation of human action: “the moral action never occurs, however, unless there is 
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sufficiently strong motivation for the circumstances, relative to competing motivational resources: 
this is a function of the variable, affective aspect of respect.”11  
 On this view, the intellectual and sensible aspects of moral consciousness are not only 
logically but also temporally separable. McCarty speaks of the “two stages”12 of the motivational 
process, suggesting that “the moral law determines the will directly, and then follows the feeling 
of respect, which subsequently determines the choice to act accordingly.”13 If the resultant feeling 
is not strong enough in competition with other sensible motives, the agent does not act in 
accordance with her representation of the good, and she manifests one of the three grades of evil 
Kant discusses in the Religion. The complex details of McCarty’s view on immoral action will be 
discussed in §6.3; for now, my goal is to emphasize the paradigmatic affectivist reading of respect 
he has offered. To do this, we can consider how McCarty handles the thought that moral feeling is 
both caused by and somehow identical with consciousness of the moral law. Like the 
intellectualist, he holds that respect is the effect of one’s representation of the moral law as binding. 
So, the intellectual aspect of respect is the cause or ground of the affective one. But unlike the 
intellectualist who thinks the affective aspect of respect is a mere psychological side-effect, 
McCarty casts it as the cause of action from the subjective perspective, the perspective external to 
reason and characterized by mechanistic forces. Though he does not explicitly weigh in on how to 
square this reading with the thought that respect just is morality from the subjective perspective, 
we can piece it together from his comment that “respect for law is just the motivational attitude 
for action whose ground is the moral law.”14 For the affectivist, respect is identical with the 
																																																						
11 McCarty, “Kantian Moral Motivation,” 427. 
12 McCarty, “Kantian Moral Motivation,” 427-8. 
13 McCarty, “Kantian Moral Motivation,” 428. 
14 McCarty, “Kantian Moral Motivation,” 430. 
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subjective aspect of morality insofar as it showcases the moral disposition from the mechanical-
motivational point of view.15 
 
6.2.2 The Second Generation of Debate: Non-mechanical Affectivism 
 Responding to this initial round of interpretive debate are a number of views that attempt 
to carve out a middle path. Such positions recognize that both sides of the debate present untenable 
accounts of Kant’s view of moral motivation. The affectivist embraces the dominant dualistic 
reading commonly attributed to Kant, holding that the autonomy of pure practical reason is 
compatible with a need to account for sensible motivation in terms fixed by an independently 
intelligible view of empirical psychology. The intellectualist, wary of the seeming contradiction 
this implies, pulls back from the economy of sensibly determined motivation that the affectivist 
takes to be necessary to Kant’s picture. But in so doing, he obscures the fact that sensibility has 
any real role to play, suggesting that any attendant affect is a mere by-product of the rational 
activities that have true efficacy. Not surprisingly, in response, other commentators have attempted 
to reconcile the perspectives of those who would like to uphold Kant’s rationalist commitments, 
with those who would like to emphasize the important role that feeling does play in Kant’s account 
of moral motivation. 
 In a 2001 paper, Jeanine Grenberg laments the plight of the Kantian who would like to 
fully vindicate the role of human emotion and desire in relation to action:  
“despite a willingness to welcome the influence of feeling to many aspects of action 
and moral theory, most commentators, guided by a desire to maintain a clear 
																																																						
15 Paul Guyer’s view represents another strand of traditional affectivism, though he does not explicitly 
weigh in on this debate. His view will be discussed in the final section of this chapter as it pertains to the 
practical postulates. For yet another version of affectivism, see Larry Herrera, “Kant on the Moral 
Triebfeder,” Kant-Studien 91 (2000): 395–410. 
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distinction between Kant’s theory and a more ‘empirical’ approach to motivation, 
refuse feeling a direct motivational role both in moral action and in action more 
generally.”16 
 
Grenberg focuses in particular on Allison and those influenced by him, arguing that we can 
incorporate a more full-blooded account of feeling into Kant’s a priori moral philosophy if we 
move away from the affectivist conception that understands feelings to interact as competing 
mechanical forces. She claims that on Kant’s view, feeling has a ‘nascent intentionality’ which she 
describes as follows: “although it does not identify objective characteristics of its object and does 
partake of sensibility, [feeling] is, nonetheless, directed toward an object and, as such, is a function 
of the agent’s capacity to represent that object in a particular way.”17 Grenberg takes this focused 
directedness to set feeling apart from mere mechanical force, and suggests this difference can be 
the entry point to a rich account of feeling that is consistent with the requirements of Kant’s a 
priori system. This move marks a distinctive functionalist turn for Kant commentators who want 
to give feeling its due without wandering into unapologetically empiricist territory. Rather than 
focus on its sensible character or strength, Grenberg’s strategy is to be attentive to the role that 
feeling plays relative to other practical representations. She holds that “feeling is a sensible 
susceptibility to representations,” and builds an account casting it as a vital sensible resource that 
rational reflection takes as its object. Through the latter, the agent learns about herself and finds 
access to the material needed to make choices and live a practical life.  
 In a 2011 paper that focuses more directly on the feeling of respect, Grenberg takes aim at 
the Allisonian account offered by Anne Margaret Baxley.18 Grenberg argues that despite efforts to 
																																																						
16 Jeanine Grenberg, “Feeling, Desire and Interest in Kant’s Theory of Action,” Kant-Studien 92 (2001): 
154. 
17 Grenberg, “Kant’s Theory of Action,” 160. 
18 Cf. Anne Margaret Baxley, Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
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the contrary, Baxley succumbs to the rigid constraints of intellectualism and fails to offer a 
satisfactory interpretation. She describes Baxley’s strategy as follows:  
“by desensibilizing moral feeling, Baxley hopes she is making that feeling more 
appropriate for integration into an a priori morality; and that by denying that feeling 
a constitutive role in consciousness of moral law, she is respecting necessary, 
unavoidable constraints on the introduction of feeling to that a priori morality.”19  
 
In opposition to this kind of view, Grenberg turns to passages where Kant speaks of common 
human judgment and its relation to respect. Because Kant claims that it is through this special 
feeling that moral and immoral determining grounds of the will are distinguished, Grenberg 
concludes that “we can rely upon the moral feeling of respect even for the very justification of 
moral principles.”20 She thus advocates that we pull feeling all the way into Kant’s epistemic or 
cognitive system, going so far as to suggest that human beings need the feeling of respect to 
identify and judge moral principles. Though Grenberg does not explicitly link this claim to her 
earlier work, one could flesh out her view by suggesting it is through the feeling of respect that we 
recognize our sensible relation to universal practical laws grounded in pure reason. Without 
consciousness of this relation, our latent capacity for moral judgment could not be actualized. 
Whether or not this is the right way to fill out her account, Grenberg’s central thought is clear. As 
she says, “the future of Kantian ethics rests, I think, on the willingness of more commentators to 
welcome the fuller integration of feeling into the grounding of a priori morality which Kant’s 
common grounding of morality encourages.”21 We can also flesh out her view by returning to the 
thought that moral feeling is both caused by and somehow identical with consciousness of the 
																																																						
19 Jeanine Grenberg, “Making Sense of the Relationship of Reason and Sensibility in Kant’s Ethics,” 
Kantian Review 16 (2011): 469. 
20 Grenberg, “Reason and Sensibility in Kant’s Ethics,” 470-1.  
21 Grenberg, “Reason and Sensibility in Kant’s Ethics,” 471.  
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moral law. At the outset of her paper, she asks: “is moral feeling a consequence of a previous, non-
felt consciousness of the authority of the moral law; or is it an aspect of that consciousness itself, 
something upon which a finite being relies as an epistemic tool for appreciating the authority of 
the moral law?”22 Insofar as she builds an account in line with the latter option, her view is 
especially capable of answering the question of how respect can be both caused by and identical 
too the subjective aspect of morality. As a sensible susceptibility to or directedness towards 
representations of reason, respect must be caused by rational representation—it is our subjective 
reaction to such representations. But importantly for Grenberg, the grounding role it plays in moral 
life means that moral feeling is also a necessary aspect of moral consciousness. It is, as Kant says, 
morality itself subjectively considered. Given these commitments, we can recognize her position 
as the first prominent example of non-mechanical affectivism in the ongoing debate about respect.  
 Since Grenberg’s work, two more examples of non-mechanical affectivism have emerged. 
Not surprisingly, both also embrace implicitly or explicitly functionalist accounts of feeling. In a 
2014 paper, Owen Ware brings out the extent to which Kant’s functionalist definition of feeling is 
“transcendental” in nature, i.e., such as to bring out feeling’s “kinship with the pure faculty of 
cognition a priori.”23 He thus makes manifest what was latent in Grenberg’s work: to bring Kant’s 
account of feeling into the realm of a priori moral metaphysics, we must recast it to capture its 
transcendental character. Ware proceeds much as Grenberg does. He develops Kant’s non-
mechanical account of feeling, using the same language of intentionality and reflexive relation: 
“every feeling has an intentional object (perceived by the senses, or imagined in thought) as well 
																																																						
22 Grenberg, “Reason and Sensibility in Kant’s Ethics,” 463. 
23 Owen Ware, “Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 
52 (2014): 733, footnote 17.	
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as an accompanying representation of the object’s agreeableness or disagreeableness to the subject. 
This makes every feeling reflexive in character”.24 He also distances himself from McCarty’s 
mechanistic affectivism without accepting the utter lack of efficacy accorded to feeling on the 
intellectualist view, stating that his aim is to rehabilitate Kant’s account of feeling by articulating 
“a suitably idealized phenomenology, rather than a model of competing forces.”25 For Ware, the 
key step is to recognize that such an account requires a first-personal perspective on the structure 
of moral motivation. Rather than thinking of feelings as affective forces, we understand them as 
the result of rational reflection. To do this, he emphasizes the extent to which the negative and 
positive aspects of respect—the humiliation and self-esteem we feel when confronted with the 
law—are not identical with sensible pains and pleasures. The former is a “feeling of reproach,”26 
the latter “a feeling for the sublimity of our moral vocation.”27 Both involve rational recognition, 
and are uniquely suited to motivate the individual to morally good behaviour. Motivation is the 
key issue for Ware: he differs from Grenberg in that he does not go so far as to suggest respect 
provides epistemic justification for moral judgment. For his Kant, respect addresses  
“the problem of how reason can access sensibility in a way suited to moral 
motivation, thereby serving as an incentive in the place of pathological feelings. 
The aim of Kant’s theory of moral sensibility is to show how our recognition of the 
moral law must influence us, with the positive influence serving as our interest to 
make the law our own maxim of choice.”28 
 
On Ware’s view, respect amounts to the subjective aspect of morality insofar as it describes a 
feeling that explains not the ground of motivation, but the motivation itself. Because it accounts 
for our interest in the law, respect is identical to subjective moral consciousness. 
																																																						
24 Ware, “Kant on Moral Sensibility,” 733. 
25 Ware, “Kant on Moral Sensibility,” 743. 
26 Ware, “Kant on Moral Sensibility,” 738.	
27 Ware, “Kant on Moral Sensibility,” 739. 
28 Ware, “Kant on Moral Sensibility,” 743. 
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 Before moving on to discuss my own view and its relation to this debate, it is worth 
developing one other version of non-mechanical affectivism. In a 2014 paper, Janelle DeWitt 
articulates a self-avowedly functionalist interpretation of respect that she claims can account for 
its dual nature, insisting that “Kant describes pleasure in terms of its function in the activity of the 
mind, rather than in terms of its affective character or visceral feel.”29 She differs from both 
Grenberg and Ware, however, in that she goes as far as to say that feeling is itself a practical or 
motivating form of judgment. Note how in the following passage, she uses both the language of 
intentionality and reflexivity we saw with Grenberg and Ware, but concludes on the basis of such 
pronouncements that feeling amounts to judgment on Kant’s view: 
“pleasure is a representation of an object, not as it is in itself, but as it relates to the 
subject. Or more specifically, it represents how the object relates to the subject’s 
faculty of desire—the source of his activity. Without this connection to the subject’s 
source of activity, an object cannot move us to act. It is in this regard, where 
pleasure is a type of judgment representing this relationship, that Kant says the 
faculty of desire is determined by a pleasure in an object.”30  
 
DeWitt thus attributes more of a role to feeling than any commentator in this debate. Since she 
builds so much into the concept, she need only look to the passages where Kant argues that we 
need feeling to establish the driving power of action to complete her account. Her functionalism 
is so rich that we need only look to feeling to see how representations relate to our faculty of desire. 
Because it is raised to the full status of judgment, feeling alone can account for how we relate to 
possible courses of action, even those determined by the moral law. In this sense, it has the 
epistemic status Grenberg wants to give to feeling, though Grenberg herself does not go so far as 
to equate it with judgment. And since DeWitt, along with most commentators, takes feeling to be 
																																																						
29 Janelle DeWitt, “Respect for the Moral Law: The Emotional Side of Reason,” Philosophy 89 (2014): 
36. 
30 DeWitt, “Respect for the Moral Law,” 38.	
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what motivates, or accounts for the driving spring of action, her account of respect is secured. She 
concludes, “as an action-initiating evaluative judgment, respect qualifies as both a feeling and a 
moral motive without violating the metaphysical constraints of Kant’s theory.”31 Interestingly, 
DeWitt does not even allow this evaluative judgment to have its usual humiliating effect on the 
inclinations. She assumes that respect’s special character as a judgment made in relation to 
representations of the understanding and not sensibility means it cannot take mere inclination as 
its object. Her conclusion, then, is that respect’s influence on our sensible nature must be wrought 
indirectly through other rational representations, interacting with our maxims of self-love. Though 
this view can start to look quite intellectualist, it’s important to remember that DeWitt has built all 
of this rational structure into the higher faculty of feeling. The extreme nature of her view is laid 
bare when she calls the faculty of feeling—and not reason—“the faculty responsible for practical 
cognition.”32 On her view then, it is easy to account for the thought that respect is morality itself 
subjectively considered. It is, strangely, more difficult to explain Kant’s claim that respect is 
produced by reason. To accomplish the latter, DeWitt must appeal to her claim that respect and 
the other higher feelings are evaluative judgments which take representations of reason as their 
object.  
 There are two related points worth noting in response to these three versions of non-
mechanical affectivism. First, it would not be unfair to suggest that on some level, having slogged 
through two generations of debate, we are right back where we started in trying to make sense of 
respect. Recall Bagnoli’s complex claims about respect as both a feeling and an evaluative attitude. 
While the first round of debate proceeded by sharply separating and simplifying these two aspects, 
																																																						
31 DeWitt, “Respect for the Moral Law,” 55. 
32 DeWitt, “Respect for the Moral Law,” 42.	
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we now have a series of different claims that attempt to make sense of respect by collapsing them 
together. On Grenberg’s view, feeling has a nascent intentionality that allows it to play an 
epistemic role; on Ware’s view, the feeling of respect is a complex first-personal awareness “of 
the sublimity of our moral vocation” that has the power to motivate; on DeWitt’s, respect, as a 
feeling, just is a form of judgment. In each case, so much is built into feeling that these motivational 
attitudes are unrecognizable as affective states. Such characterizations reignite the questions and 
concerns posed at the beginning of this section. To stay on solid interpretive ground, these authors 
appeal to Kant’s functionalist account of feeling; but as we have seen, each draw radically different 
conclusions from Kant’s thought that feeling is intentional (or quasi-intentional) and reflexive 
rather than a mere affective force.  
 This brings me to the second point: functionalism can only take us so far. As we have seen, 
it admits of many different versions and we need to look beyond a broadly functionalist account 
of feeling to see which, if any, of the particular versions we’ve seen correctly represents Kant’s 
view. As I will argue in the next section, we should not conclude, with DeWitt, that to feel is to 
judge; or side with Grenberg and hold the more moderate view that feeling is wholly sensible, but 
nevertheless capable of playing an epistemic role in virtue of its complex structure. To his credit, 
Ware attempts to keep feeling from looking too much like a propositional attitude or something 
that can play a justificatory role, but he still allows its complex representational content to take 
centre stage. If we side with him, we accept that respect is the feeling of the sublimity of our moral 
vocation. Surely it must be something like this if it is to motivate, but how reason and sensibility 
could interact to produce a representation this complex is far from clear. Like other commentators, 
Ware is cautious of trampling over Kant’s claim that the ground of this interaction is the 
philosopher’s stone: as Kant says, we cannot comprehend “how a mere thought which itself 
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contains nothing sensible produces a feeling of pleasure or displeasure” (G 4:460). But I contend 
that there is still more to say on the subject, and we can avoid throwing our hands up and resting 
with hybrid descriptions of respect that invite more questions than they answer. 
 
6.2.3 Respect as the Formal Element of Sensibility 
 At first glance, it may seem no more helpful to claim, as I did in Chapter 3, that respect is 
the formal element of practical sensibility. A central difference in my strategy, however, lies in the 
fact that this claim brings the level of discussion up from talk of particular feelings, acts of mind, 
and thought processes to the more general talk of capacities and their interdependence. This is key 
to making sense of respect. As I clarify in Chapter 4, respect can of course be felt as a particular 
feeling, but to fully understand its complex representational structure we need to grasp not just its 
unique character, but how reason and sensibility interact to produce practical cognition. So, our 
questions should not concern whether respect is primarily intellectual or affective, or some special 
combination of the two. We must ask what role sensibility plays in practical cognition and how its 
relationship to reason allows it to fulfill this role. This is the best way to establish how respect, and 
sensibility more generally, can be brought more fully into Kant’s a priori metaphysics—the self-
professed goal of the non-mechanical affectivists surveyed above. 
  I have argued that the best way to approach the question of sensibility’s role in practical 
cognition is to be attentive to the structure of discursive cognition in general, and the ways in which 
its theoretical and practical forms are analogous to one another. While, on the one hand, theoretical 
sensibility provides a manifold of object-directed sensation, practical sensibility provides a 
manifold of feeling. As we saw, Kant is clear that the latter is not object-directed in the same way. 
Though feeling results from the subject’s relation to a representation of an object, it communicates 
	 213 
something about the subject, namely, whether or not she desires the thing she represents.33  So 
feeling essentially relates the object to her faculty of desire, communicating the extent to which 
the object is efficacious for the subject, i.e., such as to move her to fixate upon, deliberate about, 
and/or act with respect to it. Seizing on this difference between the two uses of reason, I depart 
from Grenberg and DeWitt, concluding that sensibility, as the capacity for feeling, concerns 
representations only insofar as they are efficacious or motivating. Thus, although feeling figures 
prominently in practical cognition of the good, it does not do so by providing some necessary 
epistemic warrant or, even more strongly, functioning as judgment. To isolate the role that 
sensibility plays in practical cognition, we must ask whether there are a priori sensible conditions 
on the possibility of acting from practical laws that concern the efficacy of those laws.  
  As I go on to argue, such conditions do not concern the empirical domain, or even some 
non-mechanical conception of drive or impulsion that understands sensibility, independently of 
reason, to provide the driving force of action.  I do not, of course, deny that respect is a Triebfeder 
or incentive. I deny that what makes this feeling an incentive is best understood by casting 
sensibility as the capacity which spurs movement. Even when we cast aside the mechanical view 
of feeling as Grenberg and others do, this latter assumption betrays an empiricist commitment that 
Kant does not share. As I argue, respect instead fulfills a metaphysical requirement concerning 
what the nature of sensibly dependent reason must be like if the deliverances of sensibility are to 
figure in acts of practical reason as Kant understands it. For sensibility itself, considered wholly 
independently of reason, is merely a receptive capacity to be affected by objects. Were we simply 
																																																						
33 Recall the helpful distinction Kant makes at KU 5:206: “the green color of the meadows belongs to 
objective sensation, as perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness belongs to subjective 
sensation, through which no object is represented, i.e., to feeling, through which the object is considered 
as an object of satisfaction (which is not a cognition of it).” 
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to rest with this conception, we would have to conclude that sensibility operates according to its 
own laws, and is not responsive to the demands of reason. In this case, practical cognition would 
not be possible, because the subject’s sensible desire would not be responsive to her recognition 
of what morality requires, and her representation of the good could not move her. As I claim in 
Chapter 3, if we are to be understood as subjects capable of producing objects through the 
recognition that they agree with practical principles of reason, Kant must have an account as to 
how the efficacy of sensible desire can be conditioned based on its relation to such principles. My 
claim is that Kant’s discussion of respect fulfills this metaphysical requirement, accounting for the 
fact that sensibility must be rationally determined and so responsive to the demands of reason in 
order to serve in acts of practical cognition, acts whose efficacy springs from the recognition of 
principles rather than the pull of sensible affect. Respect functions as the form of practical 
sensibility insofar as it represents this rationally determined transformation, and the fundamental 
character that sensibility takes on through its relationship to reason. This is why I claim we must 
explain respect at the level of whole capacities, not individual feelings: it accounts for the general 
structure our practical sensibility must have, given its role as the matter of practical cognition. As 
I go on to suggest in chapter three, we can point to respect as an individual determining ground of 
the will, or a feeling identifiable in a particular moment of consciousness. But we do not fully 
understand its role in Kant’s metaphysics of mind until we move up a level, and study the general 
relationship that holds between reason and sensibility.34  
																																																						
34 We should thus take Kant at his word when he talks at the general level of reason determining 
sensibility. Cf. KpV 5:76: “respect is an effect on feeling (Gefühl) and hence on the sensibility of a 
rational being”, and G 4:460 “in order for a sensibly affected being to will that for which reason alone 
prescribes the ‘ought,’… there is required a causality of reason to determine sensibility in conformity with 
its principles.”	
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 This point about transformation is key to distinguishing my view: through practical 
reason’s determination of sensibility and the feeling of respect, Kant accounts for the human 
capacity to be motivated by the practical principle itself. With this capacity, what changes is not 
just the set of ends that we can be motivated to act upon, but the very nature of our practical 
activity, the way we desire and set ends. Unlike those who would claim that respect makes practical 
cognition possible by bringing the push of sensible affect into the picture, I claim that respect 
makes practical cognition possible by completely transforming sensibility as a capacity, so that it 
is reason, and not sensibility, which motivates.35 As the matter of practical cognition, sensible 
desire still has some efficacy, but ultimately it provides neither the objective ground nor the 
subjective motivation to act. Instead, by organizing the manifold of sensible desire in a new way, 
respect changes how representations motivate us—turning us into beings motivated by the 
recognition of practical principles, rather than the strength of affect. I thus claim, like the 
intellectualist, that we are motivated through rational recognition and not affect, but I do so without 
casting the sensible aspect of respect as a mere by-product. Instead, I claim it does the integral 
work of shaping sensibility so that pure reason can itself be practical, without completely erasing 
the important contributions that merely sensible feeling makes to practical cognition.  
 We can now return to the thought that respect is both caused by reason and identical with 
the subjective aspect of morality. As I explain it, respect is not ‘subjective’ because it accounts for 
																																																						
35 Grenberg provides a helpful example of this kind of thinking on p. 158 of “Kant’s Theory of Action”: 
“Whether one struggles to maintain a commitment to the moral law, or to self-love, an agent needs 
‘impulsions’ to act so as to overcome that part of herself with which she will always be in conflict. 
Without such impulsions, an agent would not have the strength to choose as she sees fit.” Though her 
account of desire aims to bring feeling out of the empirical-mechanical realm, she still understands human 
action to be driven by affect. On her view, incorporating sensible desire into one’s maxim “involves the 
acquisition of the force of one’s sensible drives in the service of the agent’s rational choice” so that, 
ultimately, “the incorporated drive is the source of the motive force toward the action represented by the 
maxim” (“Kant’s Theory of Action,” 178). 
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the affective, as opposed to intellectual, aspect of action—whether this affect be construed as 
mechanical or non-mechanical. In this regard, I disagree with the affectivist. But I also depart from 
the intellectualist’s account: on my view, respect represents the subjective aspect of morality 
because it goes beyond the objectively necessary, universal aspects of morality to give a fuller 
picture, accounting for additional conditions on practical cognition that hold for sensibly 
dependent moral subjects. Though it is reason that motivates action, we cannot account for this 
possibility in sensibly dependent beings without saying something about how our logically 
independent capacity for feeling can be responsive to reason’s activity. As I say, otherwise, our 
sensible desires could not be organized based on their relation to the practical principles that 
motivate us. They could not, in short, take up their role as the matter of practical cognition. So, we 
must say something about feeling: the intellectualist does not give a complete account of human 
action—we do not explain how reason is practical without looking to sensibility. But we do not 
complete the account by casting sensibility as the source of motivation; rather, we must show how 
reason itself can motivate by altering sensibility’s very form, and reframing the role it plays in our 
practical activity.  
 
6.3 The Possibility of Evil 
 The above reading of respect suggests a new and fruitful way to explain the possibility of 
evil within Kant’s metaphysics of mind. Understanding respect as the form sensibility must take 
insofar as it is responsive to reason, a general relationship between the two capacities is 
established, and a form of willing secured. As I stress in Chapter 4, this does not mean that all of 
our particular acts of willing must be determined exclusively by the moral law. It does mean, 
however, that as morally interested persons we necessarily frame our action in relation to the good, 
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and are motivated on the basis of this rational activity. This leads to a unified conception of 
motivation, one which avoids the complex schisms between knowledge and motivational strength 
often found in the secondary literature. In Chapters 4 and 5, I express the interpretive commitment 
stemming from my view as follows: the objective content of a practical judgment and its ability to 
motivate the subject cannot be separated from one another. Though we can certainly fail to act on 
our representation of the good, and subordinate morality to self-love in various ways, this does not 
mean that our model for action must include the possibility of impotent knowledge or the clear-
eyed pursuit of evil ends. Kant’s view lends itself to a much more sophisticated account of human 
evil. To accommodate this picture, we must go beyond the intellectualist/affectivist framework 
and the various accounts of evil it facilitates. In what follows, I survey this framework before 
suggesting how we might transcend it. 
 
6.3.1 Intellectualist and Affectivist Interpretations of Frailty 
 Not surprisingly, Allison, Reath, and McCarty develop accounts of evil consistent with 
their views on respect. For my purposes here, it is most useful to consider frailty—or, adopting the 
term more familiar to contemporary English commentators, weakness—the first of the three grades 
of evil that Kant discusses in the Religion. Focusing on frailty will prove to be especially 
instructive because in the classic example, the agent is moved to act against her representation of 
the good, suggesting that the objective content of her practical representation and its ability to 
move her can be wholly unrelated. Whether or not an interpreter accepts this schism as a 
possibility, and how she explains it in the event that she does, tells us much about how she 
understands Kant’s theory of motivation.  
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 Henry Allison’s view represents the extreme end of the intellectualist or rationalist side of 
the spectrum. Because he attempts to square his reading with the Incorporation Thesis and its 
rationalist commitments, Allison cannot accept the traditional model of weakness, on which the 
agent is fully committed to and aware of the good, but lacks the motivational strength to carry out 
the required action. If this were the case, the agent would act on an incentive she had not 
incorporated into her will, instead of her fully incorporated commitment to morality. Instead, 
Allison concludes the weak agent must be self-deceived about her true principles: 
“the so-called lack of sufficient strength to follow moral principles when they 
conflict with the claims of inclination reflects the lack of a full commitment to these 
principles in the first place. Thus, self-deception enters the picture at the very 
beginning, depicting what is in reality a free evaluation on one’s part as a 
‘weakness’ for which one is not responsible.”36  
 
On this strongly rationalist interpretation, Kant’s insistence that human action is necessarily free 
and imputable leads to the view that all action reflects one’s considered judgment. Though the 
subject might consciously disavow or unconsciously distort her reasons for acting, we must 
conclude that her actions are indicative of her true practical commitments. Allison thus completely 
rejects the possibility that one can have full knowledge of and commitment to the good, but fail to 
act because of insufficient motivational strength. 
 Reath adopts a more nuanced but equally intellectualist position. He describes the weak 
person as someone who “does not recognize the authority of the moral law in the requisite sense 
of adopting a maxim that gives deliberative priority to moral considerations,”37 suggesting that 
that the principal failure is one of recognition or commitment. He even walks the Allisonian line 
and accepts that, in the core passages about frailty from the Religion, Kant conceives of the weak 
																																																						
36 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 159. 
37 Reath, “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility,” 28, endnote 14. 
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person as one who “acts on a different maxim, one that subordinates morality to self-love.”38 His 
account is, however, more sensitive to a wider variety of cases: though he too is open to the 
possibility of self-deception, he both accepts that the agent can act against her well-established 
practical principles, and recognizes forms of weakness that do not rely on self-deception. In the 
first sort of case, “one acts against one’s considered judgment, but constructs a rationalization that 
allows one to view the action as consistent with one’s principles and ongoing ends, and thus as 
permissible under the circumstances.”39 This type of weakness reflects Reath’s view that action 
carries an implicit claim to some form of justification, though this particular justification would 
not stand up to further scrutiny. It is also well-grounded in the text, fitting with the passages where 
Kant highlights our proneness to quibble with the moral law and make occasional exceptions that 
do not, or do not yet, amount to the full acceptance of self-interested reasoning.40 The second kind 
of weakness is much more extreme. Reath describes an agent who, even in the moment, does 
something 
“he judges he has no reason to do and does not in any sense endorse…Here it is not 
clear that the agent acts on a maxim, since there is no rationale under which the 
agent views the action as choiceworthy at the time. In such cases, what the agent 
does is less than an action, because there is a failure to exercise the capacities for 
rational control and self-governance that are standardly employed in rational 
action.”41  
 
This example fits more easily with the traditional view of weakness insofar as the agent does not 
endorse his action, even before reflecting upon it. It also fits with Reath’s wider commitments: 
because the agent feels rationally disconnected from what he does, it cannot count as an action in 
																																																						
38 Reath, “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility,” 28, endnote 14. 
39 Reath, “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility,” 30, endnote 29. 
40 See, for example, G 4:405 and G 4:424. 
41 Reath, “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility,” 30, endnote 29.	
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the full sense Reath attributes to the term. Since, on his reading of Kant, action is intrinsically 
justified for the agent, her alienated stance bars weak ‘action’ from being action proper. 
Unfortunately, Reath does not give us a more detailed explanation of how such behaviour might 
be possible from a Kantian viewpoint. He simply concludes that it results from some failure of 
rational self-control. Although we lack a complete explanation of how this break between 
judgment and motivational strength is possible on Reath’s interpretation, we can conclude that the 
behaviour which results is not a straightforward example of choice. This kind of weakness amounts 
not just to a moral failure, but a complete breakdown of rational activity.  
 In contrast, McCarty’s affectivism enables him to comfortably handle the schism between 
reason and sensibility that cases of weakness seem to present. Because he already endorses a 
mechanical understanding of sensibility and its role in motivating action, weak action is for him 
just a prime illustration of the fact that the possibility of action depends on a sufficiently powerful 
affective force. While the intellectualist understands weakness as an anomaly that fails to exhibit 
the true character of human action, the affectivist sees an instructive case that renders the true 
structure of motivation transparent. McCarty thus fully embraces the model of the agent who acts 
against her knowledge: for him, “the pure in heart but frail…are those who intellectually 
acknowledge the supreme authority of the moral law but may nevertheless choose, through 
weakness, to act on opposing inclinations.”42 In a series of papers dealing with the phenomenon 
of weakness, he takes Kant’s commitment to a ‘competing forces’ view of motivation to be 
obvious, and the main interpretive hurdle to be preserving the imputability of evil action given this 
																																																						
42 McCarty, “Kantian Moral Motivation,” 431. See also, McCarty, “Motivation and Moral Choice in 
Kant’s Theory,” Kant-Studien 85 (1994): 15-31; and McCarty, “Moral Weakness as Self-Deception,” 
Proceeding of the Eighth International Kant Congress: Memphis 1995, Vol. II, 587-593 (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1995). 
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view. As he argues, because the weak agent believes she should and could have acted otherwise, 
the action is free. McCarty thus concludes, “it is entirely appropriate to impute to moral agents any 
transgression due to moral weakness, even though there remains a sense in which we may say their 
transgressions depend on a factor beyond their immediate control: namely, the contingent strength 
of their capacity for moral feeling.”43 Here we see McCarty’s affectivist leanings at work: although 
weak action is freely adopted, explaining its occurrence requires appealing not to the agent’s 
beliefs and commitments, but to her motivational strength, an empirical matter of fact which lies 
beyond the sphere of rational influence. Because intellectual recognition and motivational strength 
have been so completely separated, the occurrence of weakness is effectively chalked up to 
dispositional luck: “no matter how strong the moral incentive is in us, dispositionally, 
circumstances can arise where competing incentives of inclination just turn out to be stronger than 
our feeling of respect for the moral law.”44  
 Before moving on to discuss my own view, we should more explicitly consider the dualism 
inherent to those just presented. 45 On the one hand, McCarty’s commitment to reading Kant’s 
theory of motivation through the two worlds distinction leads him to completely isolate our 
																																																						
43 McCarty, “Motivation and Moral Choice,” 28. 
44 McCarty, “Motivation and Moral Choice,” 26. 
45Though I have not discussed them here, other well-cited accounts of weakness also fit into this 
intellectualist vs. affectivist framework. Consider those offered by Iain Morrisson and Robert N. Johnson. 
Both attempt to square the possibility of weakness with Allison’s Incorporation Thesis, though with 
differing results. Morrisson takes a more resolutely intellectualist route and argues that the weak-willed 
subject acts “somewhat rationally,” choosing to pursue principled ends that have been deemed simply or 
immediately good, but do not figure in the totality of ends that constitute her vision of happiness. Weak 
action thus constitutes a failing to the extent that it is short-sighted, but is nevertheless guided by 
principles. Cf. Iain Morrisson, "On Kantian Maxims: A reconciliation of the Incorporation Thesis and 
Weakness of the Will," History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (2005): 73-89. In contrast, Johnson offers an 
affectivist friendly interpretation that holds an atypically expansive understanding of maxims: on 
Johnson’s view, some maxims motivate without justifying, making room for the possibility of irrational 
action that intentionally and voluntarily pursues the bad. Cf. Robert N. Johnson, “Weakness 
Incorporated,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (1998): 349-367. 
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intelligible character from our empirical one, and conclude that the feeling of respect and all other 
incentives operate in a closed economy of psychological forces whose general thrust is indicative 
of our empirical character. This makes for a shockingly precarious view of virtue, even by Kant’s 
lights. As McCarty declares, “we have better moral characters, empirically, to the extent that we 
are susceptible to feeling greater moral pleasure and displeasure: to the extent, that is, that our 
recognition of how our contemplated action conforms to the moral law generates, through feeling, 
a stronger motive force.”46 Since McCarty is insistent that rational recognition is only contingently 
related to motive force, moral education and the cultivation of motivational virtue cannot be a 
predominantly cognitive process. It must, instead, involve training psychological responses so as 
to strengthen one’s ability to withstand temptation from inclination. Leaving aside the question of 
whether one wants to make room for the latter phenomenon within the Kantian picture, I would 
argue that it cannot stand as his model for virtue. Such a view cannot fit with Kant’s cognitivist 
commitments.47 Placing such a large gap between reason and sensibility, the affectivist is unable 
to articulate a properly Kantian account of moral life. 
 The intellectualist allows for a similarly fatal gap, but, unlike his counterpart, develops the 
account too much on the side of reason. Allison’s view is the paradigmatic example: he rejects the 
battle of forces model, and talks up the Incorporation Thesis so much that there appears no viable 
alternative but to deny the traditional conception of weakness. There is no room for immoral action 
to take place unless it has been at least partially incorporated into one’s maxim—as it is with the 
																																																						
46 Richard R. McCarty, Kant’s Theory of Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 182-3. 
47 Consider the following passage from MS 6:383-4: “But virtue is not to be defined and valued merely as 
an aptitude and…a long-standing habit of morally good actions acquired by practice. For unless this 
aptitude results from considered, firm, and continually purified principles, then, like any other mechanism 
of technically practical reason, it is neither armed for all situations nor adequately secured against the 
changes that new temptations could bring about.” As I argued in Chapter 4, I take passages like this one 
to require a much tighter relationship between reason and sensibility than McCarty makes room for. 
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latter grades of evil, impurity and depravity. So with Allison, too, we see reason and sensibility 
held at arm’s length from one another, this time with the consequence that reason completely 
overshadows sensibility and the contributions it makes to practical life.48 Andrews Reath, on the 
other hand, seems to recognize the impossibility of such an extreme intellectualist account of evil, 
and this creates some tension within his account. He accepts some version of the Incorporation 
Thesis, but insists that an intellectualist reading can accommodate more complex examples. He 
thinks weakness can be understood as either the result of a rationalizing process through which the 
agent departs from her characteristic commitments, or as a non-action that, as such, cannot be 
justified in any way. But both cases are difficult to square with the party line voiced by Allison 
and Reath. In the first, the rationalization is meant to serve as an alternative maxim, one that 
opposes the moral law. This seems too strong, however, since Reath is clear that the rationalization 
does not replace the agent’s more deeply rooted commitment to moral goodness. Moreover, since 
Reath, like Allison, rejects the battle of forces model, it is difficult to see how the second case is 
possible. Though he should ostensibly deny that it is sensibility, and not reason, which determines 
such weak behaviour, it is not clear what other recourse for explanation is available to him, 
especially given that reason and sensibility have been so cleanly separated in his account of 
motivation. If, as he would have it, our capacity for rational reflection and control is not being 
exercised—either well or badly—it would seem that the only other way to explain the subject’s 
behaviour is to appeal to the strength of her desire.  
																																																						
48Consider, for example, Kant’s reflections on affect and passion from the Anthropology: “To be subject 
to affects and passions is probably always an illness of the mind, because both affect and passion shut out 
the sovereignty of reason” (ApH 7:251); and “affect is surprise through sensation, by means of which the 
mind’s composure is suspended. Affect is therefore rash, that is, it quickly grows to a degree of feeling 
that makes reflection impossible (it is thoughtless)” (ApH 7:252). It is difficult to see how Allison could 
incorporate such phenomena into his view without somehow invoking self-deception and the 
incorporation thesis, suggesting that the affected subject does in fact act on a maxim. 
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6.3.2 Finding the Middle Path: Frailty and Affect 
 Given the failures of intellectualism, a question that emerges from this debate could be put 
as follows: can we account for the fragmented character of weakness without reverting to 
McCarty’s empiricist-inspired dualism? I argue that we can, but only if we adopt a more unified 
understanding of the relationship between reason and sensibility. Building on my conception of 
respect, I suggest we can formulate an account of evil that precludes the affectivist-style schism 
between recognition and motivational strength, while also making room for explanations that 
appeal to strong sensible desires—as opposed to maxims about sensible desire that diminish one’s 
moral commitment. My account of respect argues that we must reconsider the role that sensible 
desire plays in practical reasoning: insofar as we are moral agents, sensible desire possesses only 
a limited kind of efficacy. It is ultimately practical reason that moves us. So I hold, with the 
intellectualist, that to explain our action we must look to the activity of practical reason. But unlike 
the intellectualist, I do not claim that all action is the expression of a chosen maxim, while anything 
else is something less than an action. Because our practical activity is inherently directed towards 
the good, we can miss the mark, make exceptions, and be tripped up by momentary desires without 
having to concede that we are not really committed to the moral law, or downgrading what we do 
to mere behaviour. 
 Focusing on the nature of sensibly dependent reason, I argue that reason’s general function 
of cognizing the particular through the general suggests the fragmented nature of weakness is not 
caused by a schism between knowledge and motivation, but an incomplete sense of the 
determining relationship between universal laws and particular ends or circumstances. This, and 
not a dualistically framed sensible nature that stands in opposition to reason, is the sticking point 
in our practical lives. It is of course true that we represent the particular ends and circumstances 
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we are confronted with as having a kind of efficacy that pulls us in a certain direction. If this were 
not the case, we would not be talking about practical thinking. My point of departure from other 
interpreters, especially the affectivist, is the claim that it is not the efficacy, the pull, of such 
representations which presents difficulty so much as the task of properly organizing them in 
accordance with the conditions of practical cognition. That our sensible needs and desires often 
direct us away from what morality requires is an important part of the equation, but ultimately it 
is the difficulty of sensibly dependent synthetic reasoning that makes us fallible beings. As I claim 
in Chapter 4, we fail, not because countervailing desires are too strong, but because we lack the 
judgment required to determinate what we ought to do in the face of a constantly changing, 
incredibly varied world which makes demands on us. At this moment, it is helpful to recall Kant’s 
thought about virtue from the Metaphysics of Morals: if virtue does not result “from considered, 
firm, and continually purified principles, then, like any other mechanism of technically practical 
reason, it is neither armed for all situations nor adequately secured against the changes that new 
temptations could bring about” (MS 6:383-4). Given the variability of sense-dependent life, the 
only way to consistently act well is to cultivate the judgment required to effectively organize the 
desires that make up the material aspect of our practical reasoning. 
 There are a number of ways to flesh out cases of weakness or frailty using this general 
explanation for the possibility of evil. I thus agree with Reath that we should be open to many 
different sub-types of explanation for weak action. One of only examples of weakness we find in 
Kant’s texts suggests this as well: as I described it in Chapter 4, in the Lectures on Ethics, he takes 
up a case where someone insults another person at a gathering, and comes to regret it after 
reflecting on the incident at home later on (LE 27:295). This suggests a much more expansive 
interpretation of St. Paul’s quote, which Kant uses in the Religion: “What I would, that I do not!” 
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(R 6:29). Frail action does not just refer to the traditional case of knowing one is doing wrong, and 
doing it anyway despite the considerable pain of this recognition. Frailty includes any case where 
the subject acts against her established principles, in a way that she will regret once able to properly 
reflect on the matter. Under this description, I suggest there are three general types of cases, two 
of which Reath recognizes, and one which he does not—perhaps because of his intellectualist 
commitments. Reath describes both  i), rationalized weakness, where one consciously deliberates 
and makes an exception that permits self-interested action; and ii), alienating weakness, the 
traditional conception of weakness on which one realizes that one is acting badly while acting, and 
cannot endorse the action. I would also add, iii), impulsive weakness, where one acts without 
reflection and neither explicitly endorses nor disavows what is done. 
 To flesh these cases out, it is helpful to return to Kant’s remarks on affect from the 
Anthropology, which I discussed in Chapter 4. Recall his characterization of affect as “surprise 
through sensation, by means of which the mind’s composure is suspended. Affect is therefore rash, 
that is, it quickly grows to a degree of feeling that makes reflection impossible (it is thoughtless)” 
(APH 7:252). As I argued, affect does not describe the class of feelings capable of overpowering 
us through sheer force, it picks out those feelings that, owing in part to our natural disposition and 
in part to our rational ability, we have difficulty reflecting upon. Given this difficulty, our judgment 
is limited, and we are likely to act from weakness. Now this could happen in various ways. 
Consider the affect of anxiety, which Kant describes as “fear concerning an object that threatens 
an undetermined ill,” noting that it can even “fasten onto someone without his knowing a particular 
object for it: an uneasiness arising from merely subjective causes” (ApH 7:255). Understanding 
anxiety as an affect is helpful because Kant is clear that it does not simply arise through a direct 
causal reaction to an object one is in sensible contact with. It is the result of complex subjective 
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processes involving both reason and sensibility. This helps to forestall the thought that affects are 
particularly intense sensations that passively overtake the subject, perhaps expressing some 
unreflective aspect of her baser instincts or animal nature. Focusing on anxiety is also helpful 
because it is a complex feeling that informs our action in many different ways, which reflect the 
different types of weakness I want to identify.  
 For example, someone could abruptly leave a friend’s party due to social anxiety, failing 
to uphold a promise she had made to be there to support the host.49 Upon proper reflection, she 
will regret her action, and be pained by her failure to live up to her commitment. This appears to 
be a clear case of weak action. Now looking more closely at the situation, we can imagine a number 
of different ways she might leave. In a case of impulsive weakness, the socially anxious person 
simply goes without consciously reflecting on her reasons. Perhaps someone else is leaving and 
she jumps at her chance for a ride home, or she feels uncomfortable enough to just walk out and 
leave the party. In such moments, her conscious thought process is better captured with the thought 
“I have to get out of here,” than with any reasoning about whether she should go or stay.  
 In a case of rationalized weakness, the agent reasons that she really should leave: perhaps 
she has been neglecting her partner at home, and would like to get a good night’s sleep because 
she has work-related obligations to attend to the next day. She has been at the party long enough 
to fulfill her obligation to her friend, and it now makes sense to go home to spend time with her 
loved-one and then get an early night. She thus leaves in good conscience, though later reflection 
will show that she really let her friend down in response to a strong sense of anxiety, and not 
																																																						
49 One can of course imagine a bout of extreme anxiety that would serve as a perfectly acceptable reason 
for leaving, something that would qualify as extenuating circumstances. This is not the kind of case I am 
imagining here. 
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because of any of the other commitments that were weighing on her. This sort of case is arguably 
the most dangerous, as it exhibits the rationalization characteristic of more advanced forms of evil 
and is harder to expose for what it is—though, as a case of weakness, we should conclude such 
rationalization is carried out in good faith. 
  Finally, in a case of alienating weakness, the agent is fully aware that she is defaulting on 
a promise: she feels pained at letting her friend down, but cannot see a better way to deal with her 
anxiety. She must leave, and though she recognizes that she has failed in some way, she cannot 
work out how to remain at the party and be there for her friend given her anxious state. So although 
she disavows her leaving even as she does it, she can recognize no better course of action. 
 These examples help to fill out the general account developed in Chapter 4, suggesting that 
weakness in response to affect is determined in different ways, at different levels. Recall Kant’s 
non-mechanical characterization of affect: “generally speaking, it is not the intensity of a certain 
feeling that constitutes the affected state, but the lack of reflection in comparing this feeling with 
the sum of all feelings” (ApH 7:254). I take this description to fit all of the explanations given 
above. One could not reflect at all, reflect poorly in rationalizing, or have some but not enough 
reflective clarity. In any of these cases, one fails to arrive at a properly organized representation of 
one’s end that is determinate enough to motivate, and weak action is the result.  
 I take this interpretation of weakness to walk a middle path between the raw empiricism of 
an unqualified affectivist like McCarty, and the rationalistic caricature offered especially by 
Allison and to some extent by Reath. On my reading, we can account for the sometimes-disruptive 
presence of sudden and unexpected sensible desire without falling back on a mechanistic, battle of 
forces model of motivation. We can also show that reason is always the ultimate motivating factor 
in human action without having to accept an implausibly strong reading of the Incorporation 
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Thesis. The weak subject does not disclose her true, self-interested maxims in acting as she does. 
As I argued in Chapter 4, her activity is better described as an exception that downgrades the strict 
universality of the law instead of usurping it and installing a maxim of self-love in its place. This 
fits with Kant’s general view: as I pointed out earlier, inclinations are not incorporated into one’s 
practical principles as conditions for acting until the later stages of evil.50 Weakness is, instead, 
better described as the subject trying to do what she ought to in good faith, though she fails because 
of her unsharpened judgment. Though its true she exhibits a lack of self-control and winds up 
acting from self-love, such action does not constitute an unwavering expression of her character.51 
But it is also not on that account, as Reath would say, ‘less than an action.’ Even when she 
disavows her action as in what I have called ‘alienating weakness,’ she acts as she does because 
she cannot see a better way forward. Returning to our example, the agent knows, in a general sense, 
that she should remain at the party for her friend’s sake, but cannot see how to reach this end. 
Someone more prepared for the bout of social anxiety might think “I’ll go talk to so-and-so, they 
have a calming presence,” or “I should busy myself with making drinks so I don’t have to carry 
on a conversation.” Absent such thoughts, however, leaving presents itself as the thing to do—
painful though it may be. Though the agent cannot fully defend her action, it is freely chosen, the 
product of her current reflective circumstances, limited though they may be.  
 I take this understanding of evil, and weakness in particular, to go some way towards 
overturning the staunchly intellectualist representation of our actions as the product of 
																																																						
50 Cf., for example, his discussion of impurity and depravity at R 6:30. Recall also his discussion of 
passions from the Anthropology, where he declares that only passions, and not affects, presuppose 
maxims for acting, because the former contains “a constant principle with respect to its object” (APH 
7:266).  
51 As Kant says in his discussion of affect, “since he quickly regrets the episode afterward, it is only a 
paroxysm that we call thoughtlessness” (APH 7:253). 
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corresponding principles that have been consciously or unconsciously chosen. On such a view, 
immoral action results from immoral maxims that must reflect who we are at our core. Failing this, 
our actions would not be attributable as freely chosen. I do not think Kant’s view requires this 
model of willing to respect the idea—championed by the Incorporation Thesis—that free action is 
ultimately motivated by reason and not sensibility. The general form of practical reasoning secured 
through my account of respect, which holds that we must look to the activity of reason to explain 
the efficacy of our representations, is enough to meet this condition. Such a view facilitates a more 
nuanced understanding of evil because it affords us the opportunity to develop the sophisticated 
interdependence between reason and sensibility, making room for sensible disruption without 
conceding that such disruption implies one’s pursuit of the good has been voluntarily abandoned, 
or disarmed in the face of a stronger incentive.  
 
6.4 The Practical Postulates 
Finally, we can examine more closely how my reading of respect and Kant’s theory of 
motivation facilitates a new interpretation of the practical postulates. As I stated in Chapter 5, I 
take there to be two major conditions of adequacy for understanding how the ideas of freedom, 
immortality, and God function in Kant’s practical philosophy. First, Kant’s reader must be wary 
of accidentally turning the will’s formal determining ground into a merely material one. If belief 
in being rewarded by God in the afterlife becomes part of the subject’s grounds for acting, Kantian 
morality will no longer be autonomous in character. We must therefore avoid interpretations which 
understand this belief to be what explains the motivational boost that is enabled through the 
postulates. Second, Kant’s reader must avoid denying that non-believers would still possess the 
cognitive and motivational capacities required to be subject to the law. The failure to believe in 
	 231 
these subjectively necessary objects of practical reason does not thereby preclude the possibility 
of moral interest. Hence, we must be careful not to build so much into the postulates of moral faith 
that they become objectively necessary conditions on the possibility of moral action as such. In 
what follows, I suggest that a number of prominent views fail to meet these conditions. Once again, 
we can carve up the field according to the intellectualist/affectivist framework. As we will see, the 
affectivist fails to meet the first condition of adequacy, while the intellectualist is likely to run 
afoul of the second. Finally, I show how we can transcend these limitations by embracing the 
unified view of moral consciousness I developed in Chapters 3-5.  
 
6.4.1 Intellectualist and Affectivist Interpretations of the Practical Postulates 
 McCarty does not offer a developed view of the postulates, but the position Paul Guyer 
articulates in his book Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, serves as a helpful stand-in that 
walks the affectivist party line. Like McCarty, Guyer separates Kant’s account of motivation from 
his rationalist metaphysics, taking him to hold “a profoundly dualistic conception of human 
nature.”52 On Kant’s behalf, Guyer identifies our sensible dependence as grounds for concluding 
that a good account of motivation must cater to the independent nature of sensibility as determined 
by empirical psychology. Though we are subject to universal laws that hold for all rational beings, 
Guyer insists that Kant “never conceives of us as creatures who can act in accordance with these 
laws by means of our reason alone, without also recognizing our sensibility and inducing this 
sensibility to act in accordance with the demands of reason by means appropriate to sensibility.”53 
																																																						
52 Paul Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
365. 
53 Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 366. 
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On the basis of this general view of human nature, Guyer argues that “the entire doctrine of the 
postulates of practical reason is stated within the limits of human psychology.”54 So, on Guyer’s 
view, it is a conception of human nature that isolates sensibility from reason which explains Kant’s 
claim that belief in the theoretically transcendent ideas of freedom, immortality, and God are 
subjectively necessary. Because sensibility remains at least partially outside reason’s influence, 
we must appeal to beliefs that cater to merely subjective conditions on our sensibly determined 
motivation. We can thus believe that for which we have no evidence if it soothes our psychology 
on non-rational grounds and motivates us to act well. So on Guyer’s view, the practical postulates 
have no rational standing beyond the bare condition of being logically non-contradictory. 
Disconnected from our rational capacities, belief in these ideas “have no recommendation except 
that they are effective in motivating creatures like us to act in the way and toward the end that 
reason demands.”55 As I argued in Chapter 5, this general strategy flouts the first condition of 
adequacy insofar as it appeals to merely material incentives and thereby infringes upon the 
autonomy of pure practical reason. 
Opposing this view are those who shy away from an empirical-psychological reading and 
think Kant’s doctrine of the highest good and the practical postulates must be grounded in his 
conception of practical reason. Largely of the same mindset as those who would argue for the 
intellectualist conception of motivation, these commentators are concerned to distance themselves 
from any reading which understands the postulates as additional incentives which are designed to 
placate our sensibility and increase the chances of moral compliance. These interpretations thus 
																																																						
54 Guyer, Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 367. 
55 Guyer, Freedom Law and Happiness, 367. For another account along these lines, see Lara Denis, 
“Autonomy and the Highest Good,” Kantian Review 10 (2005): 33-59. Denis argues that we can conceive 
of belief in the postulates as akin to feelings of sympathy and benevolence that help us act morally when 
we might otherwise be reluctant to do so.	
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often take pains to show how belief in a deity could be rational independently of any hope for God-
given happiness. With this end, Andrews Reath makes a widely-cited argument for a non-
theological conception of the highest good, insisting that in ideal conditions humans could achieve 
the final end prescribed by the moral law without God’s intervention. Against those who would 
interpret the concept in terms of a morally proportioned happiness that appeals to our merely 
sensible nature, Reath places it squarely in the domain of reason, describing the highest good “as 
a construct of reason in its characteristic activity of introducing systematic unity into a body of 
given material—the material here being the ends that can be contained in or could result from 
moral conduct.”56 But though he argues for a secularized conception of the highest good, Reath 
still recognizes the extent to which the postulates are required to make sense of the concept for 
sensibly dependent reason. He concludes that its real possibility depends upon belief in God as the 
“moral author of the world, who ordered the laws of history so as to support progress towards this 
end in time.”57 So far, this interpretation does not differ much from my own, but Reath goes on to 
take a hard intellectualist turn, invoking an argument from pragmatism which suggests we need 
belief in God so that moral action does not appear irrational to us. The worry expressed here is not 
a general scepticism about the possibility of meeting both the objectively necessary end of 
morality, and the subjectively necessary end of happiness. Instead, Reath suggests that moral 
behaviour can itself start to look pointless insofar as others might take advantage of our good 
intentions, effectively reversing the intended end of moral action: “the problem which this poses 
for Kant is that, in many situations, it may become (or appear to become) irrational for individuals 
																																																						
56 Andrews Reath, “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 
26 (1988): 597. 
57 Reath, “Two Conceptions,” 602. 
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to act from what they recognize as their duty.”58 On the secular interpretation of the highest good 
that Reath endorses, this worry is abated—not through belief in God—but through collective 
human action and the establishment of social institutions whose aim is to cultivate circumstances 
that are conducive to moral conduct.59  
There are two points worth making in response to this view. First, as Kant describes it, the 
unfailing moral interest we take in the law does not seem compatible with this pragmatist form of 
doubt Reath articulates. Kant takes the best examples of moral conduct to highlight a display of 
virtue undertaken in spite of considerable disadvantage to oneself. As he says in the Groundwork, 
even the “most hardened scoundrel” responds to this good conduct—“even combined with great 
sacrifices of advantage and comfort”—by wishing he might also be so disposed to it (G 4:454). As 
I argued in Chapter 4, the scoundrel fails to exhibit this virtue, not because such action appears 
pointless or irrational to him, but because his judgment either fails to live up to his principles, or 
has been utterly corrupted through misuse. Perhaps he is unable to properly reflect in moments 
that call for self-sacrifice; or he is unpracticed in vigilantly distinguishing incentives of self-love 
from those of happiness. Regardless, it is key to the preservation of moral agency that his interest 
in the law remains, and good action never appears pointless. Insofar as it is formally determined, 
good willing cannot be invalidated by its material consequences, and the freedom it discloses to 
the practical subject is always an object of respect. 
Second, even if we accept this picture of apparently ‘irrational’ moral action, Reath’s 
account cannot succeed. While his suggestion that we work towards the harmony of our formal 
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59 Reath, “Two Conceptions,” 619. Given this conclusion, it appears as though Reath’s earlier claim that 
we still need belief in God merely pays lip service to Kant’s insistence that it be included as one of the 
practical postulates.  
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and material ends through social institutions is no doubt an important aspect of realizing the highest 
good, such action does not seem well-poised to address practical reason’s Antinomy as it is 
presented in the Critique of Practical Reason, the Critique of Judgment, and as I developed it in 
Chapter 5. Reath takes his secular conception of the highest good to be preferable to the theological 
conception, on which the harmony of our two necessary ends is resolved by God, but it’s not clear 
how the activity of sense-dependent human reason can work towards the resolution of a problem 
that is supposed to be irresolvable for it given its very nature. As I argued in Chapter 5, belief in 
the postulates is required because we rely on two heterogeneous sets of laws—those of morality 
and those of happiness—that cannot be synthetically connected, regardless of how well we act or 
how lucky we are. Even the most virtuous human society could not succeed in establishing a 
necessary causal connection between laws of reason and laws of nature, and this is the sticking 
point that ushers in theoretically motivated doubt that must be countered by moral faith. However 
desirable some commentators might find the possibility, a secular resolution to the Antionmy of 
practical reason is not possible. Human action cannot be the answer, for the sought-after resolution 
cannot be stated within the very limits that need to be transcended.   
Allen Wood presents a different, potentially more successful intellectualist argument for 
the postulates in Kant’s Moral Religion. Wood seizes on one of Kant’s remarks from his Lectures 
on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, where he claims that the argument for moral faith is an 
“absurdum practicum,” such that “if I deny this or that I would have to be a scoundrel” (LR 
28:1083). Picking up on the close analogy to a theoretical absurdum logicum Kant draws in the 
lecture, Wood suggests we read Kant as suggesting that we implicitly commit ourselves to certain 
practical beliefs in aiming at the highest good: 
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“assume that I deny either the existence of God or of a future life. Now if I deny 
either of these, then I cannot conceive the highest good to be possible of attainment. 
If I deny that I can conceive the highest good to be possible of attainment, then I 
presuppose or imply that I will not pursue the highest good, or commit myself not 
to pursue it.”60 
 
Wood’s intellectualist reading of the postulates thus proceeds on the basis of a tight analogy with 
theoretical reason. He assumes that the postulates are necessary objects of belief because of their 
logical connection to the highest good and the structure of sense-dependent rational action.  
 Though I am of course sympathetic to the idea of an informative analogy between the two 
uses of reason, I would argue that Wood’s interpretation fails to heed this analogy’s limits. Given 
that the essential difference between theoretical and practical reason is that the former determines 
an already existing object, while the latter brings the object it determines into existence, I contend 
that a practical absurdity differs from a logical one because it concerns the efficacy of 
representations—their ability to move the subject to act, to produce its object—rather than their 
logical standing. So, we do not distinguish between theoretical and practical absurdities because 
the former concerns logical relations pertaining to the domain of facts, while the latter concerns 
logical relations pertaining to the domain of actions. Practical absurdity is instead bound up with 
the objectively necessary interests of practical thinking, and the extent to which they can be 
contradicted. The faithless person who denies the existence of God is possessed of an unfailing 
interest in the moral law through her consciousness of the fact of reason. This interest makes 
manifest her personality, her predisposition to the good. But, because of her faithlessness, her 
conviction in this same law falters and she would also “have to be a scoundrel” (LR 28:1083), 
manifesting her propensity to evil. This contradiction does not occur at the level of propositions, 
																																																						
60 Allen Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 29. 
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as in the logical contradiction between “the highest good is possible,” and “the highest good is not 
possible.” This is Wood’s suggestion, which makes it hard to see why this is a specifically practical 
contradiction and not just a logical contradiction about practical matters. Instead, the practical 
absurdity occurs insofar as one is both motivated and not motivated to act in accordance with the 
moral law. Though Kant is more likely to describe this absurdity in terms of the moral disposition 
suffering, even this thought echoes the structure of practical contradiction just articulated. 
Consider the following passage from the third Critique, which says of the faithless Spinoza, 
“if he would remain attached to the appeal of his moral inner vocation and not 
weaken the respect, by which the moral law immediately influences him to 
obedience, by the nullity of the only idealistic final end that is adequate to its high 
demand (which cannot occur without damage to the moral disposition), then he 
must assume the existence of a moral author of the world” (KU 5:452-3).   
 
This passage articulates the dilemma in practical terms that concern the subject’s ability to be 
motivated by the law. Wood, on the other hand, expresses it in logical terms. Consider his thoughts 
on the faithless subject who pursues moral ends without believing in the possibility of the highest 
good: “in this case I will have to admit that I am acting ‘irrationally’ and that according to my own 
beliefs I should (in a logical, but not a moral sense of ‘should’) give up my pursuit of the highest 
good and my obedience to the moral law, and become a Bösewicht [scoundrel].”61 As I argued 
above, the subject cannot come to see moral action as pointless or irrational. But, perhaps more 
worryingly, this interpretation also runs afoul of the first condition of adequacy on interpreting the 
postulates that I laid out above. By articulating a tight logical connection between the moral law, 
the highest good, and the practical postulates, Wood suggests there is an objectively necessary 
connection between recognizing the force of the moral law and believing in the postulates. As I 
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argued above, this claim is much too strong. The ideas of freedom, immortality, and God constitute 
only subjectively necessary objects of belief. One can recognize the force of the moral law and 
worry about the real possibility of the highest good without logical contradiction. Insofar as we do 
not have theoretically based proof of the latter’s objective reality, nothing irrational is taking place. 
This possibility is, in fact, the source of the distinctively practical absurdity that I propose is at the 
heart of Kant’s account of practical reason’s Antinomy. Because of this natural conflict of reason, 
its practical use must venture into the intelligible realm on the strength of its objectively necessary 
law.  
 
6.4.2 The Unified Account of Motivation 
 The shortcomings associated with the accounts surveyed above lead nicely to the reading 
of the practical postulates I developed in Chapter 5. As we saw, those with affectivist leanings 
treat the postulates as representations whose only purpose is to soothe human psychology. They 
thus interpret Kant’s claim that the postulates are subjectively necessary beliefs as an argument 
that their purpose is sub-rational: the postulates motivate by speaking to our sensible desires, not 
our rationally determined ends. In contrast, intellectualists like Reath and Wood connect the 
postulates too closely with reason’s activity. On Wood’s view, our moral ends rationally commit 
us to an additional set of beliefs that we give up on pain of theoretical irrationality; on Reath’s, we 
need these beliefs to keep moral action itself from looking irrational and pointless. As I argued in 
connection with Wood’s view, both the distinctly practical absurdity Kant connects with practical 
reason’s Antinomy, and its resolution, must be expressed in motivational terms. But, lest we swing 
back towards the affectivist view, the source of this motivation cannot be our desire for happiness. 
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What is required, then, is an account of the postulates that conceives of their purpose in 
practical/motivational terms without appealing to merely material incentives.   
 The view I present in Chapter 5 does exactly this, by drawing on the third major 
commitment of sense-dependent rationalism articulated at the outset of the present chapter: 
namely, that the cognitive content of a representation and its ability to motivate us cannot be 
understood as separable from one another. To the extent that we can show the postulates to add 
cognitive determinacy to our representation of the highest good, they also serve to motivate us. 
More specifically, the postulates show how the highest good can be possible by showing how the 
limits of sense-dependent theoretical reason can be transcended. Through the ideas of freedom, 
immortality, and God, we determine key conditions on the highest good’s real possibility through 
the unschematized categories of causality, substance, and community. Through freedom, we think 
the kind of causality capable of acting from the moral law; through immortality, we think the kind 
of being capable of realizing the completely moral disposition commanded by the highest good; 
and through community, we think the coordination of ends required for the attainment of both 
virtue and happiness. By sharpening our representation of the real possibility of the highest good, 
these concepts serve to protect the moral disposition that would otherwise falter, clashing with a 
theoretically motivated scepticism based in speculative reason’s limitations. The practical 
postulates therefore motivate without appealing to material incentives of happiness. 
 My account of the postulates thus secures the unified view of practical reason I have been 
working towards. I began this project by arguing that the feeling of respect is key to securing the 
formal unity of sense-dependent reason. Through respect, the form of sensibility, the characteristic 
efficacy that practical representations have for rational beings—whose actions must always be 
explained through an appeal to reason and not merely affect—was accounted for. This interpretive 
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gain enabled a reading of practical reason’s natural dialectic which suggests that it is neither the 
overwhelming power of sensible desire, nor a diabolical reason interested in pursuing non-moral 
action for its own sake, which grounds our moral failures. It is, instead, the cognitive determinacy 
of our practical representations that explains how we are motivated to act. We find especially good 
confirmation of this reading in trying to make sense of the ideas of freedom, immortality, and God 
in relation to the practical system. For given the fundamental interpretive constraints guiding 
Kant’s reader, she can only do justice to the practical postulates through a unified account of 
motivation, one which understands the cognitive content of a practical representation to be 
inseparable from its ability to motivate.  
 Developing Kant’s account of practical reason’s antinomy also helps to drive home just 
how radical Kant’s conception of practical reason really is. The practical realm does not merely 
pick out those principles and cognitions that pertain to action, it marks the kind of rational 
representation that is productive of itself. Thus, although a suitably specified analogy between 
reason’s two uses is appropriate, its limits dictate that we cannot conceive of practical reason’s 
antinomy in theoretical or logical terms. We must instead honor the idea that sense-dependent 
practical reason’s unique dialectic emerges through its inability to grasp and thereby be motivated 
by a conception of the complete systematic unity of its ends. I take the sense-dependent rationalism 
I have articulated here to be capable of doing this, and so too of securing Kant’s unifying vision 
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